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This dissertation addresses three research questions about democratic 
deconsolidation in Central and Eastern Europe after EU accession: what are the 
conditions under which it occurred? What intervening, case-specific processes 
explain deconsolidation? And what was the nature of the EU’s domestic impact 
relating to this phenomenon? To operationalize deconsolidation, I use the 
democratic embeddedness model proposed by Wolfgang Merkel in 2004. It 
states that consolidated democracies feature two dimensions of embeddedness. 
Internally, five interconnected elements ensure democracy’s proper functioning: 
elections, civil rights, political rights of participation, horizontal accountability 
and the guarantee that elected officials have the effective power to govern. 
Externally, three conditions protect democracy against destabilizing factors: a 
favorable socio-economic context, active civil society and a high degree of 
international integration. Using the embeddedness model in combination with a 
set-theoretic multimethod approach, I examine the conditions responsible for 
facilitating deconsolidation in Central and Eastern Europe.  
The study presents three main findings. Firstly, at a regional level, there 
are two alternative, non-exclusive combinations of conditions for 
deconsolidation: a deteriorating socio-economic context, and a sequential 
combination of declining economy, rising populism and increased bargaining 
power in relation to the EU. Secondly, examining the processes behind 
deconsolidation in two cases, Hungary and Romania, shows that domestic 
factors provide a more coherent explanation than the EU’s failure to address 
democratic backsliding effectively. In Hungary, it is populism in power coupled 
with a constitutional reform that constrained democratic institutions. In 
Romania, deconsolidation occurred because of a dysfunctional system of checks 
and balances and low government capabilities. Thirdly, the EU’s capacity to 
implement formal sanctions is decisive in whether its interventions against 
deconsolidation are effective. The EU’s impact was more limited in Hungary, 
while in Romania, it was more efficient in keeping deconsolidation in check due 
to dedicated instruments focusing on fighting corruption and preserving the rule 
of law. Overall, the EU as a guarantor of democracy is not yet vulnerable, but it 
is at risk, as has become evident more recently.  
Finally, this dissertation proposes two topics for future research. The first 
deals with examining the EU’s relationship with its member states through the 
lens of democratic credibility, rather than that of legal compliance, which has 
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thus far produced a limited understanding of post-accession democratic 
promotion. The second is based on the European Commission’s recent proposal 
to apply budgetary sanctions in response to rule of law violations from member 
states. Although still in its preparatory stage, this proposal will introduce formal, 
targeted sanctions with implications for democracy. Its process of adoption and 

























The roots of democratic deconsolidation in 
Central and Eastern Europe 
 
1.1. The research problem 
 
Examining a volatile process while its effects are in full swing can be frustrating. 
I began work on this dissertation at a time when there was already mounting 
evidence that Central and East European democracies were entering a period of 
decline, and found, early on, that much of my research would run parallel to this 
trend. The response from theorists, moving along similar lines, has been mixed. 
The transition paradigm of the 1990s, resting on the assumption that a country 
moving away from dictatorship is moving towards democracy in a sequential 
manner (Carothers, 2002) is no longer tenable when measured against empirical 
evidence. However, the idea that this progression of liberalization - regime 
change - transition - habituation may be reversible is not new. As early as the 
1980s O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead were writing on the sequential 
collapse of bureaucratic-authoritarian rule, emphasizing that the process should 
be viewed as neither inevitable, nor irreversible (O’Donnell, Schmitter and 
Whitehead, 1986, p. 92). And indeed it seems that, three decades later, we are 
starting to see the signs of such a reversal.  
Over the last fifteen years, the tone of the public discourse around 
democracy has turned from optimistic, to reserved, to bleak. Speaking in turns 
of stagnation, backsliding or decline, the debate has shifted towards a 
deconsolidation paradigm in the 2010s (Ágh, 2016). But while the media and 
expert reports continue to paint a depressing picture of democracy under 
assault, political scientists have been asking a more cautious question: are we 
dealing with a crisis of democracy, or the symptoms of one? 
With this dissertation, I offer my own contribution to the debate by 
examining the conditions and processes behind democratic deconsolidation in 
Central and Eastern Europe since the European Union’s eastern enlargement. 
The twofold goal is to test how well a theoretical model put forward in the early 
2000s – democratic embeddedness – is able to explain deconsolidation; and to 
examine the EU’s post-accession effectiveness in preserving democratic norms 
4 
 
at the domestic level. The analysis looks at the decade between 2005 and 2014, 
which corresponds to the deconsolidation paradigm shift, although, due to the 
timing of the study, it does not address the most recent, and increasingly 
concerning developments in the region. Instead, the broader problem I am 
interested in pursuing is whether empirical evidence from this period reflects 
what we know now: that democracy here is undergoing a process of 
deconsolidation which has the potential to generate a crisis. In other words, to 
what extent are we able to find the roots of this outcome, knowing as we do, 
that it has indeed occurred in the long run? Central and Eastern Europe is not a 
deviant case in the deconsolidation paradigm. Some of the factors that have 
been eroding these comparatively new democracies, such as dwindling public 
trust in democratic institutions and the rise of populism, are present in 
established Western democracies as well. What differentiates Central and 
Eastern European democracies from their Western counterparts, in addition to 
their age, is their degree of consolidation at the point where the reverse process 
began. If older, established democracies are not immediately at risk, as many 
political scientists suggest, what then are the effects of deconsolidation on 
younger and more vulnerable ones? Central and Eastern Europe provides a good 
ground for exploring this question. 
It is, of course, unrealistic to expect to find a comprehensive explanation 
that pertains to all countries in the region, especially during a decade-long 
period. Deconsolidation is not a quick process, despite what cases such as 
Hungary and Poland may suggest. Nor are many of its mechanisms directly 
obvious, regardless of the wealth of empirical evidence and theoretical 
explanations put forward in the last two decades. A coherent formula for 
deconsolidation implies both parsimony and the understanding that some cases 
deviate from the explanation, resulting in a trade-off between complexity and 
coverage. Relatedly, explaining this outcome cannot be restricted to a single 
condition or process. A realistic examination must thus make room for multiple, 
possibly co-existing, explanations. 
This chapter, which introduces the concept of democratic 
deconsolidation, is divided into two parts. The first provides an overview of the 
context in which deconsolidation occurred in Central and Eastern Europe, and 
how theoretical stances evolved to reflect it. Here, I briefly present relevant 
theoretical gaps that emerged in literature since the early and mid-2000s, and 
discuss how I approach them in my research. These are further expanded in 
Chapter 2, where the democratic embeddedness model is examined at length. 
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The second part of this chapter presents three research questions concerning 
the conditions and mechanisms of deconsolidation, along with the contributions 
my dissertation hopes to make to this timely topic. 
 
1.1.1. Navigating the deconsolidation paradigm 
 
The fifteen years following the EU’s eastern enlargement have been at odds with 
the prior confident expectations concerning the state of democracy. While 
scholarship widely recognizes that most Central and Eastern European countries 
(hereafter CEE countries) joined the EU as consolidated democracies, it appears 
that old assumptions no longer hold up against new evidence. To aid the 
understanding of how theoretical stances moved away from a narrative of 
democratic success towards one of deconsolidation, I suggest dividing recent 
literature on CEE democracies into three distinct groups. Pre-accession studies 
(up to 2004) tend to focus on the role of EU conditionality as a catalyst for 
democratic consolidation, and set many of the expectations for the performance 
of then-candidate countries, which were later contradicted in the long term. 
Early post-accession literature (2004-2010) examines the new member-states’ 
capacity to comply with EU norms, compared to old member-states, and signals 
a few initial causes for concern, although much of the positive tone carries over 
from previous studies. On the other hand, late post-accession research (after 
2010) marks a negative turn towards notions of decline and crisis.  
Most optimistic views on the state of post-accession democracy in CEE 
originate in the early post-accession literature. Prior to the EU’s eastern 
enlargement, the focus on political conditionality recognized the process as a 
strong driving force behind democratic consolidation in the region. The external 
incentives model proposed by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2008) explains 
how national governments were motivated in their rule adoption efforts by a 
‘carrot and stick’ system, where accession was facilitated by concrete assistance 
from EU programs for economic restructuring, such as PHARE and SAPARD. 
Conversely, the prospect of delaying accession, as was the case in practice with 
Romania and Bulgaria, was used in response to candidates’ failure to implement 
the Acquis Communautaire in a timely manner. Scholars of both democracy and 
European integration writing in the early and mid-2000s largely agree on the 
latter’s positive effect on the former, which is evident in the fact that most of the 
countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 did so as consolidated 
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democracies  (Eckiert et al., 2007; Pop-Eleches, 2007; Merkel, 2004; Vachudova, 
2005) and that the delay imposed upon Romania and Bulgaria corresponded with 
a continuing period of improvement in the countries’ quality of democracy (The 
Democracy Barometer, 2016). The transformative power of accession also 
boosted the economy and reduced populist tendencies initially (Zielonka, 2007), 
and generated a shift towards the liberal and green parties on the CEE political 
scene (Vachudova, 2009; Toshkov, 2008).  
Literature is not, however, universally hopeful. While consolidation 
through accession was at first hailed as a success story, it also created a few 
vulnerabilities that were the object of research on the new member-states’ 
performance. Several years before negotiations were finalized, Grabbe (2001) 
cautioned that the rational mechanism of rule adoption that governed accession 
also generated institutional imbalances that weakened national parliaments. 
Noting that the EU’s role in shaping policy processes and institutional relations 
in CEE far exceeded its influence in old member states, Grabbe suggested that 
the EU may have exported its own democratic deficit in these relatively young 
democracies. Through conditionality, efficacy was prioritized over legitimacy, 
favoring strong executives able to manage the accession process quickly and 
effectively. This, in turn, affected the quality of participation and representation, 
to which a European layer was now added. At the same time, citizens were left 
feeling detached from the democratic process due to the absence of a genuine 
European demos (Zielonka, 2007; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015). Evidence is also mixed 
concerning the post-accession role of political conditionality. During accession, 
strong pressure from the EU bolstered reforms that drew a clear boundary 
between CEE candidates and other former communist countries in Eastern 
Europe, where the promise of membership was not formally in place (Gherghina, 
2009). Initially, compliance with EU norms continued successfully in the new 
member-states (Sedelmeier, 2008), but once the incentive of joining 
disappeared, and conditionality replaced by a more diffuse external pressure, a 
slowing down of reforms occurred (Pridham, 2008; Levitz and Pop-Elecheș, 2010) 
 
1.1.2. The deconsolidation paradigm in brief 
 
In a classic observation on democratic transition, Linz and Stepan (1996) noted 
that consolidation is achieved when democracy becomes ‘the only game in 
town’. But what happens when the term ‘democracy’ starts needing qualifiers? 
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The transition from 1990s optimism towards the rejection of consolidation in the 
2010s has also introduced a variety of concepts that led to the expansion of the 
semantic field of democratic theory. But, much like the reversibility of transition, 
the idea of ‘democracy with adjectives’ is not new. Two decades ago, Collier and 
Levitsky (1997) warned about the risk of stretching the conceptual borders of 
democracy beyond logical extremes in order to make room for observed cases 
that would not qualify as democracies under a more rigorous definition. The 
deconsolidation paradigm faces a similar problem of trade-off between 
conceptual clarity and empirical coverage.  
Democratic backsliding is one such concept, widely used but vaguely 
defined in literature. Bermeo (2016) proposes to define it as the ‘state-led 
debilitation or elimination of any of the political institutions that sustain an 
existing democracy’ (p. 5). This can manifest either in a radical form, leading to 
democratic breakdown, or a more gradual change across a limited number of 
institutions, producing hybrid regimes. Similarly, Waldner and Lust (2018) 
conceive of backsliding as a discontinuous ‘deterioration of qualities associated 
with democratic governance in any regime’ (p. 95): elections may become less 
competitive, participation more restricted and accountability more diminished, 
but there is no danger of democratic norms being completely - or rapidly - 
suspended.  
The dispute over the nature of democratic backsliding reflects the 
widespread disagreement on what the process opposite democratization should 
be called, and what forms it can take (Cassani and Tomini, 2018). The public 
discourse on democracy has veered into anxieties about crisis, under the impact 
of Donald Trump’s electoral victory, Brexit, and the threat of terrorism (Norris, 
2017), but political scientists have been more reserved, and literature is largely 
in line with the idea that a reverse Third Wave (per Huntington, 1991, p. 15: ‘a 
group of transitions [...] that occur within a specified period of time and that 
significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction’) is not underway. 
In 2015, a Journal of Democracy special issue asked, ‘Is democracy in decline?’ 
Most responses recognized the risks, but kept a cautious tone: democracy in the 
world is characterized by net stability, with young democracies proving 
surprisingly robust (Levitsky and Way, 2015); democracy is either stagnating, 
against high expectations bolstered by the early successes of the 1990s, or 
experiencing decline in an incipient form (Diamond, 2015); the legitimacy of 
established democracies is called into question not as a mode of government, 
but due to their poor economic performance, coupled with the shifting 
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geopolitical balance between democracy and autocracy (Plattner, 2015); 
democracy may be in crisis, but it is not at risk of collapse (Schmitter, 2015). In 
short, there is a risk of deconsolidation, but not of democratic breakdown.  
On the other hand, the radical form of democratic backsliding translates 
into diminished checks on executive powers, restriction on judiciary 
independence, media and civil society by the state, and human rights abuses 
(Norris, 2017). These trends are not yet common in Western democracies but 
are growing in CEE countries, with significant decline occurring in the areas of 
national democratic government, media independence and judicial frameworks 
(Sibinescu and Teramae, 2016). As Table 1.1. shows, half the countries in the 
region experienced a decline in democratic quality across the board since 2005 
(marked as ‘-‘), while only Czech Republic and the Baltic states managed to 
maintain positive or stable trends (marked as ‘+’/’0’).  
 
Table 1.1. Changes in the quality of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, 
2005-2014 
COUNTRY FH BTI EIU DB 1 
Bulgaria - - - - 
Czech Republic + + - + 
Estonia 0 + + + 
Hungary - - - - 
Latvia + + 0 + 
Lithuania + + + + 
Poland - - - + 
Romania - - - - 
Slovakia - - - - 
Slovenia - - - - 
Source: Sibinescu and Teramae (2016) 
 
Thus, while scholars such as Bermeo (2016) have attempted to define backsliding 
in both moderate and radical forms, I suggest that a clearer conceptual boundary 
needs to be established before proceeding with this study. Subscribing to the 
more cautious view that we are facing the risk of a democratic crisis, but not yet 
an outright crisis, I opt for using deconsolidation to denote the slower process, 
                                               
1 Note: FH: Freedom House - Nations in Transit (2005-2014); BTI: Bertelsmann 
Transformation Index (2006-2014); EIU: Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index 




which is less likely to produce a crisis in the short run, and take Norris’ (2017) 
meaning of backsliding to represent the more radical process. Deconsolidation, 
then, can be interpreted as public disenchantment with democracy and the 
erosion of legitimacy among its institutions, coupled with the destabilizing of 
democratic party systems and rising support for other forms of government. (Foa 
and Mounk, 2016, 2017; Howe, 2017). These trends, which have been growing 
in CEE, are also found in more incipient forms in Western democracies, where 
the appeal of far-right populist parties and charismatic leaders has been on the 
rise in recent years. 
Deconsolidation is a particularly worrying problem in CEE for three 
reasons. Firstly, Poland and Hungary contradict the long-standing 
democratization success narrative with the worrying erosion of democratic 
norms and the rise to power of right-wing populism. Secondly, Romania and 
Bulgaria continue to maintain their position as laggards of democratic 
consolidation a decade after joining the EU. And relatedly, the situation in the 
region calls into question the efficacy of the EU as a democratizing actor.  
Two further aspects should be considered when addressing the 
consequences of the EU’s domestic impact in CEE. Firstly, post-accession 
operationalization is tricky. The external incentives model helps identify relevant 
factors based on the benefits and sanctions associated with the accession 
process However, once membership status was attained and conditionality 
removed from the picture, operationalizing the impact of the EU became much 
more difficult. Sedelmeier (2008) suggests that this dilemma could be 
approached in terms of post-accession rule compliance, which remained 
positive. He uses two variables, transposition and infringement, to assess the 
levels of rule compliance in the new member states, compared to the old ones. 
But this poses a problem of data reliability, in that these variables measure 
formal rule implementation and account only for infringement cases that have 
been detected and acted upon by the European Commission. Giusti (2007) 
suggests turning instead to a kind of residual conditionality associated with 
accession to the Economic and Monetary Union. As with political conditionality 
though, the fact that it would no longer be reliable past a certain point renders 
this variable unusable in the long-run. A second related problem deals with a 
recurring dilemma in literature: is the EU damaging or protecting CEE 
democracies? This question appears in several of the early post-accession studies 
discussed above (most notably: Grabbe, 2005; Zielonka, 2007; Dimitrova and 
Pridham, 2004), where it is once again addressed in the context of conditionality. 
The authors conclude that the accession process has indeed had some negative, 
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but limited effects, mainly by creating institutional imbalances that could 
exacerbate over longer periods of time. 
However, there is currently no systematic effort to determine the nature 
and strength of the EU’s post-accession impact in the region based on empirical 
evidence. CEE is a good testing ground for the claim that the EU’s strategy of 
linking consolidation to accession has failed in the long-run. The EU’s role must 
also be integrated with domestic conditions when seeking a comprehensive 
explanation for deconsolidation. The democratic embeddedness model, 
proposed by Wolfgang Merkel in 2004, provides a promising theoretical 
framework for such an integration, by singling out conditions that protect or 
weaken democracy against external destabilizing elements.  
 
1.2. Dissertation road map 
 
1.2.1. Research questions 
 
To wrap-up the previous points, this dissertation follows three objectives, with 
corresponding research questions. The first of these concerns the viability of the 
embeddedness model when tested against recent evidence of deconsolidation. 
The model, whose theoretical foundation and components are described in 
Chapter 2, belongs to the early post-accession literature, where a few concerns 
about the long-term performance of CEE democracies had made their way into 
the debate. The model, however, was not specifically designed with these 
countries in mind, and can be used as an analytical framework to examine both 
consolidated and flawed democracies. It does not describe precise causes of 
decline, but focuses instead on the conditions that weaken or enhance their 
effect. Furthermore, embeddedness only stipulates what these conditions are, 
but makes no statements about how they interact with one another. So, while 
the model has wide applicability, interactions vary across different clusters of 
cases, and are particularly valuable for understanding the mechanisms of 
deconsolidation in young democracies. Thus, the first research question my 
study addresses is: What were the conditions of post-accession deconsolidation 
in CEE, and how did they interact with one another? 
The second, related objective of this study is to understand the 
processes that link these conditions to deconsolidation. As Table 1.1 shows, a 
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decrease in the quality of democracy is prevalent, but has not occurred 
everywhere in the region. This is even more evident when breaking down the 
2005-2014 decade into smaller intervals, when some countries experiencing 
overall deconsolidation saw short instances of improvement. The mechanisms 
that connect conditions to outcome are thus case-specific and best suited for an 
in-depth analysis of individual countries or time periods. The research question 
corresponding to this objective is: What processes explain deconsolidation in 
individual CEE countries? Case selection for this question is explained in Chapters 
4 and 5.  
Table 1.2. Research questions 
OBJECTIVE RESEARCH QUESTION CHAPTER 
Testing the democratic 
embeddedness model 
RQ1: What were the 
conditions of post-accession 
democratic deconsolidation in 
CEE? How do these conditions 
interact with eachother? 
 
Chapters 2-4, 6 
Linking the conditions of 
deconsolidation to the 
outcome 
RQ2: What processes explain 
deconsolidation in individual 
CEE countries? 
 
Chapters 3, 5, 6 
Examining the assumption 
that the EU’s domestic 
impact in terms of 
preserving democracy has 
been either weak or 
negative 
RQ3: What was the nature of 
the EU’s post-accession 
domestic impact, and how 
does it relate to 
deconsolidation 
Chapters 2-5, 6 
 
Finally, the third objective deals with the early post-accession assumption that 
the EU’s domestic role in preserving democracy is significantly weaker in the 
post-accession period, compared to the pre-2004 period, when conditionality 
was in place. This is an intriguing question, considering the EU did not explicitly 
position itself as a democratizing actor during accession. Similarly, conditionality 
had not been designed as an instrument for promoting democracy, but rather as 
means of achieving economic, institutional and legislative alignment between 
CEE countries and the EU. On the other hand, a consolidated democracy was one 
of the pre-conditions of membership (The European Council, 1993). This 
disconnection between objectives and supporting mechanisms means that, in 
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terms of the EU’s input, democratic consolidation was a byproduct of accession. 
The retirement of conditionality opened up concerns about the nature and 
viability of new instruments the EU may use to prevent backsliding. Evidence so 
far suggests that, much like conditionality, they have been ad-hoc, rather than 
specifically designed for the purpose. With the recurring exception of Romania 
and Bulgaria, for which the EU instituted the Cooperation and Verification 
Mechanism to monitor the rule of law and judicial independence, efforts to 
address deconsolidation in Hungary or Poland have been both inconsistent and 
largely ineffective. Thus, the third research question examined in this 
dissertation is: what is the nature of the EU’s post-accession domestic impact, 
and how does it relate to deconsolidation? Table 1.2 summarizes the three 




The main ambition of this dissertation is theory testing. There is a strong link 
between the objectives outlined above when they are viewed through the 
framework of democratic embeddedness. Although it provides a valuable way of 
framing deconsolidation, the model has thus far seen limited empirical use2, 
which tends to focus on internal political and institutional flaws as a source of 
instability, rather than addressing the claim that a variety of other conditions, 
both domestic and pertaining to international integration, are responsible for 
preventing or facilitating deconsolidation. In examining how the model holds up 
against empirical evidence, preliminary information about the EU’s role and how 
it interacts with other conditions, is derived.  
Relatedly, a second contribution of this dissertation is the 
operationalization of the EU’s role as a component of embeddedness. As I 
explain in Chapter 2, the CEE-EU relationship is more balanced in the context of 
membership, compared to the pre-accession period, when the ‘carrot and stick’ 
approach was in place. As members, CEE countries are able to exert direct 
influence on European institutions and policies, balancing out the old, 
predominantly one-way relationship. Thus, any meaningful operationalization 
should take these changes into account. Operating under the assumptions that 
(1) deconsolidation is largely driven by domestic factors; and (2) the EU’s goal is 
                                               




to preserve democracy as one of its core values, operationalization should be 
able to integrate two opposing forces. 
Finally, this study also hopes to make a methodological contribution by 
taking a set-theoretic multimethod approach to the embeddedness model. This 
research design is particularly valuable for its ability to reveal not only how 
conditions interact, but also whether they are necessary or sufficient for 
explaining deconsolidation. In addition to the analysis proper, in Chapters 3 and 
4 I describe a way to translate the model from natural language into set-theoretic 
terms. This enhances the usability of the embeddedness model in empirical 































Deconsolidation, democratic embeddedness 
and the EU’s domestic impact 
 
The deconsolidation paradigm in Central and Eastern Europe is anchored in 
compelling empirical evidence, but its theoretical evolution is equally important 
for understanding why democracy has failed to live up to the optimistic 
expectations of the 1990s. As a concept, deconsolidation may be clear on the 
surface - a gradual deterioration of established democracies - but in practice, it 
is difficult to operationalize for a simple reason: political scientists rarely agree 
on what democracy is. Most attempts to tackle deconsolidation so far have used 
the quality of democracy (hereafter QOD) as an instrument for empirical analysis. 
But QOD too is built around the concept of democracy and, in consequence, on 
its long history of theoretical contestation. Thus, in order to make sense of 
deconsolidation, it is necessary to draw the road map backwards by first outlining 
the meanings of democracy, then focus on QOD and the defects of young 
democracies, and finally arrive at the current understanding of deconsolidation. 
This chapter establishes the dissertation’s theoretical basis. In it, I begin 
addressing two of the research questions posed in the introduction from a 
conceptual point of view:  
 
RQ1: What are the conditions of post-accession democratic 
deconsolidation in CEE and how do these conditions interact with 
eachother? 
 
RQ3: What is the nature of the EU’s post-accession domestic impact, and 
how does it relate to deconsolidation? 
 
Accordingly, the chapter is divided into two parts. In the first, I propose 
operationalizing deconsolidation using the democratic embeddedness model, 
which requires a brief excursion through the many definitions of democracy and 
QOD. In the second part, I focus on international integration, as one of the 
components of embeddedness, in the form of EU-CEE relations before and after 
accession was completed. It is particularly important to understand the EU’s role 
in deconsolidation given that democracy has been formally established as both 
one of the Union’s core values and a key condition for the accession of CEE 
countries. Has the EU failed in its attempt to help develop consolidated 
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democracy in the region? Or, more critically, has the accession process itself 
created conditions for deconsolidation? Scholars of integration put forward 
various responses to these questions, ranging from the early post-accession 
confidence in the EU’s transformative power, to the more reserved views of the 
2010s. In the second part of this chapter I offer my own contribution to the 
discussion by suggesting that, in the context of deconsolidation, EU-CEE relations 
are no longer predominantly uni-directional: on the one hand, membership 
granted CEE countries a measure of bargaining power; on the other hand, 
deconsolidation impacts the EU’s credibility as a democratizing actor. As a 




2.1. Situating democratic embeddedness: the road-map    
backwards 
 
In 1987, Giovanni Sartori wrote that “[a definition] must embrace the whole of 
what it defines, but no more.” (p. 182). He remarked that “What is democracy?” 
and “How much democracy is there?” are complementary questions, but they 
should be asked in that order. Before examining QOD and the origins of 
democratic defects, it is imperative to clarify the meaning of both democracy and 
quality. Since the 1950s, the limitations - and advantages - of a dichotomous 
understanding of democracy as non-autocracy have given way to a more 
nuanced, multi-dimensional concept. In time, flexible definitions resulted in the 
notion that a ‘bad’ democracy can still be considered democratic as long as it 
does not experience a systemic crisis leading to authoritarian take-over. These 
interpretations also created the premise for measuring democracy, which has 
drawn much scholarly interest since the early 2000s and led to the development 
of numerous democracy indexes and cross-country data sets.  
In the post-Cold War decades, the stark separation between democracy 
and autocracy is no longer useful for analytical purposes. Instead, there is an 
increasing number of regimes where only some conditions of democracy are 
present, or all conditions are present, but only in part. In other words, there are 
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varying degrees of democracy3, frequently equated with QOD (Sartori, 1987; 
Diamond, 1996; Dahl, 1989). However, these concepts all inherited one aspect 
of the dichotomous approach: all democracies, regardless of their quality, hold 
contested elections.  
 
 
2.1.1. What is democracy? 
 
The electoral criterion 
Since Joseph Schumpeter defined democracy as a system “for arriving at political 
decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a 
competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (1947, p. 269) the electoral criterion 
has been the conceptual anchor of democracy. This is not surprising, considering 
the political climate in which Schumpeter wrote. The end of World War II marked 
the beginning of a new wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991), which took 
place in the context of the Cold War’s ideological polarity. Within this time-frame 
it makes sense that democracy should be understood in the limited sense of 
electoral competition, which set it apart from authoritarianism. Huntington 
himself adopted the electoral criterion as a minimal definition of democracy to 
explain how countries fit into his waves of democratization model.  
The electoral criterion states that democracy is a political system that 
holds contested elections (Przeworski et al., 2000). This does not imply that 
simply holding elections makes a country democratic, but rather that emphasis 
should be placed on their contested character. At minimum, this requires 
electoral competition, which in turn requires a multi-party system, along with 
electoral rights and access to multiple sources of information. Furthermore, the 
electoral criterion by itself says nothing about whether competition is 
meaningful in practice. Rather, such a minimalistic concept of democracy 
illustrates the fallacy of electoralism (Schmitter and Karl, 1991), whereby 
elections are given priority over other dimensions of democracy. However, 
despite its conceptual limits, the electoral criterion is a useful tool for making 
sense of the long-standing scholarly debate over how democracy should be 
                                               
3 Authoritarianism has seen a similar treatment in literature, with the development of 
concepts such as competitive authoritarianism and hybrid regimes (Levitsky and Way, 
2002, 2010; Bardall, 2016; Bogaards, 2008; Gilbert and Mohseni, 2011). 
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defined. Since the late 1940s, its centrality established two theoretical trends: 
the first claims that elections should continue to be seen as democracy’s most 
important feature; the second adopts a more inclusive view, bringing in 
substantive and procedural elements of the political process.  
Joseph Schumpeter proposed a bare-bones definition of democracy. But 
the problem with this classic approach, notes Pasquino (2005), is that, while 
straightforward, it fails to account for the role of voter participation outside 
elections. This limitation is addressed in the second strand of the debate, led by 
Robert Dahl, who began developing the concept of polyarchy in the 1950s. In his 
later work, Democracy and Its Critics (1989), Dahl defined polyarchy as a political 
regime where power is exercised between three or more actors. In his view, the 
concept entails a procedural approach, in which political and civic freedoms, 
along with equality and accountability, support the principle of universal 
suffrage. Based on Dahl’s earlier work, Giovanni Sartori defined democracy as “a 
procedure and/or a mechanism that (a) generates an open polyarchy whose 
competition on the electoral market (b) attributes power to the people and (c) 
specifically enforces the responsiveness of the leaders to the led.” (Sartori, 1987, 
p. 156) He described democracy first as an electoral polyarchy, then as “a 
[selective] polyarchy of merit” (p. 169), and finally, as a non-autocracy.  
Dahl’s elements of freedom and equality, along with Sartori’s 
responsiveness and accountability, later translated into the debate on QOD in 
the early 2000s. But before this transition can be addressed, it is important to 
understand one particular aspect of how scholars relate democracy to QOD: in 
building their concepts of QOD, authors typically begin by giving, or implying a 
definition of democracy. These definitions are often similar and build on the two 
theoretical strands described above. Many of them prefer minimal concepts for 
reasons of clarity, but they do not always draw the line between the meaning of 
democracy and that of QOD.  
 
Minimal and baseline definitions 
 
Minimal and baseline definitions of democracy are not necessarily the same 
thing, although they often coincide. Minimal definitions describe the necessary 
conditions that a political regime must meet in order to be classified as a 
democracy. Baseline definitions are instrumental in nature, showing what kind 
of concept of democracy authors use to explain what they mean by QOD (Munck, 
2014). Minimal definitions of democracy should not be understood strictly in 
electoral terms, although a few authors have argued more recently that there is 
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a useful trade-off between coverage and simplicity. For instance, Knutsen (2010) 
points out that the electoral criterion remains attractive for two reasons. Firstly, 
it is a clear baseline definition, and acts as the necessary condition that 
differentiates between democracy and authoritarianism. Secondly, the quality of 
the electoral process can be used as a simple measurement of QOD. For similar 
reasons, Møller and Skaaning (2010) revert to the electoral criterion in an 
attempt to correct democracy typologies built on more complex definitions.  
Minimal definitions cover a wide spectrum. Those given by Schumpeter, 
Dahl and Sartori fall into a somewhat simplified category. Another simple 
definition is given by Bühlmann et al. (2008), who describe democracy as a 
regime that protects citizens against arbitrary rule, where elections function as 
an aggregate of people's interests. Munck (2012) and Knutsen (2010) prefer the 
electoral criterion, defining democracy as a political system where high 
government offices are accessed through free and fair elections. Morlino 
(2004a), who has written extensively on QOD, takes a more inclusive approach 
to the minimal definition. In his view, democracy requires at least the following 
elements: universal adult suffrage, regular, free and competitive elections, more 
than one political party and more than one source of information. Andreev 
(2005) takes Dahl’s polyarchy as the basis of his definition, describing the 
following conditions for democracy: a self-governing polity, free and fair 
elections, elected officials, democratic constitution, freedom of expression, 
alternative sources of information and associational autonomy. 
If minimal definitions describe the necessary characteristics of 
democracy, what is the role of baseline definitions? Munck (2014) explains that, 
often, when scholars discuss QOD, they focus on the conditions of quality and do 
not state clearly what they mean by democracy. The meaning is either implied, 
or relegated to more generic terms, such as stable democracy or electoral 
democracy. This is likely to create confusion between the concepts of democracy 
and QOD (i.e., what are the conditions of democracy, and what are the 
conditions of good democracy?) Making baseline definitions explicit helps 
differentiate between the two.  
For many of the authors mentioned above, minimal and baseline 
definitions coincide, as minimal definitions of democracy are made explicit. 
However, a number of other authors writing on QOD do not state outright what 
they mean by democracy. For instance, Lijphart’s influential Patterns of 
Democracy (1999) is concerned with describing typologies rather than making 
sense of a definitional debate. Lijphart largely subscribes to Dahl’s conception of 
polyarchy, built around political rights and civil liberties, but takes an institutional 
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approach to describe two models of democracy - majoritarian and consensus. 
Other scholars use more general terms, such as established democracy 
(Bühlmann et al., 2011a) electoral democracy (Munck, 2012) or 
formal/institutional democracy (Roberts, 2009). 
 
 
2.1.2. What is the quality of democracy? 
 
The meanings of quality 
As with the case of democracy, there are many approaches in literature to how 
quality should be defined, and sometimes this too is addressed in ambiguous 
terms. For instance, Dahl (1989) does not directly specify the meaning of quality 
in his concept of polyarchy, but he points out that polyarchy is an ideal type 
regime which cannot be fully achieved in practice. Rather than defining quality 
as such, he describes a number of conditions which, when in place, generally 
ensure democratic stability. Under these conditions: (1) regular, free and fair 
elections provide a way to elect or remove officials peacefully; (2) these officials 
have the effective power to govern; (3) there is universal adult suffrage; (4) civil 
and political rights are safeguarded (particularly the  right to express criticism of 
the government); (5) citizens have the right to free association; and (6) they have 
access to alternative sources of information.  
In a similar approach, Lijphart (1999) describes quality as the degree to 
which a stable regime approximates a perfect democracy and the policies 
associated with stable democracies. Altman and Pérez-Liñán (2002) similarly take 
quality to mean the extent to which a polyarchy actualizes its potential as a 
political regime. Andreev (2005) understands quality in terms of regime stability 
and how well it conforms to the principles of competition, participation, 
representation, equality and accountability. For Ringen (2007), it reflects the 
extent to which a democratic polity promotes and protects freedom, as the 
central purpose of democracy. Bühlmann et al. (2011a) see quality as the degree 
to which a regime fulfils the three core concepts of liberal and participatory 
democracy: freedom, equality and control. Roberts (2009) examines QOD in the 
specific context of CEE countries and defines it as the strength of citizens’ control 
over politicians. These definitions all emphasize different aspects of democratic 
rule, but have two points in common: they reference degrees, and emphasize 
freedom, equality and control as three essential elements of QOD. 
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In a more systematic attempt at an empirical analysis, Morlino (2004a) 
asks: what is a good democracy? His minimal definition excludes electoral and 
defective democracies from being classified as good democracies. In addition, he 
argues against the inclusion of delegative democracy, from a perspective similar 
to Pasquino’s criticism of Schumpeter’s classical definition: while in theory it 
meets the minimal conditions of a democracy, in practice citizens delegate the 
process of decision-making through elections, but have no means to maintain 
checks on the performance of elected officials between elections. 
Morlino distinguishes between three dimensions of quality. First, there 
is quality at the level of procedure, whereby democratic processes happen 
according to precise methods and timing. Secondly, there is quality at the level 
of content, pertaining to the characteristics and functions of democracy. Thirdly, 
there is quality at the level of performance, where citizens express their level of 
satisfaction with democratic processes. The result of examining QOD from this 
threefold perspective is Morlino’s definition of a good democracy: a stable 
institutional arrangement that ensures the freedom and equality of citizens 
through the legitimate and correct functioning of its institutions. In terms of 
outcomes, a good democracy meets most of its citizens’ needs and, 
consequently, enjoys wide legitimacy. In terms of content, it ensures high levels 
of freedom and equality for its citizens and organizations. In terms of procedure, 
there is genuine accountability on the part of political actors, and their decision-
making processes reflect the demands and preferences of citizens.  
Interestingly, a wide concept of ‘bad’ democracy is not similarly 
formalized. While scholars of QOD usually define good democracy in relation to 
an ideal form, they refer to faulty democracies by describing their different 
defects, thus creating typologies of incomplete, or defective democracies.  
 
Democracy ‘with adjectives’: defects and their typologies 
 
Writing extensively on the nature of QOD, Leonardo Morlino and Larry Diamond 
provide a useful empirical approach for analyzing both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
democracies (Morlino, 2004b; Diamond and Morlino, 2004). They explain that 
QOD may be approached in two ways: in an effective democracy (democracy 
from above), accountability and the rule of law are a priori guarantees of quality. 
In a responsive democracy (democracy from below), citizens’ assessment of 
decision-making processes is the most important feature. Based on this 
classification, QOD may vary on two of the procedure-content-performance 
dimensions of quality. On a procedural level, quality can be measured in terms 
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of rule of law, accountability and responsiveness. There is a complementary 
relationship between these, with accountability and the rule of law providing the 
basis for examining responsiveness. In theory, responsiveness should translate 
into appropriate public policies provided to citizens according to their demands 
and preferences, as well as fair distribution of resources through public 
administration. In practice, responsiveness can be examined as an expression of 
legitimacy, along with citizens’ level of interest in political participation. On a 
substantive level, variations can be observed in the respect for rights and 
protection of freedoms associated with democratic rule, along with the 
implementation of greater political, social and economic equality. There is a 
close relation between the procedural and substantive aspects. The latter does 
not make sense without the former. However, in the context of good 
democracies, Morlino (2004b) argues that the substantive dimension holds more 
sway. 
Previously, I mentioned that Morlino (2004a) excludes a few typologies 
from the concept of good democracy. Instead, he distinguishes between quality 
democracies and “democracies without quality.” He then describes different 
types of democracy based on how they vary along the procedural-substantive 
levels. A concept of perfect democracy is specified in Morlino’s typology, but it 
is defined vaguely as a regime where all components of the procedural-
substantive levels are present to a high degree. In more approachable terms, an 
effective democracy is one where a minimal democracy is reinforced by real 
guarantees of freedom and the implementation of equality, along with strong 
rule of law. Similarly, a responsive democracy is a minimal democracy in which 
freedom and equality are guaranteed, and there is also a high level of 
accountability from the government. In a fully legitimated democracy, the 
regime is highly responsive to citizens’ demands and preferences, consequently 
enjoying a high degree of legitimacy.  
The typology of ‘democracies without quality’, or ‘lower quality 
democracies’ in constructed in a similar way. At worst, regimes may be formally 
classified as democracies, but all substantive and procedural elements likely to 
improve QOD are missing. Inefficient democracies, characterized by legal 
systems that fail to reflect democratic values, high levels of corruption and weak 
accountability are more common. In democracies with low legitimacy, citizens 
can hold relatively regular protests, causing governments to respond by limiting 
rights and freedoms. Unequal democracies are regimes where economic policies 
routinely disregard problems with social welfare, resulting in wide socio-
economic gaps between different groups. 
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Already this shows how increasingly complex definitions of democracy 
have resulted in the creation of widely diverse categories. Attempts to re-
conceptualize democracy by moving away from the democracy-autocracy 
dichotomy towards a scale have given rise to contradictory goals (Collier and 
Levitsky, 1997): to increase conceptual differentiation in order to capture more 
forms of democracy; or to employ conceptual stretching, by applying definitions 
of democracy to countries that exhibit features that would not qualify them as 
such. The result, Collier and Levitsky explain, is that, presently, hundreds of 
adjectives can be attached to the concept of democracy. The inherent 
disadvantage of such great variety is that it is difficult to manage, and the authors 
suggest three strategies for standardizing terminology while avoiding the trap of 
contradictory goals.  
The first is contextualizing the definition of democracy. This means that 
the definition should be adapted when applying it to atypical cases, often by 
introducing new criteria to establish the cut-off point between the categories of 
democracy and non-democracy. The second strategy involves shifting between 
overarching concepts related to democracy. The common association between 
democracy and the overarching concept of political regime has gradually given 
way to the idea that it can also be related to other basic concepts, such as 
governance, society and state. Collier and Levitsky argue that combining 
democracy with these concepts may yield different typologies. Thus, shifting 
between overarching concepts helps avoid stretching the definition, but without 
necessarily sacrificing analytical diversity. Finally, a third strategy involves 
forming sub-types: creating derivative types by adding defining attributes to 
democracy in order to adapt the concept to a new standard when there is a 
discrepancy between commonly accepted definitions and empirical evidence 
from a specific case.  
With regards to established democracies, Collier and Levitsky adopt an 
approach similar to Morlino’s: these cases can be described on a scale running 
from the minimalism of inclusive suffrage and reasonably competitive elections, 
to an expanded concept that also incorporates socio-economic equality and high 
levels of citizenship participation. With flawed democracies, the issue is that such 
regimes are generally seen as democratic, but differ in terms of what, precisely, 
makes them flawed. In this case, the concern is emphasizing the problematic 
element. This leads to categories such as low intensity democracies (low 
participation), low-income democracies (difficult socio-economic conditions), 
neocolonial democracies (weak national sovereignty) and so on. Where the 
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source of the flaw is not clear, a wider concept of incomplete or problematic 
democracy can be used.  
By now, flawed democracies are already making a consistent appearance 
in the debate. The problem remains that, as categories, they are constructed 
along similar lines to established democracies, and are similarly difficult to 
manage. This is the point where embeddedness comes into the picture 
 
 
2.1.3. Democratic embeddedness 
Over the past decade, Freedom House reports have been the go-to source for 
systematic, easily quantifiable measurements of democracy. However, Wolfgang 
Merkel (2004) criticizes Freedom House’s democracy scores by explaining that 
its minimal requirement for countries to be classified as democracies is to have 
free, fair and regular elections. Freedom House’s minimal definition comes 
closest to Schumpeter’s, in that it both maintains the centrality of the electoral 
criterion, and fails to include elements where QOD can be measured. In response 
to this shortcoming, Merkel proposes the concept of democratic embeddedness. 
It is based on the idea that stable democracies are embedded in two ways: 
internally, five interdependent partial regimes create the conditions for the 
proper functioning of democracy. These are: (1) electoral processes; (2) political 
rights of participation; (3) civil rights; (4) horizontal accountability; and (5) a 
guarantee that democratically elected representatives hold the effective power 
to govern. The second dimension, external embeddedness, reinforces the five 
partial regimes and protects democracy against destabilizing factors. The three 
elements of external embeddedness are socio-economic conditions, civil society 
and international integration.  
The logic of internal embeddedness rests on interdependence. Thus, 
universal active suffrage together with free and fair elections is the feature that 
distinguishes democracies from authoritarian regimes. However, this is a 
necessary condition for a minimal concept of democracy and does not say 
anything about its degree of consolidation. The minimal condition for embedded 
democracies requires that the electoral regime be connected to political and civil 
rights, which guarantee the pre-conditions for elections, rule of law and the 
public’s control that ensures the continuous accountability of officials between 
elections. The latter is further reinforced by the remaining two partial regimes, 
which ensure that there is an effective system of checks and balances, and that 
no extra-constitutional actors hold the effective power to govern.  
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Internal embeddedness describes the political and institutional factors 
that determine the quality of an established democracy. However, while damage 
to these partial regimes results in different types of defects that reduce the 
quality of consolidated democracy, it is the elements of external embeddedness 
that define a wider set of conditions which protect democracy. The three 
elements of external embeddedness are not themselves direct sources of 
deconsolidation.  In the first sphere, a developed economy, fair distribution of 
resources and the pluralization of social structure create a favorable 
environment for democracy and can help improve its quality. In the second 
sphere, the role of civil society is to ensure that citizens are protected from the 
arbitrary use of state power, to support the rule of law and balance of powers, 
and to cultivate a political culture that aligns with the core values of democracy. 
Finally, international integration helps consolidate democracy by disseminating 
good practices and facilitating social learning. In sum, the concept of embedded 
democracy means that the stronger, more consolidated external embeddedness 
is, the better it protects the partial regimes of democracy from destabilizing 
factors. The tighter the interdependence between these partial regimes, the 
more stable internal embeddedness becomes. The reverse is also true – and here 
is the point where defective democracies are addressed.   
Starting from the partial regimes of internal embeddedness, Merkel 
describes five types of defective democracies, depending on which of these 
regimes is weakest. Thus, in exclusive democracies, one or more segments of the 
population are excluded from the right of universal suffrage. In domain 
democracies, ‘veto powers’ (entrepreneurs, the military, or multi-national 
corporations) remove one or more political domains from the hands of 
democratically elected representatives. In illiberal democracies, the rule of law 
is damaged, civil rights are partially suspended and the judiciary has limited 
control over the executive and legislative. Finally, delegative democracies (which 
Morlino classified earlier as democracies without quality) are regimes where the 
system of checks and balances is damaged and the legislative and judiciary 
branches have little control over the executive.  
Merkel’s concept of embeddedness is attractive for two reasons. Firstly, 
it builds consistently on previous research, reflecting the principles of freedom, 
equality and control which emerge as a common theme throughout much of the 
literature on QOD since the early 2000s. Not only that, but embeddedness is 
specifically built as a means to counter the shortcomings of Freedom House’s 
widely employed measurement. Secondly, embeddedness is not simply a 
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concept, but comes equipped with its own index: the Democracy Barometer is 
one of the more recent developments in measuring democratic quality, and has 
the potential to challenge Freedom House and other standards in the field. 
 Briefly, the Democracy Barometer attempts to move away from 
minimalist, electoral-based concepts of democracy, towards a wider concept 
which incorporates both liberal and participatory ideas of democracy. It is 
conceived as a stepwise process of reflecting freedom, equality and control, each 
being then disaggregated into measurable indicators (Bühlmann et. al, 2011a; 
2011b). For reasons of both clarity and coverage, I adopt Merkel’s concept of 
democratic embeddedness as the way to describe and measure QOD in this 
study, and address deconsolidation as a product of weak external 
embeddedness. However, the model is not without flaws or inconsistencies, 
particularly in the sphere of internal embeddedness, where the way 
interdependence works may need to be reconsidered. Several of these problems 
are discussed in the following section, before proceeding with the 
operationalization of embeddedness. 
The most important source of criticism for embeddedness comes from 
Møller and Skaaning (2010), who suggest that there is a major error in how 
Merkel builds his typologies of flawed democracies. Each type of defective 
democracy is defined by the attribute, or partial regime, that it lacks. However, 
although Merkel emphasizes the interdependence of the five elements of 
internal embeddedness, he gives priority to the electoral partial regime as the 
most basic characteristic that distinguishes democracy from authoritarianism. In 
addition to this point, Merkel’s reasoning has several other inconsistencies. 
Firstly, this system does not come with clear guidelines on how to distinguish 
between defective democracies and autocracies. Secondly, some sub-
components are linked to more than one partial regime (for instance 
participation or the independence of the judiciary), so in practice this makes it 
difficult to explain exactly how different partial regimes are affected. Thirdly, the 
definition of exclusive democracy does not correspond to the general definition 
of defective democracy, which was defined as a political regime with well-
functioning elections but defective on one or more of the other aspects of 
internal embeddedness. Exclusive democracies are regimes that limit the 
electoral rights of certain segments of the population, and therefore are most 
affected at the level of the electoral partial regime.  
The most significant of these flaws is that the typology of defective 
democracies does not correspond precisely to the partial regimes described in 
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the frame of internal embeddedness. There are five partial regimes and only four 
types of defective democracies. Møller and Skaaning make a good point in 
explaining that Merkel’s internal embeddedness is a radial concept - a collection 
of partial regimes that are not only interdependent, as Merkel emphasizes, but 
also hierarchical, which he fails to address directly. The electoral regime takes 
precedence over all other components and is central to the concepts of 
embedded and defective democracy. Møller and Skaaning attempt to correct 
these typologies by referring to Sartori’s logic whereby moving up the ladder of 
abstraction (Sartori, 1970, 1991), it is possible to distinguish between 
democracies and non-democracies in the most general terms. Systems that 
contain only one of Merkel’s partial regimes (the electoral one) should be 
considered minimal, ‘thin’ democracies. Systems that contain all five partial 
regimes display the lowest level of abstraction and should be classified as liberal 
democracies. The criticism that Møller and Skaaning give Merkel’s model brings 
to attention an essential aspect of examining QOD: any good instrument for 
assessing it should be able to reflect the concept accurately.  
 
2.1.4. Embeddedness and deconsolidation: conditions versus 
causes 
In his 2004 article introducing the embeddedness model, Merkel differentiates 
between the causes of defective democracies, and the conditions that prevent 
or facilitate the loss of QOD. The latter are part of external embeddedness and, 
as explained previously, are not directly responsible, but rather make up the 
environment that reinforce or hinder particular conditions that may produce 
deconsolidation over time. The former are such factors that act directly upon 
QOD, and differ depending on the case or time period that are being examined.  
In Table 2.1., the left-hand column shows the three conditions of QOD 
decline (Merkel, 2004, p. 44-48) and the right-hand column lists the conditions 
of QOD decline (Merkel, 2004, p. 52-54). The two sides are connected, both 
conceptually and empirically. In two cases - civil society and international 
integration - they overlap entirely. However, in most situations the link between 
the two is found in how conditions act as more general categories, to which 





Table 2.1. Conditions and causes of democratic decline 
CONDITIONS OF DEMOCRATIC DECLINE 
(EXTERNAL EMBEDDEDNESS) 








State and nation building 
Type of authoritarian predecessor 
regime 
Mode of transition 
Political institutions 
International and regional context 
 
Linking conditions and causes in this way has two important implications. 
On a conceptual level, Merkel discusses the two terms in detail and provides 
concrete ways to operationalize and measure them, but stops short of clarifying 
how they are connected. In other words, he explains that conditions provide a 
diffuse environment, while causes are forces that affect QOD directly, but does 
not specify that the latter actually originate in the former. Along this line of 
reasoning, the second, empirical implication is that causes may differ on a case-
by-case basis, but conditions can be examined across multiple cases. This is 
particularly valuable when conducting research on a regional level, whether or 
not the countries under consideration share certain characteristics4. In CEE 
countries, transition and accession provided a common background, but the way 
these processes were experienced, as well as the evolution of QOD, have been 
quite different. Therefore, focusing on conditions over causes is useful for 
understanding QOD trends, rather than these individual experiences. This is the 
framework through which the first research question of this study is addressed 
                                               
4 Using external embeddedness in this way is also valuable for regional-level studies where 
cases do not share as close a historical context as CEE countries. For example, replicating 
this research to include all 28 EU member-states will likely reveal more background 
differences than similarities. However, when used in combination with methodological 
approaches, such as set theory, that allow cases to be grouped according to certain 
characteristics, external embeddedness is a useful tool for categorizing countries in relation 
to changes in QOD. 
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empirically in Chapter 4. Later, in Chapter 5, causes of democratic 
deconsolidation are also addressed in individual countries.  
Table 2.2 illustrates the connection between the conditions and causes 
described by Wolfgang Merkel, and the specific factors associated with each 
condition, which are likely to produce deconsolidation over time. The latter also 
act as concrete ways to operationalize the causes of deconsolidation. As the first 
two columns show, there is a complete overlap between conditions and causes 
in the case of international integration, while the socio-economic context is more 
detailed. There are also two conditions - institutions and historical context - 
which are not included in external embeddedness, but can be extrapolated by 
grouping remaining conditions together.  
Table 2.2. Linking causes and conditions 
CONDITIONS CAUSES DECONSOLIDATION INDICATORS 
Socio-economic 
context 
1. Path to 
modernization 
1.a. Socio-economic 
modernization occurred along 
semi-modern paths 
1.b. Property owners view 
democracy as a threat to their 
economic and political interests 
2. Level of 
modernization 
2.a. Lower levels of socio-
economic development 
2.b. Unequal distribution of 
economic, cultural and 
intellectual resources, resulting in 
unequal access to resources for 
action among different political 
actors 
3. Economic trends 3.a. Economic crises as a means to 
institutionalize defects in 
unconsolidated democracies 
4. Social capital 4.a. Social capital historically 
accumulated along ethnic and 
religious lines 
Civil society 5. Civil society 5.a. Lack of interpersonal trust 
5.b. Civil society organized along 
ethnic cleavages, contributing to 







6.a. Weak or absent regional 
mechanisms to secure liberal 
democratic institutions 
Institutions (not part of 
external 
embeddedness) 
7. State and nation-
building 
7.a. Possibility of secession 
7.b. Discrimination against 
minorities 
 8. Political 
institutions 
8.a. Informal institutional 
arrangements inherited from 
previous regime (corruption, 
clientelism, patrimonialism) 
Historical context (not 
part of external 
embeddedness) 
9. Type of 
authoritarian 
predecessor regime 
9.a. Long-lasting totalitarian, post-
totalitarian, sultanistic or neo-
patrimonial predecessor regime 
 10. Mode of 
transition 
10.a. Non-negotiated transition 
(systemic changes steered from 
above or forced from below) 
 
There are two points of interest here. Firstly, the overlap between conditions 
and causes in the case of civil society and international integration means that 
the factors listed in the third column could be used to help operationalize the 
conditions themselves. Merkel already suggests some ways of doing this in his 
original discussion of external embeddedness (see section 2.1.3 of this chapter). 
However, making civil society and international integration measurable is rather 
complicated in practice, because the concepts are more diffuse compared to the 
socio-economic context and thus, the three dimensions of external 
embeddedness are difficult to align in a compatible way. It may be tempting to 
use indicators 5.a., 5.b. and 6.a. in the table, based on the condition-cause 
overlap, but this is not consistent with how Merkel conceptualizes civil society 
and international integration.  
 The second point of interest is that the embeddedness model leaves out 
the institutional and historical contexts, which also yield potential causes of 
deconsolidation. It is not immediately clear why Merkel excludes these from 
external embeddedness, since they too are rather diffuse and can be examined 
across multiple cases. A plausible explanation is that Merkel limits the historical 
context to post-authoritarian states which experienced some form of transition 
to democracy (concretely, CEE and Latin America). If the embeddedness model 
is indeed designed to have wide applicability, then the historical context would 
also need to be expanded to make room for more diverse cases. The institutional 
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context is in a similar situation: it singles out conditions that are more common 
in younger, post-authoritarian democracies. Yet, even in their more limited form, 
the two conditions cannot be entirely excluded from the analysis. 
The problem of operationalization, however, persists. In Table 2.2., 
operationalization takes place when moving from the second to the third 
column, but deriving diffuse conditions from specific causes requires a turn in 
the opposite direction. Furthermore, while Merkel proposes ways to 
operationalize the socio-economic context, civil society and international 
integration in ways that do not overlap with how conditions are operationalized, 
he does not do so for the institutional and historical contexts. One possible 
solution to the discrepancy is to treat these as background conditions that 
cannot be integrated into the same analytical step as the original three, and 
examine them separately, in a more descriptive way. Another is to follow an 
inductive logic and derive a ‘thin’ condition in which the corresponding 
indicators, such as the possibility of secession, discrimination against minorities 
and informal institutional arrangements, could conceivably be found. In this 
study, I apply the first solution to the historical context, and the second to the 
institutional context where, loosely, the common theme is the existence of 
societal cleavages. Based on this, I propose operationalizing this condition 
through the lens of populism, as explained in the following section.  
 
2.1.5. Introducing populism into the model 
 
The nature of the link between democracy and populism has been the subject of 
scholarly debate for more than two decades, and the argument is split between 
claims that populism is democratic at its core, and that it is potentially disruptive 
for democracy (Abts and Rummens, 2007). Populism, as an ideology that pits ‘the 
people’ against various categories of ‘others’ is not inherently anti-democratic. 
Pasquino (2008) argues that whether or not populism and democracy are at all 
compatible depends on how ‘the people’ are defined. He suggests that an 
understanding of people as ‘citizens, endowed with rights and duties, but above 
all with the power of sovereignty that [...] must be exercised within the limits and 
forms codified in the constitution itself.’ (p. 16) does not contradict the tenets of 
democracy, because it conceives of the people as a demos. On the other hand, 
when populism defines them along ethnic or socioeconomic lines, it is explicitly 
exclusionary because it creates concrete categories of ‘others’. 
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In a different approach to how populism frames the people as citizens, 
Urbinati (1998) posits that, since populism imposes the will of the people over 
established institutions and social categories, it ‘[puts] the demos above the 
laws’ (p. 119) and, in consequence, carries the potential to destabilize 
democratic rule by limiting access to political resources. The notion that 
populism is a pathology of democracy (Mény and Surel, 2002) has gained traction 
with the rise of popular support for right-wing parties in the West, and these 
concerns are not unsubstantiated. Although the ideological core of populism is 
rather loose, it nevertheless establishes the basis for drawing societal fault lines 
between ‘the people’, who are fundamentally virtuous, and ‘others’, elites or 
outsiders, seeking to deprive them of their rights, values or resources (Albertazzi 
and McDonnell, 2008; Laclau, 2005; Mudde, 2004; Taggart, 2004). Populist 
leaders further widen the rift with mainstream politics by claiming to hold the 
‘view from the grassroots’ (Canovan, 2002, p. 27) and thus setting themselves 
apart from political elites, who are perceived as corrupt and self-serving.  
In CEE countries, Havlik and Pinkova (2012) find that populism’s success 
rests on several factors. Firstly, populist parties that enjoy strong electoral 
support tend to be exclusively populist and emerge in electoral systems that are 
less structured, fostering weaker ties between voters and parties. Secondly, 
these tend to be ‘flash parties’ (p. 294) that experience equally rapid electoral 
success and decline and, with a few notable exceptions, such as the Greater 
Romania Party in the early 2000s, or Hungary’s Fidesz, they do not become a 
long-term fixture in mainstream politics. Thirdly, their voter base comprises 
largely of social categories that are especially vulnerable to economic 
transformations, whether as a result of crisis or the earlier transition to market 
economy.  
However, the recent surge of populism is by no means exclusive to CEE 
countries, but rather a pan-european trend (Kessel, 2015; Merkel and Scholl, 
2018). Since the early 2000s, there has been consistent link between populist 
success, reflected in the voter shares in national elections, and the supply of 
credible populist options, along with perceived unresponsiveness from 
established parties (Kessel, 2015, p. 173-175) However, there does not seem to 
be a clear separation between CEE and Western democracies in terms of which 
conditions explain populist success. For example, the success of populism in 
countries that were hit particularly hard by the financial crisis is related, in 
addition to economic hardships, to perceived corruption, a high degree of 
nativist sentiments, and Euroscepticism in Hungary, Greece, Slovakia and Italy. 
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But the reverse does not hold true: successful populist parties were also found 
in low-corruption, Europhile countries like Denmark, Belgium and Norway. Van 
Kessel explains that, in these cases, the success can be attributed to their ability 
to appeal to a niche of dissatisfied voters, rather than go for wider support. Trust 
in political institutions similarly fails to draw a clear regional boundary. Populist 
parties have performed well in both low-trust countries like Poland, Romania and 
Bulgaria, and in countries such as Denmark, Switzerland or the Netherlands, 
where public trust in institutions is higher.  
So how does populism fit into external embeddedness? First of all, its 
addition is theoretically sound in a more general sense: the embeddedness 
model was not specifically designed with CEE (or post-authoritarian) countries in 
mind. If populism had been exclusive to these, including it would have made the 
model more regionally-bound than general. As it is, there is evidence that, at 
least within Europe, it would remain widely applicable. Secondly, discrimination 
against minorities and the possibility of secession (indicators 7.a-7.b in Table 
2.2.) are consistent with exclusionary definitions of ‘others’, particularly along 
ethnic and cultural lines. Informal institutional arrangements (indicator 8.a) 
require more interpretation. Wolfgang Merkel argues that issues such as 
corruption and clientelism contribute negatively to QOD. But the relation 
between corruption and support for populism is inverse. More populism does 
not necessarily produce more corruption, but a higher public perception of 
corruption among elites is associated with declining political trust and increased 
electoral support for (particularly right-wing) populist parties (Ziller and Schübel, 
2015). These observations can be summarized as follows: populism is more likely 
to find support when there is a higher perception of corruption, and it is more 
likely to foster discrimination and secessionist tendencies.  
Of course, the mere existence of public support for populism is not a 
guarantee that these will occur - nor that QOD will decline in the short term. For 
one thing, fringe support for populism is not uncommon, in CEE or elsewhere. 
For another, even if populist parties participate in the legislative process, they 
may not have enough power to implement the policies they advocate. However, 
the potential for influencing legislation once a populist party garners enough 
support to enter a country’s legislative body. The operationalization of populism, 





2.1.6. Operationalization of conditions 
There are, unfortunately, few empirical studies using embeddedness to draw on 
for operationalization. For example, Tolstrup (2009) uses internal embeddedness 
to study the impact of Russia’s foreign policy on regional stability by tracking the 
changes it causes in the performance of the five interrelated partial regimes. 
Similarly, Wetzel and Orbie (2011) use internal embeddedness to unpack the 
EU’s strategies of democracy promotion by looking at the specific partial regimes 
being targeted. Neither of these studies, however, attempts to operationalize 
the conditions of external embeddedness. It is only in Bühlmann’s (2011) 
research on the crises and success stories of QOD evolution since the early 1990s 
that some useful points of departure can be found.  
Of the three original conditions of external embeddedness, Bühlmann 
only operationalizes the socio-economic context by using GDP/capita, inflation, 
the Human Development Index (HDI) and globalization as indicators. The first 
two are relatively straightforward, if simplistic, measurements of an economy’s 
size and stability. A higher GDP/capita and lower inflation are hypothesized to 
have a positive impact on QOD. Higher HDI, which comprises of the Gini 
coefficient of income distribution, level of education and life expectancy, is 
expected to have a similarly positive effect. Globalization combines economic 
flows and trade restriction to determine how open an economy is. But the 
argument that more economic openness is likely associated with higher QOD is 
incongruous with empirical evidence. For instance, comparing World Bank (n.d.) 
data on economic openness, defined as the percentage of trade in a country’s 
total GDP to data on QOD from the Economist Intelligence Unit (2014) shows 
that highly open economies such as the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and 
Vietnam are also decidedly non-democratic regimes. This inconsistency aside, 
the positive link between economy, development and democracy is extensively 
documented (Lipset, 1959; Przeworski and Limongi, 1997; Li and Reuveny, 2003; 
Inglehart and Welzel, 2005) and Bühlmann himself finds further evidence in this 
direction.  
Beyond the socio-economic context, Bühlmann does not operationalize 
the other conditions of external embeddedness. Arguably, globalization could be 
used as a measure of international integration, but even without the empirical 
discrepancy highlighted above, it is too limiting in the context of CEE-EU 
relations. My own approach to operationalizing external embeddedness draws 
on Bühlmann’s with regards to the socio-economic context, but proposes a few 
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changes. Firstly, I break down the economic and social contexts into two 
separate conditions. This is, first of all, because Bühlmann’s own 
operationalization casts the net too widely and includes a few indicators that do 
not reveal much with specific regard to CEE countries. For instance, HDI includes 
life expectancy and level of education, in addition to the Gini coefficient, but 
these two do not vary greatly across CEE countries, and do not indicate any 
significant differences compared to the EU average (Eurostat 2017c, 2018a). 
Therefore, while the Gini coefficient may reveal something about socio-
economic inequalities, education and life expectancy do not contribute relevant 
information. Secondly, I have decided to treat the economic and social contexts 
separately because I am interested in the political consequences of the global 
financial crisis in the region. In order to account for these I include government 
public debt as a general indicator pertaining to the crisis (Schularick, 2012; 
Eurostat, 2016c) in addition to Bühlmann’s inflation and GDP/capita. In the social 
sphere, I keep the Gini coefficient, and further account for the effects of the crisis 
through unemployment and fluctuations in the percentage of population at risk 
of poverty and social exclusion. Due to the diffuse character of external 
embeddedness, I measure each of the two conditions as averages of their 
respective indicators. Details, along with corresponding sources, are listed in 
Table 2.3. 
I operationalize populism based on the idea that a populist party’s ability 
to participate in the legislative process, regardless of the party’s size, degree of 
electoral support or whether it is part of the government or the opposition, 
carries the potential of divisive societal impact, initially exercised within a 
democratic framework. I keep this condition deliberately wide to ensure that it 
is usable across multiple cases. With regards to civil society5 and historical 
context, I choose to exclude them from this analytical step because it is difficult 
to operationalize them meaningfully, in line with Merkel’s definitions. These 
conditions should be examined separately and descriptively.  
International integration requires special attention. In Table 2.3 I 
summarize how I have chosen to measure this condition, but the reasons for this 
particular option can only be understood properly through a discussion of how 
the largely top-down relationship between the EU and CEE countries, driven by 
                                               
5 A few indicators, such as the USAID civil society sustainability index, and the civil society 
index in Freedom House’s Nations in Transit reports, are indeed available for CEE 
countries. But they do not reflect the dimensions of civil society laid out in the 
embeddedness model, and are therefore not best suited for this study.  
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conditionality, has changed over time to include an element of vulnerability for 
the EU as a democracy promoter.  Part 2 of this chapter covers the topic in detail. 
 
Table 2.3. Operationalization of conditions 
CONDITION OPERATIONALIZATION SOURCES 
Economic 
context 
Average of GDP/capita, inflation and 




Social context Average of unemployment, Gini 
coefficient and population at risk of 
poverty 
Eurostat (2014, 
2017a, 2017b, 2017d) 
Civil society Not operationalized for cross-case 




Bargaining power (Average of share in 
EU GDP, voting power in the Council and 
percentage of public trust in the EU) 
 
EU vulnerability in relation to member-
states. Not operationalized for cross-
case analysis; examined for individual 
cases 
Eurostat (2017e) 









Presence or absence of populist parties 
in the legislative body during the 
reference period 
Van Kessel (2015) 
Nordsieck (2017) 




Not operationalized for cross-case 









2.2. International integration: the EU’s domestic impact 
 
Here, I begin to address the third research question from a theoretical 
perspective: How did the EU’s domestic impact influence democratic 
deconsolidation in CEE? Three issues are discussed: how the EU has positioned 
itself as an external democratizing actor, what lessons can be drawn from the 
pre-accession experience about democracy promotion in CEE, and how the 
nature of the EU-CEE member states relationship has changed after accession. 
At the end of this part, I propose to operationalize the EU-CEE relation in a way 
that reflects these changes.  
For nearly six decades, the EU has defined its identity as an external actor 
along two dimensions: inclusionary, as a community of shared values, and 
exclusionary, through conditioned membership to an ‘exclusive club’. 
(Bretherton and Volger, 2006). The legal basis establishing how the EU operates 
in relation to external actors has expanded from defining the EU vis-à-vis third 
countries in the 1950s, to describing the conditions and procedures for 
membership in the 1990s, and reflects this dual position. In its initial incarnation, 
the European Union established its position as an external policy actor6 through 
Article 310 of the Treaty establishing the European Communities (1957), which 
stipulated that ‘[the] Community may conclude with one or more States or 
international organisations agreements establishing an association involving 
reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special procedure.’ The 
turn towards an inclusionary identity was defined in the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU), Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EUCFR) which mainly 
refer to European citizenship and the rights it entails. These treaties introduced 
significant innovations that transcend the Community’s initial goal of 
establishing security and economic cooperation among its members (Grabbe, 
2002). They prescribe that persons who are nationals of a member-state also 
hold (complementary) EU citizenship, which includes the right of free movement 
                                               
6 In a comparative study of how major international actors, such as the EU, China, Russia 
and the United States, position themselves in relation to third countries, Zielonka (2011) 
finds that the EU’s practice of foreign policy differs significantly. Its strategy of promoting 
changes on its periphery is to incentivize neighboring countries by promising membership 
and market access, and supporting institutional engineering in candidate countries. By 
comparison, the US tents to practice regime overhaul, China uses economic development 
as the main incentive, and Russia intervenes via political and military channels.  
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and residence on the territory of other member states, the right to run and vote 
in municipal and European Parliament elections, the right to petition the 
European Parliament or the Ombudsman, and to receive diplomatic protection 
from the authorities of another member state while on the territory of a third 
country (see Table 2.4.) TEU also expanded the Union’s attributes to include (1) 
strengthening the democratic legitimacy of its institutions; (2) improving the 
effectiveness of its institutions; (3) establishing an economic and monetary 
union; (4) developing the community’s social dimension; and (5) drawing up a 
common foreign and security policy. 
 
Table 2.4. Legal basis for the EU’s relation with external actors 












TFEU Art. 18, 25 
TEU Art. 2, 3, 7, 9-12 
EUCFR Art. 39-46 
Basis for membership: any European country 
that adheres to the principles of democracy, 
respect for human rights and rule of law 
 
Introduces EU citizenship, including the right 
of residence, voting and running for office, 
petitioning the European Parliament and the 
Ombudsman, diplomatic protection in third 
countries 
 
The EU’s exclusionary identity is based on Articles 6 and 49 of the Treaty on 
European Union, which establish the criteria for membership. Among these, 
stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, consolidated rule of law, human 
rights and protection of minorities established that democracy was a key 
requirement for joining the ‘exclusive European club’. The long and deeply 
transformative accession process CEE countries entered shortly after the 
collapse of the Eastern Bloc was connected to this exclusionary identity through 
conditionality, and evolved towards the inclusionary view as guarantees of 
membership were secured. It is important to note that the EU did not explicitly 
position itself as a democratizing actor during accession, but focused instead on 
securing institutional and socio-economic alignment between the candidates 
and older member-states.  
38 
 
As exclusionary factors, the channels of conditionality are easier to 
document and measure, compared to the EU’s more diffuse, post-accession 
influence. This forms the crux of the problem when it comes to operationalizing 
domestic impact: surprisingly, the EU’s relationship with CEE countries as 
candidates is, in analytical terms, clearer than its relationship with CEE as 
member states. In the following two sections, I discuss how the nature of this 
relationship has changed before and after the eastern enlargement, and what 
options are available for operationalizing the EU’s domestic impact in a way 
compatible with the other conditions of external embeddedness.  
 
2.2.1. The EU’s domestic impact before accession 
 
Early post-accession empirical evidence on the impact of the EU in CEE are highly 
consistent: when the structure of incentives and sanctions was clear, the EU had 
a strong domestic influence, which diminished once accession was completed. 
Schimmelfening (2008, p. 921) finds that the key to effective reforms in the 
candidate countries is found at the intersection of three factors: (1) the 
conditional and credible offer of membership; (2) the normative consistency of 
enlargement decisions; and (3) low compliance costs in candidate countries. But 
the EU’s commitment to offering membership, which originates in the EU’s 
exclusionary dimension, gains an interesting position even earlier in the 
accession process, when membership negotiations are initiated and candidates 
begin recognizing that the risk of withdrawing membership at this point 
diminished significantly. Thus, rationality is the main drive behind compliance 
with EU requirements in the pre-accession period.  
 
The rational dimensions of rule adoption 
Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier (2005) discuss pre-accession compliance from 
an institutional perspective. They classify compliance processes according to two 
dimensions: likelihood of adoption, and implementation/enforcement of rules7. 
They also make two additional distinctions: domestic versus EU-driven 
compliance, and rational versus values-based motivation of domestic actors. 
                                               
7 Simple legal transposition is not sufficient to indicate effective implementation 
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Using these elements, they describe three mechanisms of compliance: external 
incentives, lesson drawing, and the social learning models. 
Conditionality is reflected in the external incentives model, which 
defines the EU’s carrot-and-stick relationship to candidates during accession. The 
lesson drawing model is domestic-driven, as a candidate is likely to adopt EU 
norms when they offer a viable solution to internal problems that are otherwise 
difficult to address. This is in line with an earlier approach by Dolowitz and Marsh 
(2000), who describe a “policy transfer continuum” running between a form of 
coercive compliance (in this case, conditionality) and voluntary adoption (lesson-
drawing). 
 
Table 2.5. Alternative mechanisms of EU rule adoption before accession 































 Lesson drawing Lesson drawing 
 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier acknowledge that, while conditionality 
enables a quick, formal adoption of EU rules on the domestic level, paradoxically, 
it is also the least effective form of compliance in the long run, because it 
produces little behavioural change, whereas voluntary compliance is more likely 
to lead to systematic and profound transformations. Nevertheless, the external 
incentive model is particularly useful for understanding EU-driven compliance. It 
is a rational bargaining system based on exchanging benefits and threats as 
leverage. Concretely, candidates adopt EU rules if the benefits of doing so exceed 
the cost of adoption. This is made possible by the fact that conditionality only 
enables the EU to employ a reactive strategy, whereby it rewards candidates who 
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have successfully implemented a required set of rules, and withholds benefits 
from those who fail to do so. This is meant to make candidates responsible for 
creating a domestic environment conducive to rule adoption, rather than placing 
the power of reinforcement in the hands of the EU. In this respect, one may argue 
that the EU also has an active function in driving rationality. However, the model 
assumes that, in the absence of external incentives, candidates would have no 
motivation to comply with EU rules.  
Aside from rationality, a few other studies suggest that compliance also 
has a spatial and temporal dimension. Böhmelt and Freyburg (2012, 2015) ask 
whether candidates are more or less likely to comply with EU rules when other 
candidates do, and propose two arguments. Firstly, the existence of a spatial 
dimension implies that, in addition to the external pressure of conditionality, 
candidate countries are also under pressure from eachother. This results in a 
form of competitive learning that becomes possible because candidates are 
granted membership in ‘accession waves’. But these waves may also have a 
negative impact on the credibility of conditionality when the EU admits members 
on different levels of alignment. This enables free-riding among candidates, such 
that non-compliance itself becomes less costly and therefore rational. In this 
context, Böhmelt and Freyburg argue that candidates’ patterns of compliance 
behavior is are interdependent, but that free-riding is more likely. They propose 
a number of explanatory factors for the spatial dimension of compliance, such as 
countries’ administrative capacity and membership in the same informational 
networks, along with the credibility of EU conditionality. 
With regards to the temporal dimension of compliance, Böhmelt and 
Freyburg (2012) suggest that candidates’ compliance patterns can be 
understood by examining the credibility of conditionality at different phases of 
the accession process. When do candidates defect? The authors determine that 
this is likely to happen about 1.5 years before the accession treaty is officially 
signed. The stage of accession is the main determinant here: candidates have 
strong incentives to comply with EU law before official membership, but this 
decreases substantially shortly before accession. In fact, Haughton (2007) finds 
that the EU’s transformative power is at its greatest when deciding whether or 
not to open up negotiations, because this step is tied to the credible promise of 
membership. Once negotiations begin, the risk of exclusion is diminished, 
resulting in resistance to change and delays in implementing reforms. This has 
implications on the EU’s ability to enact change beyond this point.  
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The effectiveness of conditionality and its impact on 
democracy 
 
Does EU conditionality always work? Steunrnberg and Dimitrova (2007) show 
that certain factors must be in place to guarantee its effectiveness. Their 
definition of conditionality, like previous ones, emphasize rationality, but also 
outlines several limits of this mechanism. If the date of accession is not fixed, 
conditionality will only be effective if (1) membership has significant benefits; (2) 
the one-time benefits of non-compliance are small; and (3) the candidate is 
patient with regards to the lengthy time frame-of negotiations. On the other 
hand, if the date of accession is fixed, candidates are likely to slow down the 
implementation of reforms. Thus, in order to guarantee the effectiveness of 
conditionality beyond this point, the period between announcing accession and 
actual accession must be as short as possible.  
Further empirical evidence from CEE countries supports the idea that 
rationality can undermine conditionality. For instance, Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier (2005) identify three factors which determine whether a candidate 
will comply: (1) the determinacy of conditions; (2) the size and speed of rewards; 
(3) the credibility of threats; (4) the size of adoption costs. Conversely, the lack 
of credible membership offers and inconsistent use of alternative incentives 
rendered the EU’s efforts to promote institutional changes in its neighborhood 
ineffective (Börzel and Lebanidze, 2017; Lehne, 2014; Schimmelfennig and 
Scholtz, 2008), The result is that, with a few exceptions (Moldova, Georgia, 
Ukraine and Tunisia), the EU is surrounded by unstable or authoritarian regimes. 
What are the implications for QOD when conditionality is both credible 
and effective? Grabbe (2002) comments that, while the prerequisites of 
membership are clear, some are too general and difficult to assess. The 
Copenhagen criteria, established in 1993, stipulate that candidates are required 
to have a consolidated market economy and the capacity to cope with 
competition and market pressures within the EU, and that they must be able to 
take on the obligations of membership and adherence to the aims of political, 
economic and monetary union. They also establish that candidates must have 
stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
the protection of minorities.  
The broadness of these latter category makes it difficult to link 
conditionality to changes in QOD in the pre-accession period. The limited 
number of studies that attempt to do so provide somewhat contradictory 
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evidence. A few scholars indicate that conditionality acting in tandem with 
domestic factors, such as the size of economy and significantly diminished 
authoritarian legacies, led to a gradual improvement of QOD. (Schimmelfennig, 
2004; Gherghina, 2009; Mendelski, 2009). Noutcheva and Bechev (2008) also 
note that conditionality had a noticeable impact in Bulgaria and Romania, the 
EU’s ‘successful laggards’, where delaying accession provided a credible 
sanctions for speeding up reforms in areas such as the quality of governance, 
rule of law, judiciary, corruption and protection of minorities. On the other hand, 
Grabbe (2001) argues that the speed of reforms should not be equated with 
effectiveness. She notes that the EU shifted its priority from legitimacy to 
efficiency during the accession process, thus creating a situation where its efforts 
to promote democratic norms came at odds with the incentives it created. This 
contradiction resulted from the fact that, while the EU promoted the 
involvement of political institutions outside the executive to help implement the 
acquis, the incentives and constraints of the accession process concerned the 
executive. In shifting its bias from legitimacy to efficiency, Grabbe observes that, 
in a sense, the EU exported its democratic deficit to CEECs. This argument finds 
support with Pridham (2008), Goetz (2005) and Zielonka (2007), who show that 
CEE governments created legal and institutional structures to conform to EU 
rules only superficially, while national parliaments were the great losers of the 
integration process. 
Overall, conditionality has been more effective in aligning CEE 
candidates with the requirements of the Acquis in the short-term, rather than 
producing systemic changes that carried over into QOD to produce positive 
effects. In fact, evidence to the contrary seems stronger, particularly where the 
system of checks and balances, which the accession process tipped in favor of 
the executive, is concerned. The democratic character of CEE countries at the 
point where they joined the EU was not in question - at least in the case of the 
2004 enlargement wave. But the immediate and widespread decline of QOD that 
followed their successful accession (See Table 1.1) raises concerns about the 
nature of the EU’s safeguard to preserve democracy, one of its core values, from 
within.  
Arguably, the decline of QOD can be explained through the same lens of 
rationality as pre-accession rule adoption: with the guarantee of membership 
locked in, the costs of compliance exceed its benefits. But the nature of non-
compliance with specific EU norms, and the failure to stabilize QOD are quite 
different. For one thing, if allowed to continue long-term, the latter has much 
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more serious implications across virtually every level of politics and society. For 
another, the EU has the legal capacity to sanction non-compliance, but it is ill-
equipped to deal with democratic deconsolidation on its own turf. In the 
following section, I discuss the nature and effectiveness of the limited tools it can 
use to prevent this trend, and how they can be used to operationalize the EU’s 
domestic impact after accession.  
 
2.2.2. Defining the EU’s post-accession impact: from clear 
instruments to a diffuse concept 
 
Research on post-accession compliance is sparser, but it has produced some 
robust explanations. It should be noted at this point that the post-accession 
concept of compliance may be somewhat confusing. When studying compliance, 
scholars actually examine two different mechanisms: infringement and 
transposition records (Sedelmeier, 2008; Angelova et al., 2012). The carrot-and-
stick mechanism is no longer in place, and sanctions for non-compliance have 
moved into the sphere of the European Commission’s infringement procedures, 
which distinguish between three types of non-compliance: nonconformity, non-
transposition and bad application. Although literature on compliance has 
produced somewhat contradictory results on the factors that enhance or hinder 
it, Angelova et al. (2012) find particularly robust evidence across 37 studies on 
compliance for two arguments: goodness of fit, and institutional decision-making 
capacity. Thus, compliance is enhanced by the similarity between the goals of a 
directive and existing national regulation. Institutional decision-making capacity 
is influenced by the number of veto players, federalism and the effective number 
of parties. In short, the fewer interest groups may dispute the implementation 
of a directive, the more likely it is to be implemented. Other factors found to be 
moderately robust, both theoretically and across case studies, include the 
complexity of the directive, administrative capabilities, corruption and political 
culture.  In addition, Gherghina and Soare (2016) find that the distance from the 
moment of accession is also an explanatory variable for compliance problems.  
The main assumption behind the rational model of compliance, that the 
change in incentive structure once conditionality is retired would result in 
weakening post-accession compliance with EU law, did not find immediate 
support in the post-accession period. On the contrary, Sedelmeier (2008) reports 
that CEE countries initially out-performed the older EU members in terms of legal 
transposition, and there had fewer cases of infringement, which were resolved 
comparatively faster and in the earlier stages of settlement. He concludes that 
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enlargement had not produced an ‘Eastern problem’, as assumed by the rational 
approach. However, despite such optimistic evidence, transposition and 
infringement are unsuitable for measuring the EU’s domestic impact on QOD. 
From a theoretical point of view, the two concepts do not intersect significantly 
with QOD. Some of the policy areas in which they can be observed, such as justice 
or employment and social affairs, can arguably be included in a (maximalist) 
definition of QOD. But the majority of areas in which the EU is able to legislate 
are concentrated towards economic and trade issues. The EU has exclusive 
competences in legislating trade, monetary policy and competition rules for the 
Eurozone and single market, and shares attributions with national governments 
in other fields, such as environment, research, energy and public health (The 
European Commission, n.d.) Thus, looking to transposition and infringement as 
potential tools for measuring the EU’s domestic impact does not reveal any 
significant information about the state of QOD.  
A more useful approach is to return to the concept of democratic deficit, 
which, Grabbe (2001) observes, has been inadvertently exported from the EU to 
CEE candidates in the accession process. In its original form, this deficit refers to 
the disconnection between citizens of the EU, and the democratic decision-
making process, whose complexity renders it inaccessible to the public. Grabbe 
applies the term to the ‘executive bias’ that accession imposed in domestic 
politics. Timely reforms led to a concentration of resources in a strong, 
centralized executive at the expense of national parliaments, thus limiting the 
decision-making power of elected representatives. More recently, Kelemen and 
Blauberger (2017) put forward another interpretation of democratic deficit as a 
bottom-up phenomenon that puts the EU in a precarious position where it 
struggles to respond to democratic deconsolidation in its member states due to 
the lack of suitable legal instruments.  
 
2.2.3. Ad-hoc and ‘designer’ instruments against deconsolidation 
 
Concerns about securing democracy in the Union date back to the 1980s, but 
they became particularly salient after the EU expanded to include a large number 
of post-communist countries (Sedelmeier, 2014; Wallace, 1996; Gherghina and 
Soare, 2016; Sadurski, 2012). The problem is that the EU does not yet have any 
instruments designed to prevent democratic deconsolidation, and those it has 
attempted to use in the past have fallen short of their goal. For example, the EU 
has the option of activating Article 7 of TEU in cases when a member state 
persistently breaches the EU’s core values - among which, democracy and the 
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rule of law. But the procedure for identifying such breaches is difficult: initiating 
the procedure requires a proposal by either one third of the member states, or 
the Commission, the consent of the European Parliament, and unanimity from 
the European Council before it can proceed.  
A few alternative instruments for sanctioning deconsolidation have been 
developed more recently, including social pressure, issue linking, and 
infringement procedures against non-compliance with issues specified in Article 
2 of TEU, which reaffirms democracy as one of the EU’s core values. Social 
pressure comprises of micro-processes meant to produce conforming behaviour 
through the social distribution of rewards and punishments (Johnston, 2001, p. 
499) One particular shortcoming of this ‘naming and shaming’ approach is that 
both benefits and sanctions are rather immaterial - status, a sense of belonging, 
shunning or social exclusion. Johnston argues that, in order for the mechanism 
to be effective, a targeted actors should identify strongly with the group. 
Similarly, Sedelmeier (2014) hypothesizes that social pressure is only effective by 
itself if the target government perceives the EU’s demands as legitimate, while 
material leverage, which mirrors pre-accession conditionality may be more 
effective. Indeed, since rationality has dominated the behavior of CEE countries 
both before and after accession, social pressure alone has failed to produce 
concrete results when stacked up against more substantial benefits and 
sanctions.  
The EU was able to use social pressure successfully only in combination 
with infringement procedures and issue linking against democratic backsliding in 
Romania and Hungary, concerning areas of judiciary independence, corruption, 
media law and data protection. Issue linking is a form of conditionality that 
increases the EU’s leverage over non-compliant member states by threatening 
to withhold material benefits related to other issues. This, argues Sedelmeier, 
can have a significant impact if the target state has strong preferences for an 
agreement in a certain policy areas. Bulgaria and Romania illustrate the 
successful use of issue linking, which connected the promise of Schengen 
membership with progress of judicial reforms and anti-corruption efforts 
monitored through the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM).  This 
mechanism was also used in Hungary when, in 2012, a substantial IMF loan was 
conditioned by the re-establishment of the central bank’s independence. This 
approach was more successful compared to the EU’s other domestic 
interventions in Hungary (Iusmen, 2014). 
The EU is also able to use a general infringement procedure stipulated in 
Articles 258 and 260 of the TFEU, targeting cases of non-compliance with Articles 
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2 and 7 of TEU. This procedure has two steps: firstly, if the Commission finds 
evidence that a member state has committed a breach, it will require said state 
to take the necessary steps to resume compliance. If the member state fails to 
do so, the Commission will refer the case to the European Court of Justice, which 
may then impose financial sanctions (Börzel, 2001). In this form, infringement 
was applied in Hungary, along with issue linking, in 2012.  
Several scholars argue that the EU resorts to these ad-hoc instruments, 
which reflect the logic of pre-accession conditionality to various degrees, 
because it is reluctant to make use of Article 7 of TEU. (Gherghina and Soare, 
2016; Kochenov and Pech, 2016, Sedelmeier, 2017). According to the ar2ticle, if 
evidence of persistent breaching of the values laid out in Article 2 of TEU is found, 
and all procedural requirements for imposing sanctions are met, the Council may 
suspend ‘certain of the rights deriving from the application of the Treaties to the 
Member State in question, including the voting rights of the representative of the 
government of that Member State in the Council.’ If the member state takes 
appropriate measures to remedy the situation, these sanctions are modified or 
revoked. 
Appropriately dubbed ‘the nuclear option’ by the Commission’s 
president, José Manuel Barroso, in his 2012 State of the Union address to the 
European Parliament, Article 7 is seen as a last-resort solution because its 
activation requires unanimity in the Council. The obstacles against fulfilling this 
highly demanding condition are political, mainly consisting of partisanship, and 
concerns that isolating a member state in such a manner may have negative 
consequences on future cooperation within the EU (Sedelmeier, 2017).  
The EU’s reluctance to use Article 7 has pushed it to produce a few 
‘designer’ instruments to mitigate the risk of deconsolidation. In 2014, the Rule 
of Law framework was adopted, introducing an assessment phase during which 
the Commission determines whether there is a credible threat of backsliding, and 
sends a reasoned opinion to the member state in question. A follow-up phase 
checks how the Commission’s recommendations have been implemented and, 
in case of non-compliance, may trigger Article 7 (Kochenov and Pech, 2016). The 
EU Justice Scoreboard is a second, more moderate, option for dealing with 
deconsolidation was introduced in 2013, based on the social pressure approach 
(Sedelmeier, 2017). However, there is no evidence at the moment that these 
instruments are any more effective than similar past attempts to contain 
deconsolidation. The Rule of Law framework only adds an extra constraint to the 
activation of Article 7, while the Justice Scoreboard is subject to the same 
limitation as other approaches anchored in social pressure: if member states are 
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driven by a rational, rather than normative logic in their actions, then ‘naming 
and shaming’ is less likely to produce any viable changes.  
Regardless of their nature or efficacy, the EU’s domestic interventions 
have had some unintended reverberations in domestic politics. Chief among 
these is the fact that national governments have been able to turn these 
interventions into an ‘us versus them’ discourse (Schlipphak and Treib, 2017) 
that plays up the negative effects of sanctions, and claims the EU does not have 
sufficient legitimacy to make its demands. Indeed, if this survey of normative and 
legal instruments proves anything, it is that, in the post-accession era, the EU’s 
relationship with its member states is no longer top-down, nor effectively 
conditional. Member states have gained bargaining power through various 
institutional, political and economic channels, while the EU has become 
vulnerable due to its failure to safeguard one of its core values - democracy. 
Up to this point, the discussion has highlighted many of the shortcomings 
of previous attempts to operationalize the EU’s domestic impact after accession. 
And while they have certainly been valuable in drawing up a robust body of 
empirical evidence for the legal aspects of (non-)compliance, it is, I believe, fairly 
clear at this point that they would be inconsistent with the concept of external 
embeddedness. Therefore, in the final part of this chapter, I propose my own 
operationalization, based on the more balanced two-way relationship between 
the EU and CEE countries in the post-accession period.  
 
 
2.3. Operationalizing the international dimension of external 
embeddedness: a two-way road 
 
The idea of using bargaining power and vulnerability as the two dimensions of 
international integration originates with Way and Levitky’s 2007 article, Linkage, 
Leverage and the Post-Communist Divide, where they describe a framework for 
analyzing the capacity of external actors to support democratization in 
authoritarian regimes. According to this framework, democratic (Western) 
actors are able to exert domestic leverage proportional to authoritarian 
governments’ vulnerability to external pressures. Way and Levitsky define 
leverage to include (1) the bargaining power of these regimes in relation to the 
West, or their ability to avoid Western sanctions of autocratic abuse; and (2) the 
potential economic and security impact of Western actors. Countries with weak 
bargaining power are more vulnerable to external sanctions, while stronger 
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bargaining power reduces external pressures. Leverage is high in the former 
case, and weak in the latter.  
 Of course, using this framework to operationalize the relationship 
between two democratic actors requires more than just the obvious 
qualifications. The concept of bargaining power is useful, in the form proposed 
by Way and Levitsky, as long as it operates on the assumption that democracy is 
always more likely to deteriorate in member states without the EU’s 
intervention. It also assumes the EU will always act in the interest of preserving 
democracy. Even with substantial empirical support, the two statements are too 
broad, and very likely fallacious. However, they provide a valuable observation, 
on which I base my operationalization: where democratic deconsolidation is 
observed, member states and the EU act as opposite, but unequal forces. This 
explains why the EU, with its limited legal instruments, has been more successful 
in controlling deconsolidation in some cases, and not others: countries with 
higher bargaining power are able to ignore the threat of sanctions, or comply 
only partially when they can ‘afford’ the material costs of non-compliance; 
conversely, weak bargaining power makes a country more likely to comply in 
order to avoid sanctions.  
 The EU’s position is a little more difficult to tease out conceptually. 
Certainly, it is clear that bargaining power makes it more vulnerable by reducing 
its options for domestic impact. This is further compounded by the lack of 
effective options for responding to non-compliance. Increased vulnerability 
should not be understood as something as drastic as putting the EU at risk of 
disintegration. The long process of formation, enlargement and integration on 
levels that go far beyond economic and political, and the high costs of leaving 
the EU, recently illustrated by Brexit, make it unlikely that such a disintegration 
will occur in the foreseeable future. Vulnerability has a specific meaning in this 
dissertation: the EU has demonstrated that it is ill-equipped to deal with 
democratic decline, and this adds another risk factor to a political and 
institutional environment that has already failed to live up to the optimistic 
expectations of the 1990s.  
 Similarly, measuring bargaining power is more intuitive. This is why, in 
Table 2.3. I include it among the operationalized conditions of external 
embeddedness, together with populism and the social and economic contexts, 
but I choose to treat vulnerability in the same way as civil society and the 
historical context. I propose measuring bargaining power based on three 
indicators. The size of a country’s economy reflects the degree to which it is able 
to afford financial sanctions imposed either through the general infringement 
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procedure, or the Commission’s Rule of Law framework. Additionally, it can play 
a role in how member states decide, based on economic ties or the prospect 
thereof, to cooperate or defect when voting in the Council. For this particular 
reason, I also use voting power for measurement. A qualified majority is the 
standard voting procedure in the Council, based on which approximately 80% of 
EU legislation is adopted. (The European Council, n.d.) It requires that two 
conditions are met: favorable votes from 55% of member states, representing at 
least 65% of the EU’s population. Countries may also form a blocking minority 
when their vote represents more than 35% of the population. CEE countries 
would not be able to turn a vote around in the Council against all other members, 
because, even acting together, they fulfill neither of the two conditions above. 
Nevertheless they may be able to achieve their goals by cooperating with other 
members. The final component of bargaining power is an indicator of 
Euroscepticism, in line with Schlipphak and Treib’s (2017) observation about 
national governments framing EU sanctions in terms of ‘us versus them’. 
Specifically, I use Eurobarometer data negative responses to the questions ‘Do 
you tend to trust or not trust the European Union?’  
 Thus, the three components of bargaining power are: the size of the 
economy, voting power in the Council, and level of Euroscepticism. Similar to the 
social and economic contexts, bargaining power is calculated as an average of 
the three indicators, and has an inverse relationship to democracy: higher 
bargaining power is expected to have a negative impact on QOD, while lower 
bargaining power leaves more room for the EU to intervene and potentially 
stabilize democracy. Much like the other conditions that have been 
operationalized as part of the same analytical step, bargaining power is also kept 
quite diffuse because in the study’s first stage, following in Chapter 4, the focus 
is on conditions, not causal mechanisms. But there are two other reasons for this. 
CEE countries are smaller and less populous than their older counterparts, and 
have comparatively weaker economies. This is why it may appear, at this point, 
that none of the conditions of external embeddedness can, by itself, make a 
difference in how an individual member state behaves in relation to the EU, or 
to the threat of deconsolidation. However, I have argued here that the value of 
the embeddedness mode lies in how it is able to differentiate between 
conditions and causes, and thus enable both cross-case and within case analysis 
as part of the same research design. The second reason is the potential of this 
approach for future studies. The conditions of external embeddedness may not 
vary significantly among CEE countries, but they tell a vastly different story when 
applied to older member states with their older, and more stable democracies, 
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or across all 28 EU countries. It is for this particular reason that I have chosen to 
keep operationalization so broad.  
 
 
2.4. Conclusions: focusing the concepts 
 
At different points throughout this theoretical chapter I referred to 
democracy in terms of backsliding, loss of QOD, or deconsolidation. In this final 
part, I wish to clarify how these terms will be used in the dissertation from this 
point on. As I explained in Chapter 1, deconsolidation is derived from the shifting 
paradigm regarding the contradictory evolution of democracy. It is one of the 
two main concepts, along with embeddedness, used in this study, but it is not 
treated as an umbrella term for the many other concepts and theories literature 
has put forward in the last decade-plus to explain why democracy currently 
behaves as it does. I chose to use deconsolidation in recognition of the fact that 
the state of democracy has become more precarious in CEE countries, but not in 
an abrupt or, in the beginning, even a particularly alarming way. Deconsolidation 
describes a sustained, long-term trend that can currently be observed in CEE over 
a period of nearly fifteen years, but more radical trends have been observed only 
a few cases (most notably Hungary and Poland). When this period is broken 
down into smaller intervals, as I do in the following three chapters, the trend is 
less consistent. In many cases, democracy improves over one or more of these 
short intervals, only to decline overall. This is where the quality of democracy 
comes in. In simple terms, I use QOD in this study to operationalize 
deconsolidation, but, as explained above, I do not equate QOD decline over 
shorter periods with deconsolidation itself. Rather, I treat their relationship in a 
similar way to how I described conditions and causes: deconsolidation provides 
the context, while QOD reveals specific causal mechanisms.  
A final note on terminology: the choice of method for this study requires 
that both deconsolidation and its opposite phenomenon be examined because, 
while as outcomes they are symmetrical, their respective conditions may not be. 
How should this opposite trend be called? ‘Democratic consolidation’ is the 
obvious answer, but I suggest that it is not entirely suitable here. This is firstly 
because a consolidated democracy is a precondition for joining the EU and, 
indeed, many of the studies discussed in this chapter recognize that CEE 
countries had achieved this goal to a satisfactory degree at the time of accession. 
Secondly, if consolidation is conceptualized in the same manner as 
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deconsolidation - a sustained, long-term trend of QOD growth - there is virtually 
no evidence that it has occurred in CEE countries other than Czech Republic and 
the Baltic States, and even here it has been inconsistent over shorter periods of 
time. This is not to say, however, that further democratic consolidation is not 
possible in the region. If anything, it is quickly becoming necessary. But I choose 
not to use the term ‘consolidation’ in this study in order to maintain consistency 
between concepts and observed evidence. For this reason, I refer instead to the 
more general ‘democratic improvement’, operationalized as an observed growth 
of QOD. 
In the following chapter, I introduce the research design and set-
theoretic methodological approach used to study both these levels. I should 
emphasize, in advance, that the theoretical and methodological components are 
closely intertwined in this dissertation, because it is possible to translate 
embeddedness from natural into set-theoretic language. This further allows for 
both rigorous theory testing, and expanding Merkel’s original model, if enough 

























Methodology: set-theoretic multimethod 
research 
 
3.1. Setting the scene for case-oriented theory testing 
One of the ideas this dissertation subscribes to is that, in the social world, a single 
explanation rarely represents reality accurately (Hesse-Biber Nagy, Rodrigues 
and Frost, 2016; Goertz and Mahoney, 2012; Ragin, 1987; Crabtree and Miller, 
1999). The method by which reality is examined should therefore reflect this 
view by allowing the exploration of multiple, coexisting causal paths. With the 
theoretical background in place, the building blocks of these paths are clear, but 
their interactions and underlying mechanisms are not. With only four conditions 
operationalized thus far - social and economic contexts, populism and 
international integration - the number of explanatory configurations is small, but 
the approach becomes more complicated due to its nature as a cross-case study. 
The choice of methodological approach should, then, also address this level of 
case/condition complexity.  
Aside from the multiplicity of explanations, two more points must be 
considered when choosing a method. The overarching focus of my research is to 
test the embeddedness model’s ability to explain deconsolidation in Central and 
Eastern Europe. If empirical evidence suggests that some level of theory building 
is also required to integrate the findings, the goal is to provide a better 
understanding of the mechanisms linking the conditions of embeddedness to 
deconsolidation, rather than find additional conditions to supplement the 
original model. The latter has been addressed extensively in the past by literature 
on QOD, which found relevant conditions outside the embeddedness model: for 
instance, levels of education and urbanization (Neubauer, 1967), the absence of 
violence against marginalized groups (Schwarzmantel, 2010) institutionalized 
limited political uncertainty (Schmitter and Karl, 1991) and state capacity (Fortin, 
2012). However, unpacking causal processes, rather than expanding the scope of 
conditions, is valuable for its focus on the actors and actions responsible for 
generating certain causal paths.  
The second point is that the approach should balance out the somewhat 
conflicting nature of this analysis. On the one hand, finding out how theorized 
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conditions interact to form explanatory paths requires a degree of generalization 
across multiple cases. On the other hand, studying the causal mechanisms 
behind these explanations calls for detailed evidence that is best found by 
looking at individual cases. Table 3.1 summarizes the methodological issues 
relevant to the cross-case and within-case division. 
 
Table 3.1. Case-oriented methodological issues 
 CROSS-CASE WITHIN-CASE 
LEVEL OF ANALYSIS Multiple (large or 
medium-N) cases 
Single (or a few) cases 
FOCU OF ANALYSIS Finding multiple, 




OUTCOME EXPLANATION Asymmetric explanation 
of outcome/absence of 
outcome 
Specific to individual cases 
 
Aside from the different numbers of cases used at each level of analysis, 
there is a difference in focus. The role of cross-case analysis is to find conditions 
that explain the outcome of interest, but a separate approach is needed to 
explain the underlying processes that link the two. Perhaps more importantly, in 
line with the assumption of causal complexity, is the issue of outcome symmetry. 
While the special focus in this analysis is on democratic deconsolidation, it is also 
important to address cases where QOD has improved or been stable. On a 
theoretical level, it may be tempting to consider the explanations for 
deconsolidation and improvement symmetrical, as Wolfgang Merkel himself 
implies with embeddedness. But in reality, cases rarely behave so neatly, and 
some allowances must be made for asymmetry. In other words, if a certain 
combination of conditions is found to explain democratic improvement in some 
cases, it does not automatically follow that its absence explains deconsolidation 
in others, and a sound methodological approach should reflect this.  
The issues highlighted in Table 3.1 carry different importance for the 
choice of methodology. The first, regarding levels of analysis, is particularly 
important for technical reasons, and suggests that a multimethod approach is 
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best suited for moving more easily between levels. But it also dictates that 
methodological alignment is necessary with regards to the focus of analysis. 
Asymmetry should be accounted for empirically, as another reflection of 
complexity in explanation. In sum, three general considerations are essential for 
the choice of method. Firstly, and most importantly, a single method is too 
simplistic to allow for complexity and outcome asymmetry, so a multimethod 
approach is required. Secondly, understanding how conditions are linked to the 
outcome, and what the underlying explanatory mechanisms are, is best achieved 
from a qualitative perspective. And finally, empirical evidence is found in cases, 
multiple or individual, making this a case-oriented study. Based on these points, 
the discussion on methodological approach in this chapter proceeds as follows. 
In the next part I give an overview of set-theoretic multimethod research, the 
analytical tool used in this dissertation, and its roots in case-oriented qualitative 
methodology. I then present its two components, qualitative comparative 
analysis and process tracing, focusing on their respective goals and analytical 
steps. And finally, I discuss the potential and limitations of the set-theoretic 
multimethod approach for this study. 
 
 
3.2. An overview of set-theoretic multimethod research 
Set-theoretic multimethod research (hereafter set-theoretic MMR), which 
combines qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) and process tracing, has 
recently received a lot of attention for its potential to study causal mechanisms 
qualitatively at different empirical levels (Beach, 2018; Beach and Rohlfing, 2018; 
Schneider and Rohlfing, 2013; Blatter and Haverland, 2014; Rohlfing and 
Schneider, 2013). However, a thorough and much-needed discussion on how to 
integrate the underlying assumptions of the two methodological strands has not 
occurred until recently. While they are both case-oriented and anchored in set-
theory (Goertz and Mahoney, 2012), it is not immediately clear how they can be 
combined in an integrated, coherent inquiry. Rohlfing and Schneider (2018) 
argue that at the heart of the problem is precisely the difference between the 
analytical levels where QCA and process tracing operate. The former deals with 
multiple cases (medium or large-N), while the latter is used for within-case 
analysis. At first glance, this does not appear to be a significant obstacle for 
research design. On the contrary, it seems quite intuitive to use QCA first to 
uncover explanatory conditions for an outcome found in multiple cases, and then 
use the findings to study the mechanism in more detail through process tracing. 
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In practical terms, this is how set-theoretic MMR design often proceeds. But the 
fundamental assumptions of QCA and process tracing are not aligned by default. 
QCA is causal in nature to the extent that it says something about set relations, 
but it yields little information about the mechanisms linking the sets. Set-
relations can be interpreted as causal where there is enough evidence to do so, 
but causation is not implicit. For example, there may be a significant overlap 
between the ‘economically prosperous EU members’ set and the ‘consolidated 
democracies’ set, but this only establishes a superficial link between democracy, 
socio-economic conditions and international integration. By itself, this finding 
does not explain the processes that connect conditions and outcomes. This is the 
role of process tracing, which is used to find evidence of the mechanisms within 
a single case. In other words, QCA provides refined, empirically supported 
theoretical statements, and process tracing provides the evidence, drawing on 
single cases. 
To align the two methods, Rohlfing and Schneider use the concept of 
mechanisms as chains of entities and activities anchored in set-theory, 
developed by Machamer, Darden and Craver (2000), but suggest referring to 
entities and activities as actors and their behavior (Rohlfing and Schneider, 2018, 
p. 40). They then define causal mechanisms as chains of actors showing a certain 
behavior. In set-theoretic terms, each actor-behavior pair is sufficient for the 
occurrence of the next actor-behavior in the chain, and all actor-behavior 
combinations taken together are sufficient to generate the outcome. In the 
following parts of this chapter, I present QCA and process tracing as approaches 
to causal complexity, and as analytical techniques.  
 
 
3.3. Qualitative comparative analysis 
QCA was first introduced by Charles Ragin in his 1987 book, The 
Comparative Method: Moving beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies. 
Since then, several extensive examinations of the method (Scheider and 
Wagemann, 2012; Rihoux and Ragin, 2008; Ragin, 2008; Goertz and Mahoney, 
2012) have emphasized the idea that QCA is not simply a data analysis technique, 
but a particular approach to examining social phenomena that stands apart from 
the typically employed qualitative and quantitative traditions. As an approach, it 
attempts to bridge the gap between the two in a holistic manner; as a technique 
it offers a way to identify complex causal relations and works in tandem with 
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other methods to enrich the explanatory power of these relations. The following 
section looks at three questions: How is QCA used to make causal inferences? 
What are the goals of QCA? And how is QCA comparative in nature? 
 
3.3.1. QCA as approach 
 
A bridge between methodological traditions 
 
In their book, A Tale of Two Cultures: Qualitative and Quantitative Research in 
the Social Sciences, Goertz and Mahoney (2012) posit that there is a clear 
distinction between the two classic methodological approaches in social science 
research, which makes communication across these ‘cultures’ difficult and likely 
to generate misunderstandings. In the quantitative tradition, causal complexity 
is understood as one phenomenon having multiple causes, such that one 
dependent variable can be explained by multiple independent variables. On the 
other hand, the qualitative tradition understands causal complexity through the 
lens of interaction: researchers can find different combinations of conditions for 
one outcome. These combinations should not be interpreted as interaction 
terms, but as 'causal recipes' (Goertz and Mahoney, 2012, p. 57). In set-theoretic 
specific terms, this means that such combinations are sufficient to produce the 
outcome. Thus, rather than focusing on individual variables, this qualitative 
approach examines the context in which a certain condition impacts the 
outcome, since the impact of a condition can vary across different causal 
configurations. 
Another key difference between the quantitative and qualitative 
traditions is that qualitative approaches typically use within-case analysis to 
make inferences about a specific case, while quantitative approaches use cross-
case analysis and statistical methods to make inferences about populations. But 
a more careful look reveals that the scope of analysis is tied to the depth of the 
explanation, rather than the number of cases. This trade-off between the 
complexity and coverage of explanations may be addressed with the help of 
multimethod research designs, but the goals of qualitative and quantitative 
approaches remain distinct and seemingly difficult to reconcile. 
A number of researchers claim that one of the strength of set-theoretic 
methods is that they reflect the meaning and structure of natural language 
(Schneider and Wagemann, 2012; Goertz, 2006)  and are useful in creating 
typologies (George and Bennet, 2005, ch. 11; Kvist, 2006)  For example, the 
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democratic peace theory, in its formulaic version stating that democracies do not 
fight eachother, can easily be translated into set-theoretic terms: given the 
concepts ‘democracy’ and ‘war’, there should be no coincidence between cases 
belonging to the ‘democratic countries’ set and the ‘countries currently at war 
with eachother’ set. Any such coincidence would offer empirical evidence that 
should lead to a re-examination of the theory.  
The argument that one of the particular strengths of set-theoretic 
methods is their ability to reflect the structure of natural language has been 
challenged by George Lakoff (Ramzipoor, 2014), who states that the classic 
formulation of set-theory (crisp sets) fails to do so particularly because it does 
not allow for degrees of categorization, but operates with clear dichotomies 
where an object is either a full member of a conceptual set or fully outside of it. 
Lakoff also maintains that the notion of fuzzy sets as described by Ragin in his 
later work (2008) is similarly unsuitable for reflecting natural language. His 
argument is that fuzzy logic operates linearly, describing cases’ degree of 
membership in conceptual sets (e.g. countries that differ in terms of economic 
prosperity) and that the different scoring intervals are themselves fixed rather 
than fuzzy. 
Despite these differences the debate is settled on two points. The first, 
more general one, is that the language of logic, which set-theoretic methods 
employ, does not always reflect reality as we observe and conceptualize it. This 
has some empirical implications for the research conducted in this dissertation, 
which I will address in the end of this chapter. The second is that crisp sets are 
too limiting to be used in concept or theory formulation because they do not 
capture enough information to allow for anything other than superficial 
empirical testing. It is true that a country can either be a democracy or a non-
democracy, but these categories are not very useful. More so would be to explain 
how (non-)democratic a country is or what kind of (non-)democracy it is. This 
requires a differentiation of degrees or typologies, but there is disagreement in 
literature on whether fuzzy sets can be used to create the latter. 
The purpose of examining this debate in the context of Ragin’s claim that 
QCA is meant to bridge the qualitative and quantitative research approaches is 
to emphasize the relationship between how theoretical claims are formulated, 
and how they are tested. Whether or not set-theory is equipped to represent 
concepts and theories accurately, it nevertheless reflects the linguistic structures 
used to formulate them. Consider, for example, a more abstract version of 
Merkel’s claim about the relationship between internal and external 
embeddedness: a prosperous economy, active civil society and high degree of 
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international integration are conditions favorable to a stable democracy. This is 
already a simplified version of the relationship he postulates between 
democracy and the factors that protect it from destabilizing factors. But this 
higher degree of generality allows for an easier translation into set-theoretic 
terms: accounting for various degrees of membership, cases belonging to the 
sets of ‘economically prosperous countries’, ‘countries with active civil societies’ 
and ‘countries that are members of international economic and political 
organizations’ should also be found in the set of ‘stable democracies’. This 
formulation, while somewhat awkward, clearly shows how a theory expressed 
verbally can be transposed into the language of logic: given theoretical 
expectations about the three conditions of external embeddedness and their 
positive impact on democratic stability, there should be some overlapping of the 
three conceptual sets describing the conditions, and the set describing the 
outcome. From here, it is possible to determine both how well the theorized 
model describes data, and how relevant or trivial it is in relation to empirical 
cases. 
The lesson here is that set-theoretic methods – and QCA in particular – 
bridge qualitative and quantitative approaches by translating verbal theories into 
the language of logic, which makes them amenable both to empirical testing and 
the possibility of finding multiple mutually non-exclusive explanations for an 
outcome, which can then be used to further enrich theory. The strength of set 
theory does not lie simply in its ability to facilitate this translation as, indeed, the 
quantitative approach has a far richer history as the go-to method for empirical 
testing.  
In sum, this section focused on two arguments. The first is that set-
theoretic methods, of which QCA is the most thoroughly formalized, are not only 
a tool for data analysis, but also an approach to studying social reality that seeks 
to bridge the long-standing qualitative and quantitative traditions. Secondly, 
Ragin’s original intention to offer QCA as a way of bridging the qualitative and 
quantitative traditions is not simply based on technical considerations of sample 
size and complexity of results. In terms of the breadth of explanation, QCA does 
indeed operate as a mid-point between qualitative and quantitative analysis by 
facilitating small- and medium-N research designs. The bridging of qualitative 
and quantitative traditions comes primarily from the fact that, much like the 
quantitative approach, QCA translates theories formulated using natural 
language into terms amenable for empirical testing; but unlike the quantitative 
approach, it allows for multiple, mutually non-exclusive explanations for an 




The goals of QCA 
 
In his 1987 introduction to QCA, Charles Ragin suggests that the goal of QCA is 
to replicate the principles of case-oriented research in a compatible 
mathematical framework. The takeaway point is that the misfit between 
statistics and the complexity of social phenomena is not automatic, but occurs 
when quantitative methods are applied without taking into account the wider 
context, which a rigorous quantitative study must address. Boolean algebra, the 
method’s mathematical core, is meant to reflect the configurational thinking that 
forms the basis of the set-theoretic approach and, in addition, introduce the 
language of logic in an analytical system where probabilistic language is 
unsuitable. However, this bridging of tradition is still fairly vague on the subject 
of what QCA can do in practice. Revisiting the goals of QCA in more specific 
terms, Ragin, together with Benoît Rihoux, list five main purposes (Ragin and 
Rihoux, 2004, p. 6). Firstly, QCA can be used to summarize empirical data in the 
form of a truth table, which shows all the possible configurations of conditions 
and their corresponding outcome and empirical cases (see section 3.3.2. below 
for a more detailed explanation). In this form, QCA is simply a tool for data 
exploration. Based on this, a second goal is to check the coherence of data 
through observing whether any contradictory combinations (where cases with 
the same configurations of conditions exhibit different outcomes) occur. Thirdly, 
QCA can be used for hypothesis or theory testing. Relatedly, researchers can also 
use it as a way to test their own assumptions, without referring to any pre-
existing hypothesis or theory. And finally, QCA can be used as a starting point for 
developing new theoretical assumptions in the form of hypotheses to be tested 
in the future. 
The claim that QCA can be used for theory or hypothesis testing is 
particularly promising for a research design that makes causal and comparative 
assumptions. Theories typically make statements about the causes of a certain 
phenomenon, but are rarely very explicit on how these causes interact, and 
whether these interactions can change the way individual causes affect the 
outcome. A configurational approach to theory testing would thus be a good 
starting point for expanding theoretical statements. But despite this obvious 
advantage, QCA’s power to test theories in practice has also been questioned. 
Schneider and Wagemann (2012, p. 296-305) suggest that standard hypothesis 
testing is not compatible with set-theoretic methods. The reason, as with other 
qualitative methods, is that the product of QCA is a detailed account of how the 
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outcome has occurred, based on empirical evidence. Since evidence is examined 
first, explanations follow at the end of the analysis, and so can be seen as 
hypotheses themselves, rather than the outcome of testing pre-existing ones.  
All this is not to say that QCA cannot be used to test theories. The idea 
has already been proposed in the 80s by Ragin himself (1987, p. 144). But testing 
should be designed in a way that is compatible with the assumptions of set-
theoretic methods, such as the use of Boolean algebra rules, as suggested by 
Schneider and Wagemann8. It first requires that a full QCA analysis is run to 
obtain configurations of conditions sufficient for the outcome. The second step 
is to translate the theory from its verbal form into a Boolean expression similar 
to these configurations. This is done based on so-called theoretical expectations 
about the conditions and outcome under examination. The third step is then to 
intersect the theoretical and observed configuration. As an illustration, consider 
Schneider and Wagemann’s hypothetical example (2012, p. 298). If the Boolean 
expression for the theory is: 
 
T: B + ~AC → Y 
 
and the observed configuration is: 
 
S: B~C + AC → Y 
 
then the intersection of T and S is: 
 
TS: (B + ~AC)*(B~C + AC) = ABC + B~C 
  
Interpreting this intersection depends on the specifics of conditions and 
outcome, as well as initial theoretical expectations about them. Theory testing 
with QCA is quite sophisticated, but, as with all set-theoretic assumptions and 
techniques, it is primarily qualitative in nature. In the following section, I present 
the more technical aspects of the method, where maintaining this perspective is 





                                               
8 They refer to theory testing as ‘theory evaluation’. 
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Sets and set relations 
 
Previously I brought up, at different times, the concepts of set relations, crisp- 
and fuzzy-sets without offering a specific definition to either. Since these are 
essential to understanding how the set-theoretic approach approaches causality, 
it is useful to pause and clarify their meaning. A set is defined in relation to how 
it reflects a certain concept (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, p. 24). Mahoney 
(2010, p. 2) shows that treating concepts as ‘mental representation[s] of an 
empirical property’ requires the use of variables to measure cases in terms of 
whether and to what extent they exhibit that empirical property. On the other 
hand, defining concepts as sets, i.e. ‘boundaries that define zones of inclusion 
and exclusion’ (Mahoney, 2010, p. 7), helps measure cases in terms of how they 
fit within these boundaries. In short, the question of whether or not a case can 
be described by a concept (and to what degree) is the process by which 
membership scores are assigned to cases (also referred to as calibration). QCA 
operates with two types of sets: crisp and fuzzy. The former are sets that allow 
either full membership or no membership of cases, while the latter include 
partial membership as well. When measuring a case’s membership in a crisp set 
dichotomozation (scores of 1 and 0) is used to represent whether the case is in 
or out of the conceptual boundaries. Membership scores for fuzzy sets are 
assigned on a verbally expressed scale. 
The aim of conducting QCA is to examine the nature of the relations 
between the sets of conditions and outcome, which are reflected in patterns of 
necessity and sufficiency. The basic logic of necessity states that a condition X is 
necessary if, whenever the outcome Y is present, the condition is also present. 
In terms of set relations, this means that any case that is a member of the set Y 
is also a member of the set X, and no cases that exhibit the outcome Y can be 
found outside the set X. In other words, Y is a subset of X (in set-theoretic 
notation Y ← X). The logic of sufficiency is symmetric. It states that a condition X 
is considered sufficient if, whenever it is present, the outcome Y is also present, 
and there can be no case that exhibits the condition but not the outcome. Put 
differently, X is a subset of Y (in set-theoretic notation X → Y). When natural 
language is used to postulate certain causal relations, it is expressed as the 









In QCA, the term ‘causal complexity’ has a specific meaning encompassing three 
concepts – equifinality, asymmetry and conjunctural causation – which are 
examined here in more detail. Consider a typical QCA solution formula: 
 
AB + CD + BD → Y 
 
where Y represents the outcome, and A, B, C and D are the conditions leading to 
it. QCA does not assume additivity, but rather conjunctural causation – a 
situation where the effect of a single condition occurs in combination with other 
clearly defined conditions. A, B, C and D are all individual conditions that interact 
with eachother to form the solution terms ‘A and B’, ‘C and D’ and ‘B and D’, 
which means that in each solution terms the conditions must occur together as 
specified. Here the plus sign is not interpreted arithmetically as a summation of 
terms, but as a logical ‘OR’. Thus, the solution formula reads: 
 
Conditions ‘A and B’ OR ‘C and D’ OR ‘B and D’ are sufficient for the outcome Y 
 
The solution terms – interactions of individual conditions – are alternative 
sufficient paths leading to the same outcome and accounting for all empirical 
evidence observed. In the set-theoretic approach this is known as equifinality. 
Combined with asymmetry, which states that the presence of an outcome and 
its absence should be examined separately because they may be explained by 
different combinations of conditions (Goertz and Mahoney, 2012, p. 68), 
provides a good reflection of the complexity of social phenomena. 
Thus, one of the strengths of QCA is that it produces ‘causal recipes’ 
(Goertz and Mahoney 2012, p. 56-57) where individual conditions interact to give 
a detailed picture of the context in which an outcome may or may not occur. This 
is a good reflection of Ragin’s original definition of QCA as a strategy for 
‘comparing wholes as configurations of parts’ (Ragin, 1987, p. 84) Combining the 
concept of conjunctural causation with the notions of necessity and sufficiency, 
two types of causal paths can be identified (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, p. 
79-80).  INUS conditions (conditions that are individually insufficient but 
necessary parts of a combination that is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the 





AB + CD + BD → Y 
 
Here, condition A produces the outcome Y only in combination with condition B. 
Individually, it is insufficient for the outcome, but it is a necessary part of the 
conjunction. In turn, the combination AB is one of the sufficient conjunctions that 
produce the outcome Y. All individual conditions in this formula receive the same 
treatment and are thus INUS conditions. The other type are SUIN conditions 
(conditions that are a sufficient but unnecessary part of a conjunction that is 
itself insufficient but necessary for the outcome). They occur most often in 
relation to the analysis of necessity. A solution formula illustrating this type of 
condition would be quite different. For example, in:  
 
(A+B)(C+D) → Y 
 
the unions A+B and C+D are by themselves insufficient to produce Y, but the 
conditions A, B, C and D are individually unnecessary and thus alternatives to one 
another. (A+B)*(C+D) as a conjunction is sufficient for the occurrence of the 
outcome. 
As the previous section dealing with the differences between qualitative and 
quantitative traditions in the social sciences has shown, measuring the impact of 
individual conditions is the domain of statistical analysis, while qualitative 
methods focus more on context and interactions. The typology of INUS and SUIN 
conditions provides way of looking at individual conditions consistently with QCA 
procedures. While it is still impossible to measure the exact effect of each 
condition, their relationship to eachother and to the outcome can be described 
quite easily. For example, a single condition may be necessary for the outcome, 
but it is quite rare that a single condition is both necessary and sufficient. On the 
other hand, INUS conditions are very common in the analysis of sufficiency. 
To sum up, QCA finds explanations for social phenomena by taking causal 
complexity into account. This means that it is capable of finding multiple 
coexisting explanations for the outcome while accounting for how single 
conditions interact with eachother.  It also assumes, quite sensibly, that the same 
conditions explaining the occurrence of the outcome may not explain its 
absence, and so the two instances should be examined separately. In the next 
part – the final one dealing with the aspects that make set-theoretic methods a 





The comparative nature of QCA 
 
When discussing comparativeness in set theory, the differences between the 
quantitative and qualitative traditions come into play once again. When Ragin 
introduced QCA in 1987, he did so with particular emphasis on the advantages 
that qualitative approaches have over quantitative ones in enabling 
comparisons. Describing the logic of the comparative method, he wrote: 
“When qualitatively oriented comparativists compare, they study how 
different conditions or causes fit together in one setting and contrast that 
with how they fit together in another setting […] they tend to analyze 
each observational entity as an interpretable combination of parts – as a 
whole. Thus, the explanations of comparative social science typically cite 
convergent causal conditions, causes that fit together or combine in a 
certain manner.” (p. 33-34) 
According to Ragin, a notable advantage that the qualitative comparative 
approach has over statistical methods is that it accounts for all instances of a 
certain phenomenon by enabling us to study both cases that are typical for the 
outcome, as well as deviant cases that fall outside the stipulated causal relation. 
Furthermore, in QCA comparative boundaries are established by the researcher 
rather than based on a more loosely defined population, as is the case with 
quantitative methods. Once the cases and outcome of interest have been 
identified, Berg-Scholsser and De Meur (2008) discuss two strategies for 
proceeding with comparisons. The most similar and most different system 
designs are based on John-Stuart Mill’s methods of difference and agreement 
respectively. Mill postulated that, if one or more instances of the same 
phenomenon have only one circumstance in common, that circumstance 
represents the cause. Conversely, if two instances exhibit opposite outcomes 
and all conditions except one in common, that differentiating condition 
represents the cause.   
The notion of most different and most similar systems was first discussed 
by Przeworski and Teune (1970), who posited that the main assumption behind 
the most similar systems approach was to select cases that share as many 
features as possible, so that the differences between them can be isolated as 
explanations. The alternative strategy of most different systems starts from the 
variations observed at individual levels. The first step is to identify the conditions 
observed within the system that ‘do not violate the assumption of homogeneity 
of the total population’ (Przeworski and Teune, 1970, p. 35). Then, if the 
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relationship between the conditions and the outcome is the same among sub-
groups, the differences do not need to be taken into account. In short, by 
contrasting cases we eliminate all conditions that do not lead to the same 
outcome. But Rihoux and De Meur (2008) argue, that until recently, the models 
proposed by Przeworski and Teune have not been fully operationalized. The 
models can be simplified as MSDO (most similar systems with a different 
outcome) and MDSO (most different systems with the same outcome). MSDO is 
most applicable to ‘very small-N’ populations where matching cases for 
comparison can help researchers narrow down conditions explaining the 
occurrence of the outcome, with the aim of finding conditions that may produce 
the outcome. MDSO can be used in theory testing and applied to larger, if still 
quite limited, population. Rihoux and De Meur suggest 15-25 cases of compatible 
cases. 
The comparative aspect of QCA is particularly highlighted in how it 
combines with other methods to produce in-depth explanations of the 
phenomenon being examined. The QCA ‘process’ as such – the analytical 
moment – is itself only an intermediate stage in the course of explaining 
causation. A pre-analytical case selection must first be conducted, on the basis 
of shared characteristics, which can later be adapted depending on the initial 
insights from the analytical moment. Comparison takes center-stage in the post-
analytical stage where the solution term found through QCA is further examined. 
Typically at this point researchers turn to more conventional qualitative methods 
to supplement their findings, such as comparative case studies and process 
tracing, for which QCA is quite versatile at isolating relevant cases. 
There are several strategies for selecting cases to compare (Schneider 
and Wagemann 2012, p. 307-310) but the focus in this dissertation is on 
comparing typical cases (where both the outcome and the condition is present) 
to further explore the mechanisms linking the conditions and the outcome. Aside 
from providing more empirical support to both original theoretical assumptions 
and QCA results, one benefit of looking at typical cases in depth is that it may 
help uncover possible conditions that are relevant to the outcome but have, for 
some reason, been omitted. In this type of comparison, both cases exhibit the 
same outcome, but if the solution term indicates there is more than one 
explanatory configuration, a typical case may be uniquely covered by one of the 
solution paths, or can be explained by multiple paths. Thus, comparing two cases 
individually covered by different solution terms is a good way to study why 
mutually non-exclusive explanatory paths can exist. What aspects of the wider 
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context in which the cases are situated enables this causal link? Why are the 
cases uniquely covered? What other explanatory factors can have a strong 
impact on the outcome? Are they case-specific or can they be included in a new 
iteration of QCA with the purpose of strengthening theoretical claims?  
 
 
3.3.2. QCA as technique 
 
 
Steps in QCA: truth tables and solving contradictions 
 
The first step in performing crisp-set QCA (csQCA) once the grounds for 
dichotomizing the conditions and outcome, is to organize the data into a truth 
table by grouping together the cases that have the same configuration of 
conditions. For example, consider the hypothetical dichotomous table below, 
with seven cases, three conditions (A, B and C) and the outcome Y. 
 
CASE A B C Y 
C1 0 0 1 1 
C2 0 1 1 0 
C3 0 0 1 1 
C4 0 1 1 1 
C5 0 1 1 0 
C6 0 0 0 1 
C7 1 1 0 0 
  
Notice that C2, C4 and C5 have the same configurations of conditions, so they can 
be grouped together on the same row. The same goes for C1 and C3, while C4 and 
C4 have different combinations and so remain on separate rows. The truth table 
is: 
  
A B C Y CASE 
0 0 1 1 C1, C3 
0 1 1 0/1 C2, C4, C5 
0 0 0 1 C6 




At this point, there is one inconsistency in the data. In the data table, cases C2, C4 
and C5 have the same configuration of conditions, but C2 and C5 have an outcome 
of 0, while C4 has an outcome of 1. This is called a contradictory table row and 
must be dealt with before moving on with the analysis. There are several 
recommendations in QCA literature for solving contradictions in truth tables, and 
they require that the researcher re-examine the original cases, conditions and 
outcome, and make changes to some of these (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, 
p. 120-123; Rhioux, 2009, p. 48-49). The first solution is to add or drop a condition 
based on theoretical arguments. But this can be quite tricky depending on the 
number of the conditions already used. Because QCA operates with logical 
combinations, adding another condition will exponentially increase the number 
of logically possible combinations. In csQCA and fsQCA this number is calculated 
as 2k where k is the number of conditions. For instance, in the hypothetical 
example above, the logically possible number of combinations is 23 = 8 and a 
truth table that includes all configuration looks as follows:  
 
A B C Y CASES 
0 0 1 1 C1, C3 
0 1 1 0/1 C2, C4, C5 
1 1 1 ? - 
1 1 0 0 C7 
1 0 1 ? - 
1 0 0 ? - 
0 1 0 ? - 
0 0 0 1 C6 
  
There are four combinations that have no corresponding cases observed 
empirically, whose outcome cannot be determined from the beginning. These 
are called logical remainders and a larger number of them is an indicator of 
limited diversity, meaning that not enough cases can be observed empirically. 
But logical remainders also have a use in determining the complexity of the 
solution term. I will address this in more detail in when discussing types of 
solutions below. For now, the important point is that, even if there are solid 
theoretical grounds for adding another condition to the model, this increases the 
number of combinations to 24 = 16. The number of combinations with 
corresponding cases, however, remains the same, which means that instead of 
4 logical remainders, there are now 12. The recommendation to maintain a 
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certain balance between the number of cases and the number of conditions is 
particularly important. If, for instance, the analysis had 130 cases instead of 7, 
there would be a lower chance of so many logical remainders occurring, simply 
because there are more cases covering different combinations. Unfortunately, 
this effect is gradually cancelled out by adding more conditions into the mix.  
This is where a second strategy of dealing with contradictions comes in: 
re-examining cases to determine if those appearing on contradictory rows can 
be excluded, or if others can be added to mitigate limited diversity. Assume there 
is reasonable case-based evidence to exclude C4 from the truth table above. This 
would solve the contradiction quite easily, since the remaining cases on that row 
have the same outcome. Nevertheless, the process by which researchers decide 
to drop (or add, in some instances) cases should be as transparent as possible. 
Other recommendations for solving contradictions are to re-examine cases in a 
‘thicker’ manner and determine whether they are indeed part of the relevant 
population, or if some cases have been excluded; or to re-evaluate the outcome 
and see if it needs to be re-conceptualized or measured in a way that would solve 
the contradictions - although it must be noted that this strategy affects all table 
rows, not just the inconsistent ones, and may even lead to new contradictory 
combinations. 
 
Steps in QCA: necessity and sufficiency relations 
 
At this stage the analysis is conducted through the use of the different software 
available, such as R packages (Medzihorsky et al., 2016; Dușa, 2018a; Thomann 
et al., 2018), fsQCA (Ragin, 2010) and TOSMANA (Cronqvist, 2016). Schneider and 
Wagemann (2012, p. 278) make some general recommendations for good 
practices in examining necessity and sufficiency. Firstly, the two should be 
examined separately, with necessity coming first and, as indicated by the 
principle of asymmetry, the outcome and the absence of the outcome explained 
separately. Statements about necessity should not be derived from results 
concerning sufficiency, because there is a risk of either omitting a necessary 
condition that does not appear in the solution due to minimization, or to find 
‘false’ necessary conditions. Therefore, researchers must test for necessity 
separately and impose high consistency values for the conditions being 
examined to avoid inferring that trivial ones are, in fact, necessary.  
Several sufficient solution formulas can be derived. Ragin (1987) notes 
that the different treatment of logical remainders leads to solutions that vary in 
complexity without contradicting the empirical data in the truth table. Three 
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kinds of solutions can be thus found (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, p. 172): 
(a) the conservative solution is the most complex one and deals only with the 
observed cases, making no simplifying assumptions about the outcome logical 
remainders may produce; (b) the most parsimonious solution uses simplifying 
assumptions made automatically by the software; (c) the intermediate solution 
also uses simplifying assumptions about the logical remainders, but they are 
determined based on the researcher’s expectations about how each condition 
impacts the outcome. 
 
Steps in QCA: Presenting and interpreting results 
 
Schneider and Grofman (2006) recommend focusing on three aspects of the 
analysis when presenting the results: how conditions interact to explain the 
outcome; which cases are covered by this explanation and which are left out; 
and how well the solution fits with the empirical evidence. QCA results can be 
presented in different ways, such as solution formulas, Venn diagrams or x-y 
plots, as well as using truth tables and accounting for the solution consistency 
and case coverage. Results can also be interpreted in different ways. For 
instance, a case-oriented interpretation reveals which cases are typical empirical 
reflections of the causal relationship, which cases are deviations (and therefore 
responsible for lower levels of solution consistency) and how cases are covered 
by the solution. If researchers choose to focus on the causal relationship, they 
must keep in mind that single conditions should not be interpreted separately 
(unless a single condition emerges as sufficient) since the focus of QCA is on 
describing their interactions. The focus should instead be on these interactions 
(solution terms), how they fit in with theoretical expectations and, for further 
investigation, what enables different causal paths to exist simultaneously.  
 
Steps in QCA: follow-up and researcher input 
 
It has become quite obvious by now that QCA is a method that requires 
researchers to make quite a lot of choices before and during the analysis process. 
Being both a qualitative and essentially reiterative method (Schneider and 
Wagemann 2012, p. 281-282) researchers will find that they sometimes need to 
go back and forth between stages and make adjustments depending on 
intermediate results. This is not to say that researchers cherry-pick theory and 
empirical evidence to construct a model that fits their expectations. As 
repeatedly emphasized before, QCA does not work with the same underlying 
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assumptions of quantitative approaches when it comes to theory testing. Its 
main goal is a qualitative exploration of causal relations. Causal claims made by 
theory can indeed be studied in a rigorous way that is compatible with the rules 
of set theory, but the process of adding or excluding cases from the analysis is 
necessary because these claims cannot be studied where they do not exist. In 
addition to case selection researchers must also make transparent decisions with 
regards to selecting, discarding or re-conceptualizing conditions, the rules for 
assigning membership scores and the choice of QCA variant to be used and 
strategies for including temporality.  
The qualitative nature of QCA means that results obtained through the 
analytical moment should be subjected to a further, in-depth analysis using 
compatible qualitative methods, such as case studies or process tracing. This step 
can be used for several purposes. One is to place the causal mechanism in a wider 
context, specific to the case(s) chosen for further examination. This can focus, 
for instance, on detailing theoretically relevant factors that cannot be quantified 
in a meaningful way, and therefore have not been accounted for as part of the 
QCA stage. Another aim is to look for factors that have been altogether omitted 
but on closer inspection turn out to be part of the causal mechanism. Depending 
on whether or not these can, in turn, be quantified, the researcher has two 
option: if these factors cannot be measured meaningfully, they should 
nevertheless be analyzed in a qualitative way as part of the case study. If they 
can be measured, it may be worth reiterating the QCA procedure with the new 
conditions factored in. Of course, the same recommendation to keep a balance 
between the number of conditions and cases applies.  
 
 
3.4. Process tracing 
 
3.4.1. Process tracing as approach 
 
Process tracing is the second component of set-theoretic MMR used in this 
dissertation. There are few clear guidelines in literature on how to integrate it 
with QCA. Although it makes more sense to use QCA as the first step and follow 
up with process tracing, this sequence is not fixed. Rather, Schneider and 
Rohlfing (2013) clarify, deciding in which order to use them is a matter of 
distinguishing between the objectives of pre- and post-QCA analytical steps. If 
QCA is used as the second step in the sequence, then the goal of the pre-QCA 
stage is to define and calibrate the conditions and outcome, and designate the 
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case population. I have already covered most of this - except for calibration - in 
Chapter 2, and will be using the QCA-first approach in the remainder of this study 
because I am interested in applying process tracing to complement the broader 
information derived from this initial step.  
However, unlike conditions and outcome, I have thus far addressed case 
selection only superficially, by designating all ten CEE member states as the 
general population. There are good reasons for this, as the nature of the set-
theoretic approach indicates. While the results of QCA cannot be anticipated, it 
is almost certain that this analysis will arrive at the process tracing stage with a 
modified case population. But what, actually, constitutes a case? Gerring (2012, 
p. 19-20) defines cases as spatially delimited phenomena observed at a single 
point in time. The spatial limits of CEE cases are clearer that the temporal ones. 
As I will further show in Chapter 4, these cases are indeed observed at certain 
points in time, based on several factors likely to have an impact on QOD and the 
three dimensions of embeddedness, such as the EU’s further eastern 
enlargement in 2007 and 2013, and the effects of the financial crisis on socio-
economic conditions and political stability. This spatial-temporal delineation also 
increases the number of cases for QCA, with implications for the limited diversity 
problem. Keeping all this in mind, it is difficult to make confident statements 
about case selection at this point. Nevertheless, process tracing does provide 
several rules for case selection, which I will discuss together with the method’s 
other technical points.  
Obviously, process tracing plays a much more complex role than just 
guiding post-QCA case selection. Mahoney (2015, p. 200) describes the method 
as a ‘set of procedures for formulating and testing explanation with case studies’, 
while Bennett and Checkel (2014, p. 4) define it as ‘the analysis of evidence on 
processes, sequences and conjectures of events within a case for the purposes 
of either developing or testing hypotheses about the causal mechanisms that 
might causally explain the case.’ By itself, it is used to find evidence of causal 
mechanisms, but in combination with QCA, it can be used in a ‘backwards-
looking’ way (Crasnow, 2017) to treat the solution formulas as (well-grounded) 
assumptions and further test them within individual cases.  
 
Mechanisms, processes and causal inferences 
 
Although there are several clear guidelines on how to conduct process tracing, 
the method is much less formalized than QCA. While this allows for more 
flexibility, it also raises several problems with regards to validity and the ability 
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to make generalizations based on evidence found at case level. At its core, 
process tracing makes causal claims based on mechanisms: it shifts the focus 
from conditions and outcomes towards hypothesized processes that link the two 
by transmitting causal forces (Reykers and Beach, 2017; Beach, 2016). Process 
tracing works with three types of conditions (Mahoney, 2015). Similarly to QCA, 
it recognizes that there are necessary conditions, which, when removed from the 
equation, are capable of changing the outcome. The second type is intervening 
conditions, which increase the probability that the outcome will occur, but do 
not eliminate the outcome if they are absent. Finally, process tracing also uses 
INUS conditions in the same way QCA does, treating interactions as mechanisms. 
In this study I use the latter two types of conditions: the INUS conditions 
identified through QCA, and case-specific intervening conditions that 
supplement the more general, set-theoretic explanation. These are useful for 
evaluating the weight of causal mechanisms precisely when such general causal 
patterns have already been identified across multiple cases. This is a good 
example of how QCA and process tracing play off eachother’s strength to move 
between the cross-case and within-case levels.  
The basis for making causal inferences in process tracing is diagnostic 
evidence (Collier, 2011; Bennett and Checkel, 2014). This comprises of events 
that intervene between hypothesized causes and empirical observations. For 
example, within-case diagnostic evidence can be drawn as ‘observations on 
context, process or mechanism’ (Brady and Collier, 2010, p. 12) from the spatial, 
temporal or topical dimensions that define the case. Diagnostic evidence is 
anchored in prior knowledge, which Collier (2011) places in four categories. 
Conceptual frameworks are groups of related concepts that can be 
operationalized (such as the embeddedness model). Recurring empirical 
regularities describe patterns that occur repeatedly between two or more 
phenomena. A third framework connects these regularities to theoretical 
knowledge and help build theory by collecting and verifying related hypotheses. 
Finally, theory can also be expanded to explain why these regularities occur.  
In this research, process tracing will be used mainly within the 
theoretical framework of the latter two. QCA already reveals how conditions 
interact to produce the outcome, in effect providing the hypotheses for follow-
up process tracing. The goal of this second stage, then, is to examine and 
describe how these hypotheses, which are based on population-wide empirical 




Generalization poses an interesting problem for process tracing. At first 
glance, the goal of this analytical step is to contextualize the broader 
observations resulting from QCA, not make further generalizations based on 
case-specific knowledge. Indeed, Schimmelfennig (2014) notes one of the 
shortcomings of process tracing is that it is able to maximize internal validity, but 
does not create external validity. Is this limitation a real concern in the wider 
context of set-theoretic MMR? I propose that, when the main goal is theory 
testing, the answer is no. The story is different when one hopes to use this 
approach for theory building. As Chapter 2 has shown, the embeddedness model 
in its current form leaves plenty of room for fine-tuning its concepts. QCA helps 
in this endeavor by taking model’s individual conditions and turning them into 
INUS conditions, thus providing causal inferences for further analysis. It also 
specifies which conditions are necessary - an important correction to Merkel’s 
underlying assumption that all dimensions of external embeddedness are 
necessary. But it stops short of bringing in any additional evidence from outside 
the scope of these conditions. In other words, QCA can do theory testing, but its 
theory building power is limited. Process tracing does not, unfortunately, solve 
this problem. The only thing it can do in this respect is clarify the scope of 
conditions under which a hypothesis can be generalized (Bennett and Checkel, 
2014). It is possible, however, to use process tracing for theory building under 
certain terms, by taking advantage of the fact that QCA is iterative. If, for 
example, there is solid empirical evidence that a causal mechanism carries over 
to other cases, it can be operationalized and introduced in a new QCA step, which 
tests its external validity and introduces it into the theory. If such a step is to be 
taken for the embeddedness model, the new condition should be treated in the 
same way as the original ones: it must be conceptualized in a general way, to 
ensure that it is applicable across multiple cases; and it must be measurable, to 
ensure that it can be used together with the social and economic contexts, 
populism and international integration. If this latter constraint cannot be 
satisfied, then the new condition receives the same treatment as the historical 
context and civil society - meaning that it cannot be verified through QCA. 
As a technique, process tracing is similarly flexible, with both the 
advantages and limitations this entails. Standardization is also more limited than 
in QCA, in that there are no parameters of fit, and the method is particularly 
vulnerable to the ‘storytelling problem’ (Schimmefennig, 2014) - the tendency to 
see patterns in otherwise random data and build explanations based on them. 
Still, there are a few standard steps one must follow to ensure the validity of 
results. They are described in the section below.  
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3.4.2. Process tracing as technique 
 
Steps in process tracing: case selection and hypothesizing 
causal mechanisms 
 
In comparative process tracing, case selection is based on three principles 
(Schneider and Rohlfing, 2013, p. 566-567). Comparisons can be made between 
cases that show the same outcome, if the goal is to emphasize necessary 
conditions. Another suggestion is to pick diverse cases, each covered by one 
sufficient solution term, to untangle the processes behind each explanatory 
path. Finally, case selection can be done based on the nature of case membership 
in the solution. Schneider and Rohlfing argue that uniquely covered cases offer 
better insights than multiple-covered cases, because the outcome is empirically 
overdetermined.  
QCA also helps with case selection. Earlier in this chapter I explained that 
it structures the case population based on how individual cases relate to the 
sufficient solution terms and the outcome. QCA distinguishes between typical 
and deviant cases, which can be adapted for process tracing. When combining 
process tracing with QCA, Schneider and Rohlfing (2013) make a few general 
recommendations for case selection. Among these: (1) choose at least one case 
covered by each solution term; (2) choose cases that are members in just one 
solution term; (3) in comparative process tracing at least one case must exhibit 
the outcome. In typical cases, both the outcome and at least one term in the 
statement of sufficiency are present (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, p. 305). 
Therefore, choosing such cases is useful when the goal is theory testing. 
Formulating hypotheses for process tracing in a QCA-first approach is 
quite straightforward when both case knowledge and statements of necessity 
and sufficiency are already available. For example, assume a typical case for the 
sufficient relationship between deconsolidation and the social and economic 
contexts. If that case has also been strongly affected by the economic crisis, the 
presence of specific, crisis-related mechanisms can be hypothesized. This is not 
the same as stating that the crisis itself is a causal mechanism linking poor socio-
economic performance to deconsolidation. Instead, more specific mechanisms 
can be extrapolated before the search for evidence can begin. Staying with the 
same example, evidence may be found that the crisis’ financial impact forced the 
government to take out a substantial external loan, conditioned by certain 
austerity policies that in turn created acute public dissatisfaction. Large-scale 
protests caused the government to resign, adding political instability to the 
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country’s list of problems. In the most general terms, this sequence does 
illustrate the link between deconsolidation and socio-economic instability. But 
there is more than one causal mechanism linking the two. Another country may 
decide to impose austerity measures not to pay off an external loan, but to 
finance its own deficit directly. Yet another may experience the same sequence 
of events as the first, but instead of political instability, public discontent puts a 
strong populist party in government and, over time, power entrenchment begins 
to erode QOD.  
These causal mechanisms each reflect the same statement of sufficiency 
regarding socio-economic context and deconsolidation in completely different 
ways. The role of diagnostic evidence is to guide the search for these causal links, 
and process tracing has several types of evidence available to do this.  
 
Steps in process tracing: specifying the evidence 
 
Beach and Pedersen (2013, p. 99-100) explain that predicted evidence rather 
than data observation is used in process tracing, and observations only become 
evidence after being contextualized within case knowledge. There are four types 
of evidence used in process tracing. Pattern evidence is drawn from statistical 
patterns that support the causal inference. Sequence evidence can be found in 
the chronology and spatial distribution of certain relevant events. Mahoney 
(2015, p. 204-206) emphasizes that this type of evidence is especially strong in 
process tracing because it enables researchers to identify critical junctures in the 
links between different causal factors. The third type is trace evidence, whose 
mere existence confirms that the hypothesized relationship exists, completely or 
in part. Finally, account evidence is drawn from the content of empirical data, 
typically written documents or oral accounts. 
As explained above, these types of evidence do not themselves causes, 
in that their presence or absence does not have an impact on whether the 
outcome occurs. Their role is to signal if, and how, a hypothesized causal 
mechanism has occurred.  
 
Steps in process tracing: building empirical tests 
 
In order to ensure inferential validity, causal statements are made based on 
empirical tests (Waldner, 2015; Collier, 2011). A useful terminology for creating 
these tests distinguishes between two dimensions: uniqueness and certainty 
(Van Evera 1997, p. 31-34; Beach and Pedersen 2013, p. 101-104; Rohlfing, 2014, 
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p. 611). Uniqueness refers to cases where empirical explanations can be 
developed that do not overlap with other theories. Where unique conditions are 
found, they lend confirmatory power to the explanation (i.e. passing the test is 
sufficient for inferring causation). Certainty states that the specified condition 
must be observed, or the explanation fails the empirical test (i.e. passing the test 
is necessary for inferring causation). Based on these dimensions, four empirical 
tests were developed, shown in Table 3.2.  
 
Table 3.2. Types of prediction tests in process tracing  
 
 HIGH CERTAINTY LOW CERTAINTY 
HIGH UNIQUENESS Doubly-decisive test Smoking gun test 
LOW UNIQUENESS Hoop test Straw in the wind test 
Source: Rohlfing (2014)  
 
Collier (2011) and Mahoney (2012) describe each test in relation to how it affects 
the validity of the hypothesis. Thus, straw in the wind tests either increase or 
decrease the plausibility of a hypothesis, but provide neither necessary nor 
sufficient criteria to reject or accept the hypothesis. They are the weakest type 
of test overall, but they are valuable for providing the initial assessment of a 
hypothesis. Hoop tests state that a certain piece of evidence must be present in 
order to validate the hypothesis. Failing a hoop test eliminates the hypothesis, 
but passing does not confirm it, and additional evidence is called for.  Smoking 
gun tests can strongly support a hypothesis if a given piece of evidence is 
observed. On the other hand, failing a smoking gun test does not automatically 
eliminate the hypothesis. Finally, doubly decisive tests are the strongest among 
the four: if evidence in favor of a hypothesis is found, that hypothesis is 
confirmed and all others are eliminated.  
 In set-theoretic MMR, the choice of empirical test is strongly influenced 
by the results of QCA, and the case selection procedure. This is because, as I will 
explain further in Chapter 5, if a case is covered by more than one explanatory 
path, then it is likely that the underlying causal mechanisms - and by extension, 
hypotheses - are not unique. This already limits the options to hoop and straw in 
the wind tests, both of which are comparably weak. Despite this, there are 
certain trade-offs between QCA and process tracing here. Beach and Pedersen 
(2013, p. 105) recommend that, if one must choose between certainty and 




Standards of good practice 
 
Checkel and Bennett (2014, p. 261) recommend several standards of good 
practice for process tracing. Firstly, they advise thinking broadly when 
considering alternative explanations, and treat them with equal rigour. Secondly, 
the potential biases of different sources of evidence should be taken into account 
- for example, if politicians are likely to make different statements in front of 
different audience can skew account evidence. Thirdly, evidence should be 
drawn from diverse sources, but researchers should also justify why they have 
excluded a certain piece of evidence, or how they have chosen when to stop 
investigating. Finally, they suggest being open to both deductive and inductive 
insights when pinpointing causal mechanisms.  
How process tracing is conducted largely depends on the available 
theoretical and case knowledge about the phenomenon in question. If strong 
theories about causal mechanisms already exist, process tracing can be more 
deductive. But, while theory and QCA do quite well by themselves in guiding 
hypotheses, it is also important to try and draw theoretical implications from 
case-knowledge. In this chapter I unpacked the complex nature of set-theoretic 
MMR and detailed the steps involved in performing QCA and process tracing. The 
goal of this dissertation is to make the most of the methodological tools that set-
theoretic MMR provides to examine the theoretical assumptions of 
embeddedness with regards to democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. Before 
moving on to the analytical stage, it is important to make explicit some of the 
strengths and limitations of set-theoretic MMR. 
 
 
3.5. Conclusions: what set-theoretic multimethod research 
can and cannot do 
From this point on, the study proceeds in two stages. The goal of theory, which 
has already been laid out in Chapter 2, is to provide the basis for making and 
testing claims about how embeddedness is linked to democracy, and more 
specifically to deconsolidation. The scope of these hypotheses is, at this point, 
limited. It is possible to formulate what set-theoretic MMR refers to as 
‘directional expectations’ - statements about whether individual conditions will 
have a positive or negative impact - but nothing is known about the 
configurations in which these conditions appear, or any of the underlying 
mechanisms. This is the role of the first stage of this study. Directional 
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expectations can be incorporated into QCA to produce more refined hypotheses 
about the conditions of deconsolidation. By the end of this step, the 
configurations, as well as necessary or sufficient character of each condition is 
known. The underlying causal mechanisms are not yet clear though and, as the 
latter part of this chapter has shown, it is not prudent to assume that the same 
mechanisms translate across different cases. The role of process tracing is to 
specify these mechanisms and, under certain conditions, feed them back into the 
theory. The stages of this research are summarized in Figure 3.1.  
 




3.5.1. A note on using crisp-set QCA 
 
In the beginning of this chapter I introduced the debate around QCA as a bridge 
between methodological traditions, with particular focus on its capacity to 
reflect natural language. That QCA enables us to move between natural language 
and the language of logic has important implications for this dissertation: in the 
following chapter, I explain in detail how the concept of external embeddedness 
is translated into set-theoretic language for the purpose of theory testing. 
However, this also requires a re-examination of the main criticism levelled 
against the use of crisp sets over fuzzy sets in QCA: that while natural language 
is, naturally, complex, csQCA operates in dichotomies and consequently 
produces often serious loss of information. 
Why, then, opt for crisp sets when examining something as multilayered 
as democracy? The reason is threefold. Firstly, translating external 
embeddedness into a set-theoretic formula requires some degree of linguistic 
extrapolation, since Merkel does not explicitly present his model in either crisp 
or fuzzy terms. However, the original text can fairly easily be interpreted in such 
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a way. For instance, when writing about the socio-economic component of 
external embeddedness, Merkel notes that: 
“[...] a developed economy, the prevention of extreme poverty, the 
pluralization of the social structure, and the fair distribution of the 
material and cognitive resources of society create a shield for democracy 
and, in most cases, enhances the quality of democracy with regards to 
the rule of law and participation. Inversely, both the lack of a well-
developed economy and abrupt downward economic change endanger 
the stability and the quality of a liberal democracy” (p. 45) 
 
In other words, these elements can be read as a presence/absence binary 
(although the argument can be made that ‘abrupt downward economic change’ 
should be read as a scale instead, but no corresponding opposite phenomenon, 
i.e. economic growth, is mentioned). Similarly, the civil society component is 
addressed in conditional terms, which can also be read as a presence/absence 
binary: 
“If civil society fulfills [the Lockean, Montesquieuian, Tocquevillian and 
Habermasian] functions, it generates and enables checks of power, 
responsibility, societal inclusion, tolerance, fairness, trust, cooperation, 
and often also the efficient implementation of accepted political 
programs“ (p. 47) 
 
On the other hand, the international and regional integration component clearly 
implies a scale and, by extension, fuzziness: 
“The denser, more consolidated and more resilient this external 
embeddedness of democracy is, the less vulnerable the internal partial 
regimes are towards external threats. The more densely interdependence 
between the partial regimes is institutionalized, the stronger the co-
operation between the actors of these regimes. Also, the higher the 
acceptance and respect towards mutual independence, the more 
democratic is the whole regime. The inverse is true, as well: the weaker 
the external embeddedness and the lower the mutual respect and co-
operation between the actors of the partial regimes, the closer the 




The issue with extrapolating set-theoretic terms from these excerpts, then, is 
one of consistency. There is no problem pe se with having both crisp and fuzzy 
values in the same empirical analysis. However, at this particular point the goal 
is not yet theory testing, but merely theory translation, and I suggest that this 
should be done consistently by applying the presence/absence (or 
increase/decrease) binary across the board. The argument for doing so with 
international integration is not merely that, as a scale, it is the ‘odd one out’, but 
that fuzzy sets also include crisp values and can be themselves reduced to a 
binary if needed.  
A second, related argument for using crisp sets has to do with the nature 
of dichotomization as ‘radical surgery’ (Coppedge, 2012, p. 47).  While 
dichotomization is indeed limiting, it also has a particular advantage: it 
emphasizes difference in kind over difference in degree (De Meur, Rihoux and 
Yamasaki, 2009; Sartori, 1991). For instance, while the conceptual web around 
democratic deconsolidation may be difficult to navigate, the losses or gains in 
QOD are easy to track through relevant indicators. Preserving fine-grained 
information becomes a problem when trying to link these observations to 
specific concepts. If we are not sure where the conceptual threshold between 
deconsolidation and democratic breakdown is set, then placing empirical 
observations correctly is an equally uncertain task. However, if the concept is 
already well established, dichotomization becomes a viable option. In the case 
of CEE democracies, there is already an extensive body of literature supporting 
the idea that, while democratic quality has seen a net decline between 2005 and 
2014, there are no cases of outright democratic breakdown, or formerly 
democratic regimes being re-classified as hybrid or authoritarian. Therefore, the 
scope of the analysis is bound to a single concept: a country has either 
experienced deconsolidation, as defined in Chapter 2, or it has not. The degree 
to which this has occurred can be subject to a more in-depth qualitative analysis 
- in this case process tracing - whose role is to attenuate the loss of information 
caused by dichotomization. In effect, the QCA stage functions as a more general, 
less demanding test that points out empirical regularities in the model (see 
Figure 3.1) These can be used as more sophisticated hypotheses in the second, 
more demanding stage, whereby process tracing adds the within-case 
perspective to theory testing.  
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Finally, the third argument in favor of csQCA stems from the risk of 
misplacing fuzzy thresholds when no clear theoretical guidelines are available 
and, consequently, the risk of misclassifying cases. The components of external 
embeddedness are somewhat of a mixed bag. For example, as of 2015, the World 
Bank established a clear threshold for ‘extreme poverty’ at $1.90/day (World 
Bank, 2015), while Eurostat sets the reference point for ‘population at risk of 
poverty and social exclusion’ at 60 % of national median equivalised disposable 
income (Eurostat 2018b). These values could be used to determine some fuzzy 
scales for the socio-economic component of external embeddedness, but this is 
hardly the case across the board. There is no clearly defined theoretical boundary 
for what constitutes a developed economy, or the degree to which civil society 
fulfills, or fails to fulfill, the functions indicated by Merkel. Dichotomization along 
the lines of presence/absence or increase/decrease of relevant indicators solves 
this problem. Admittedly, it does so by sacrificing more fine-grained information 
but, as explained above, this information can be reintegrated in the second stage 
of a set-theoretic MMR design. Chapter 5 of this dissertation will show how this 
is achieved in practice.  
To sum up, I opt for using csQCA in this study for three reasons: a 
consistent translation of external embeddedness from natural to set-theoretic 
language, avoidance of ambiguous thresholds, and the emphasis on differences 
in kind over differences in degree at an analytical stage where the loss of 
information does not compromise the results. In the first part of the following 
chapter I explain how the components of external embeddedness are 













Analysis: the conditions of democratic change 
in Central and Eastern Europe 
 
4.1. Placing the research questions 
 
This chapter continues to address the two research questions whose theoretical 
basis was developed in Chapter 2: 
 
RQ1: What were the conditions of post-accession democratic 
deconsolidation in CEE? How do these conditions interact with 
eachother? 
 
RQ3: What was the nature of the EU’s post-accession domestic impact, 
and how does it relate to deconsolidation? 
 
Although the focus is on deconsolidation, defined as a gradual loss of QOD over 
a longer period of time, the qualitative comparative approach used particularly 
in relation to RQ1 requires that both the presence and absence of the outcome 
be analysed substantially. Thus, in this chapter, I first examine the conditions of 
democratic change in a broader sense, and then re-focus the research towards 
deconsolidation.  
This chapter is structured into three parts. In the first, I present the 
criteria for initial case selection, the data, and a discussion of how the 
embeddedness model can be translated into set-theoretic language to facilitate 
theory testing. The second part contains the analysis and interpretation of the 
necessary and sufficient conditions of democratic change, and is broken down 
into three sections. In the first, I show the detailed steps of preparing and 
analyzing data to obtain the QCA solution formulas for both the improvement 
and decline of QOD. In the second, I interpret substantively the conditions 
explaining improvement (treated as presence of outcome) and in the third I 
discuss decline (treated as absence of outcome). Finally, in the last part of this 
chapter, I return to the embeddedness model to evaluate its theoretical claims 
in light of the new empirical evidence, and briefly discuss case selection options 
for the process tracing stage following in Chapter 5, where the focus of the 






4.2.1. Case selection 
 
One of the key aspects of QCA highlighted in the previous chapter was its 
qualitative nature. QCA does not seek to test how well theoretic assumptions fit 
a fixed, pre-determined population, but allows researchers to modify case 
selection in the early stages of the analysis as needed for a qualitative approach. 
The initial focus of this research is on the ten CEE countries that joined 
the EU in the mid-2000s. The ten year reference period, between 2005 and 2014, 
during which they are examined is split into three intervals: 2005-2008, 2008-
2011 and 2011-2014. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, looking at a rough 
time period of ten years may simplify the analysis, but it sacrifices much of the 
insight, particularly if the main point of interest is the impact of certain factors 
that occurred during that decade, such as the economic crisis or the delayed 
accession of Romania and Bulgaria. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the 
same conditions cannot be expected to remain unchanged, particularly over such 
a long period of time. So, for instance, while QOD in the Czech Republic may have 
improved both over the 2005-2008 and 2011-2014 intervals, the explanation for 
this situation may be different. QCA, with its ability to uncover alternative paths 
to the same outcome, is well suited for a research design that distinguishes 
between time intervals. With this in mind, the initial case selection comprises of 
28 country-period observations of the ten member states across these three 
periods. Bulgaria and Romania are excluded from the 2005-2008 interval due to 
the fact that they joined the EU in 2007. 
This selection will not remain fixed throughout the analysis. One reason 
for this is that opting for the crisp set variant of QCA means that, when 
constructing the truth table, some contradictory configurations will inevitably 
occur. As I explained in Chapter 3, there are several methodological 
recommendations in this situation, among them modifying the chosen 
conditions, or adding or dropping cases. However, in this analysis I am interested 
in remaining as close as possible to the embeddedness model, for the purpose 
of later theory testing. This takes away the option of adding or removing 
conditions based on other theoretical assumptions. Furthermore, due to the 
regional focus on Central and Eastern European member states, it is not possible 
to add cases from outside this area. The remaining option, then, is to drop some 
cases from the truth table in order to eliminate contradictions. The steps used to 
decide which cases to remove is described in detail in the analysis section below. 
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Before moving on to discuss how conditions are operationalized, a note 
should be made on the follow-up process tracing, which addresses the second 
research question in this dissertation, concerning the mechanisms that link the 
conditions identified through QCA to the outcome of deconsolidation. While the 
term case is used in this chapter to describe individual country-period 
observations, when moving on to contextualize the results through process 
tracing, the same term will be used to designate the countries of interest over 
the entire 2005-2014 period. 
 
4.2.2. Conditions and operationalization 
 
Earlier in Chapter 2, external embeddedness was described as having three 
dimensions: socio-economic context, civil society, and international integration. 
A reminder of how these conditions were operationalized follows. Firstly, I 
suggested breaking down integration into two components: the bargaining 
power that each member state has in its relations with the EU, and the EU’s 
vulnerability in relation to its member states, defined as the capacity to 
implement effective sanctions in cases of legal non-compliance that threaten 
democracy at the domestic level. Similarly, the socio-economic context was 
separated into elements reflecting the economic and social dimensions 
respectively. Unlike the first two conditions of external embeddedness, however, 
civil society is not easy to operationalize for QCA testing in a meaningful way. 
This is because, while several indicators measuring various aspects of a country’s 
civil society do exist, none of them reflect the concept as Wolfgang Merkel 
described it for external embeddedness9. The EU’s sanctioning capacity is in a 
similar situation. A possible option would be to use transposition and 
infringement as a way to measure EU vulnerability. Extensive data is available 
from the European Commission, but it is largely focused on trade, labor and 
environmental issues, and thus not a particularly meaningful indicator of 
whether the EU is able to exert any domestic influence to prevent democratic 
deconsolidation. Thus, civil society and EU vulnerability will be excluded from the 
QCA part of the analysis and addressed in detail in Chapter 5 as part of process 
tracing.  
This leaves four conditions to be used in QCA: economic context, social 
context, bargaining power, and populism, whose addition to the model was 
                                               
9 See for example: the USAID Civil Society Organizations sustainability index and Freedom 




explained in Chapter 2. Table 4.1 below shows these conditions, definitions and 
theoretical expectations about their relationship to the outcome. Calculations 
for arriving at the final data in Tables 4.2 - 4.3., as well as data sources, are found 
in the Appendix.  
 
Table 4.1. Conditions, definitions and theoretical expectations 
CONDITION NOTATION DEFINITION THEORETICAL EXPECTATION 
Quality of 
democracy 
D Changes over time in a 
country’s QOD as measured 
by the Democracy Barometer 
None. D is the outcome 
Economic 
context 
E Changes over time in a 
country’s economic context, 
measured as the average of 
GDP/capita, inflation and 
government debt 
An improvement in E is 
expected to have a positive 
impact on D. A decline of E is 
expected to have a negative 
effect 
Social context S Changes over time in a 
country’s social context 
measured as the average of 
its Gini coefficient, 
unemployment rate and 
percentage of population at 
risk of poverty and social 
exclusion 
An improvement in S is 
expected to have a positive 
impact on D. A decline of S is 
expected to have a negative 
effect 
Populism P The presence or absence of 
populist parties in a country’s 
legislative body at any point 
during the reference period 
The presence of P is expected 
to have a negative impact on 
D. The absence of P is 
expected to have a positive 
or neutral effect on D 
Bargaining 
power 
B Changes over time in a 
country’s bargaining power 
relative to the EU measured 
as the average of the 
country’s share of the EU’s 
GDP, share of votes in the 
Council and percentage of 
population who responded 
negatively to the 
Eurobarometer survey 
question ‘‘Do you tend to 
trust the EU?’ 
An increase in B is expected 
to have a negative impact on 
D. A decline in B is expected 








4.2.3. Working with theory: translating democratic embeddedness 
into set-theoretic language  
 
At first glance, it is tempting to assume that Wolfgang Merkel (2004) makes no 
clear statements about the necessary or sufficient character of the components 
of external embeddedness. On a closer reading, however, it becomes clear that 
some of the formulations in the text can be translated into set-theoretic 
language quite easily. To begin with, Merkel states that, while a country’s level 
of economic prosperity has a positive impact on QOD, it is not ‘the conditio sine 
qua non for democracy’ (p. 44). In other words, Merkel rules out the necessary 
character of the economic context (E) when considered independently. Further, 
he explains that a prosperous economy must be complemented by high levels of 
equality, which prevents significant income gaps and guarantees that fewer 
people are forced to live below the poverty line. Thus, it is not enough that a 
country have a developed economy in order to be a strong democracy, but also 
a fair distribution of resources and pluralization of social structure. A set-
theoretic interpretation of this statement would place the economic and social 
contexts together under the assumption that E has an impact on QOD only in 
combination with favorable social conditions (S). In short, according to Merkel, E 
and S by themselves are INUS conditions, and their conjunction (ES) forms one 
of the sufficient conditions for an improvement in QOD. 
The international integration component of external embeddedness 
requires more interpretation to determine whether it is necessary or sufficient. 
In the QCA part of the analysis, bargaining power (B) is used as an indicator of 
how well an individual member state can potentially prevent the EU from 
imposing domestic sanctions in cases of QOD decline. The theoretical 
expectation here is that a weakening in bargaining power is beneficial for 
maintaining QOD, and vice-versa. Merkel states that integration into 
international and regional organizations has a positive impact on the stability and 
quality of a democracy. In the context of the EU, which has proven to be 
successful in consolidating CEE democracies during the accession period, the 
relationship between QOD and membership is inverse to how it is considered in 
this study. Here, the assumption is that being an EU member has a positive 
impact on a country’s democracy. However, from the point of view of the 
accession process, being an established democracy is a requirement in order to 
be granted membership. Put differently, democracy is a necessary condition for 
membership, but flipping this perspective results in membership being a feature 
that occurs only in tandem with democracy: all EU member states are 
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consolidated democracies, but not all democracies are EU members. In set-
theoretic language, this makes international integration, here expressed through 
bargaining power, sufficient for QOD, since it occurs when the outcome occurs, 
but it is not, by itself, necessary. 
The rise of populism (P) among CEE countries is not included in the 
original embeddedness model, so its set-theoretic translation needs to be 
addressed separately, but the approach is quite similar to the one above. The 
broad hypothesis is that a strong presence of populist parties in the legislative 
has the potential to destabilize democracy, so the relationship between the 
condition and outcome is inverse. But, as with integration, the assumption that 
P is by itself a necessary condition rests on a weak theoretical basis. The absence 
or diminishing influence of populist parties does not guarantee a stronger 
democracy. Thus, similarly to B, P is treated as an INUS condition that occurs in 
combination with other single conditions in sufficient conjunctions. In sum, the 
core theoretical assumptions of the embeddedness model are as follows: 
 
● none of the four single conditions is by itself necessary to produce the 
outcome 
● E and S must occur together and their conjunction ES forms a sufficient 
condition 
● no clear statements can be derived about B and P other than that they 
INUS conditions; all possible conjunctions are assumed before 
minimizing the set-theoretic translation to its most parsimonious form 
 
Having clarified these assumptions, embeddedness can now be translated into 
set-theoretic language using the rules of Boolean algebra for combining logical 
operators in complex sets (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, p. 48-51). The result 
is as follows: 
  
ES + ES~P + ES~B + ES~P~B + ~P~B becomes ES + ES (~P+~B) + ~P~B becomes 
 
ES + ~P~B → D 
  
In other words: an improvement in economic conditions AND in social context 
OR a decline in the influence of populist parties (or absence thereof) AND a 
decrease in bargaining power are sufficient for an improvement in QOD. The 
reverse is also true according to the theoretical expectations described in Table 




~E~S + PB → ~D 
  
It is essential to note here that the goal of these expression is to reflect 
theory as accurately as possible. According to Boolean rules, the negation of ES 
+ ~P~B would not be ~E~S + PB but (~E+~S)*(P + B). Furthermore, as shown in 
the previous chapter, the explanations for the presence and absence of the 
outcome are asymmetrical. This means that the application of QCA should not 
yield empirical evidence that ES + ~P~B → D and its (theoretical) negation are 
simultaneously true. Wolfgang Merkel, however, clearly states that the 
explanations for the presence and absence of the outcome are symmetrical. 
Thus, in order to satisfy both logical rules and theoretical assumptions, the two 
expressions as considered valid explanations of their respective outcomes but 
mutually exclusive: if empirical evidence is found that ES + ~P~B → D, it is unlikely 
that empirical evidence in support of ~E~S + PB → ~D will be found.  
The purpose of translating external embeddedness into set-theoretic 
language is theory testing. This way, it is not only possible to observe how well 
theory explains the cases, but also what the cases covered by terms that do not 
appear in the theoretical formula reveal about the nature of embeddedness. In 
technical terms, this is done by intersecting the theory and solution formulas. 
The extent to which the two coincide will be examined once the solution 





This analysis is structured in three parts. In the first section I present the original 
data, dichotomization, QCA truth table and a method for solving contradictory 
configurations before proceeding with minimization. In the second section I 
conduct the analysis and interpretation of necessary conditions and their use for 
theory testing. In the third section I find and analyze sufficient explanations 
separately for the presence and absence of the outcome, focusing on the 
intermediate QCA solution for substantive interpretation. I then conclude theory 








4.3.1. Data and truth table 
 
Table 4.2 below shows the original and dichotomized data used in this 
analysis. The individual components of each condition are adjusted to conform 
to the theoretical expectations presented in Table 4.1 and show the differences 
between values over each time interval. The 1, 2, and 3 notations for each 
country in the first column of the table represent 2005-2008, 2008-2011 and 
2011-2014 respectively. For example, in the case of Hungary during 2005-2008 
(HU1) the economic context declined by 7.25 and by 10.84 in Romania during 
2008-2011 (RO2). Note that at this point the positive or negative direction of the 
change, rather than its intensity, is important. The size and impact of these 
changes will be addressed in the process tracing stage. 
 
Table 4.2. Original data 
 
CASE E2005 E2008 E S2005 S2008 S B2005 B2008 B P D 
BG1 - 53.85 - - 28.77 - - 5.84 - - - 
CZ1 43.5 45.23 -1.73 17.83 14.8 3.03 11.48 9.92 -1.56 0 0.38 
EE1 37.93 40.32 -2.39 22.67 19.4 3.27 8.13 4.68 -3.45 0 0.84 
HU1 43.03 50.28 -7.25 22.3 20.4 1.9 9.42 10.68 1.26 1 -0.37 
LV1 45.5 46.43 -0.93 30.83 26.47 4.36 9.5 9.53 0.03 1 1.41 
LT1 55.83 
58.87 
63.91 -8.08 28.53 22.87 5.66 6.63 5.93 -0.7 1 1.04 
PL1 59.37 -0.5 32.93 23.2 9.73 11.37 9.49 -1.88 1 0.59 
RO1 - 47.51 - - 28.57 - - 6.93 - - - 
SI1 40.16 40.98 -0.82 16.27 15.43 0.84 8.12 6.75 -1.37 1 0.02 
SK1 51.94 49.24 2.7 24.87 17.97 6.9 8.44 6.37 -2.07 1 -3.24 
CASE E2008 E2011 E S2008 S2011 S B2008 B2011 B P D 
BG2 53.85 56.71 -2.86 28.77 31.8 -3.03 5.84 6.69 0.85 1 -5.24 
CZ2 45.23 50.47 -5.24 14.8 15.73 -0.93 9.92 15.08 5.16 1 2.77 
EE2 40.32 42.51 -2.19 19.4 22.43 -3.03 4.68 7.74 3.06 0 -0.33 
HU2 50.28 60.89 -10.61 20.4 23.13 -2.73 10.68 12.53 1.85 1 -3.86 
LV2 46.43 55.81 -9.38 26.47 30.47 -4 9.53 11.2 1.67 1 0.17 
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LT2 63.91 69.23 -5.32 22.87 27.17 -4.3 5.93 7.59 1.66 1 -0.27 
PL2 59.37 61.8 -2.43 23.2 22.67 0.53 9.49 12.18 2.69 1 1.09 
RO2 47.51 58.35 -10.84 28.57 27.2 1.37 6.93 9.03 2.1 0 1.03 
SI2 40.98 53.14 -12.16 15.43 17.1 -1.67 6.75 12.46 5.71 1 -0.01 
SK2 49.24 54.71 -5.47 17.97 20 -2.03 6.37 10.93 4.56 1 -2.77 
CASE E2011 E2014 E S2011 S2014 S B2011 B2014 B P D 
BG3 56.71 60.69 -3.98 31.8 28.97 2.83 6.69 8.88 2.19 1 -1.29 
CZ3 50.47 52 -1.53 15.73 15.33 0.4 15.08 14.68 -0.4 1 -0.52 
EE3 42.51 44.88 -2.37 22.43 23 -0.57 7.74 5.5 -2.24 0 1.94 
HU3 60.89 58.83 2.06 23.13 22.7 0.43 12.53 12.15 -0.38 1 -0.12 
LV3 55.81 55.39 0.42 30.47 26.33 4.14 11.2 8.98 -2.22 1 0.23 
LT3 69.23 69.21 0.02 27.17 24.33 2.84 7.59 5.94 -1.65 1 2.49 
PL3 61.8 60.97 0.83 22.67 21.5 1.17 12.18 10.96 -1.22 1 -1.59 
RO3 58.35 61.6 -3.25 27.2 27.37 -0.17 9.03 8.92 -0.11 1 -1.47 
SI3 53.14 66.22 -13.08 17.1 18.37 -1.27 12.46 12.4 -0.06 0 -0.78 
SK3 54.71 58.98 -4.27 20 19.23 0.77 10.93 12.74 1.81 0 -2.04 
 
 
Table 4.3. Dichotomized data 
CASE E S P B D CASE E S P B D CASE E S P B D 
BG1 - - - - - BG2 0 0 1 1 0 BG3 0 1 1 1 0 
CZ1 0 1 0 0 1 CZ2 0 0 0 1 1 CZ3 0 1 1 0 0 
EE1 0 1 0 0 1 EE2 0 0 0 1 0 EE3 0 0 0 0 1 
HU1 0 1 1 1 0 HU2 0 0 1 1 0 HU3 1 1 1 0 0 
LV1 0 1 1 1 1 LV2 0 0 1 1 1 LV3 1 1 1 0 1 
LT1 0 1 1 0 1 LT2 0 0 1 1 0 LT3 1 1 1 0 1 
PL1 0 1 1 0 1 PL2 0 1 1 1 1 PL3 1 1 1 0 0 
RO1 - - - - - RO2 0 1 0 1 1 RO3 0 0 1 0 0 
SI1 0 1 1 0 1 SI2 0 0 1 1 0 SI3 0 0 0 0 0 
SK1 1 1 1 0 0 SK2 0 0 1 1 0 SK3 0 1 0 1 0 
 
All calculations for arriving at the data in this table can be found in the Appendix. 
From this point, dichotomization is straightforward. Where an increase over time 
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is observed, the case receives a value of 1, and a 0 in case of a decrease. 
Dichotomization for P is already done as part of the data collection process (See 
Appendix 2) and shows whether or not any populist parties held seats in the 
country’s parliament during the reference period (dichotomized as 1 and 0 
respectively). The analysis that follows in this chapter is done using the RStudio 
software and R packages ‘SetMethods’ (Medzihorsky et al., 2016) and ‘QCA’ 
(Dușa, 2018a, 2018b; Thomann et al., 201810 
 
 
Truth table and solving contradictions 
 
A QCA analysis using crisp sets is particularly prone to generating logical 
contradictions: truth table rows where cases show the same configuration of 
conditions but opposite outcomes. Table 4.4 below is a truth table constructed 
based on the dichotomized data and shows that, at this initial point, all but the 
first and last rows contain contradictions. This is indicated by the inclusion and 
PRI (proportional reduction of inconsistency) parameter, which reflects the 
degree to which a case is a member of the outcome and the absence of the 
outcome. With crisp sets membership should be either 0 or 1, meaning that the 
PRI value for each row shows the proportion of cases for which the outcome is 
present. For instance, in the second table row, three cases (LT1, PL1, SI1) have 
the outcome 1, as noted in parentheses next to each, while two cases (CZ3 and 
HU3) have the outcome 0. Thus, with three out of five cases showing a positive 
outcome, the value of PRI for that row is 0.600. 
How should these contradictions be dealt with? Firstly, there are good 
reasons why adding or dropping conditions is not appropriate here: the main 
goal of this chapter is to use QCA for theory testing, which makes it difficult to 
add or eliminate further conditions without deviating too much from the theory 
and, of course, generating more logical remainders. The second reason has to do 
with the approach to cases: individual observations are not countries, but rather 
country-periods, so dropping one or more observations will still allow for some 
(albeit more limited) understanding of what caused QOD to fluctuate. Similarly, 
due to how dichotomization is used here, there is little leeway for re-coding the 
conditions or outcome. Overall, the model is set up to be rather rigid at this stage 
of the analysis, which leaves with the option of manipulating cases in order to 
solve contradictions 
                                               
10 Latest updates cited for current reference. Previous versions of the packages were used 
for the analysis in 2017 
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Table 4.4. Truth table before adjustments 
E S P B D Incl. PRI Cases 
0 1 0 0 1 1.000 1.000 CZ1(1), EE1(1) 
0 1 1 0 0 0.600 0.600 LT1(1), PL1(1), SI1(1), CZ3(0), HU3(0) 
0 0 0 0 0 0.500 0.500 EE3(1), SI3(0) 
0 1 0 1 0 0.500 0.500 RO2(1), SK3(0) 
0 1 1 1 0 0.500 0.500 HU1(0), LV1(1), PL2(1), BG3(0) 
1 1 1 0 0 0.500 0.500 SK1(0), LV3(1), LT3(1), PL3(0) 
0 0 1 1 0 0.286 0.286 BG2(0), HU2(0), LV2(1), LT2(0), SI2(0), SK2(0), 
CZ2(1) 
0 0 1 0 0 0.000 0.000 RO3(0) 
0 0 0 1 0 0.000 0.000 EE2(0) 
 
A dilemma must be addressed when choosing how to proceed with this: 
re-considering cases in a thicker manner to determine whether they are indeed 
part of the relevant population, or whether others could be added, has 
consequences for research questions posed in this dissertation at a stage where 
the analysis has not yet been conducted. On the one hand, adding cases from 
outside Central and Eastern Europe would expand the research scope beyond 
the point of interest. On the other hand, dropping cases based on a thicker 
examination may still not be enough to solve all contradictions. Therefore, I 
argue for a more technical strategy11 of dropping cases, in line with both the goal 
of theory testing, and the need to solve existing contradictions, as follows: 
First, the observed outcome is marked in brackets next to its 
corresponding case. Then, using the set-theoretic translation of democratic 
embeddedness, the theorized outcome that may be observed for each row is 
stated, based on the presence of at least one of the two theorized solution terms 
(see Section 4.2.3). If, for example, the solution term ~E~S is present, as in the 
case of the seventh table row, the theorized outcome is marked as 0. Based on 
this, cases where the observed outcome is 1 (CZ2, LV2) should be removed from 





                                               
11 Another option would be to lower consistency (PRI) scores, but literature advises against 
consistency scores below 0.750 because it is difficult, at this point, to argue that a subset 
relation still exists (Ragin, 2006; Marx and Dușa, 2011) and, as Table 4.4 shows, the highest 
consistency score besides 1.000 is 0.600 
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Table 4.5. Boolean expressions and theoretically supported outcomes  
OBSERVED EXPRESSION THEORIZED OUTCOME EXCLUDED CASE 
~ES+P~B 1/0 CZ3, HU3 
~E~S + ~P~B 1/0 EE3 
~ES + ~PB 1/0 RO2 
~ES + PB 0 LV1, PL2 
ES + P~B 1 SK1, PL3 
~E~S + PB 0 LV2, CZ2 
 
Three configurations still pose a problem, in that the theorized outcome cannot 
be directly determined, due to the presence of either both, or neither theoretical 
solution terms12. The first and third row in Table 4.5 contain combinations that 
are not featured in the theoretical formula, while the second row contains both 
~E~S and ~P~B, meaning that the outcome could go either way.  
 
Table 4.6. Dichotomized table after adjustment 
CASE E S P B D CASE E S P B D CASE E S P B D 
2005-2008 
     
2008-2011 
     
2011-2014 
     
CZ1 0 1 0 0 1 BG2 0 0 1 1 0 BG3 0 1 1 1 0 
EE1 0 1 0 0 1 EE2 0 0 0 1 0 LV3 1 1 1 0 1 
HU1 0 1 1 1 0 HU2 0 0 1 1 0 LT3 1 1 1 0 1 
LT1 0 1 1 0 1 LT2 0 0 1 1 0 RO3 0 0 1 0 0 
PL1 0 1 1 0 1 SI2 0 0 1 1 0 SI3 0 0 0 0 0 
SI1 0 1 1 0 1 SK2 0 0 1 1 0 SK3 0 1 0 1 0 
 
To solve this problem a more mechanical solution is needed based on the 
argument that a higher number of cases showing a certain outcome serves as 
more solid empirical evidence for the relationship between the sufficient 
expression and said outcome. Based on this, the smallest possible number of 
cases is dropped from the first row, resulting in the exclusion of CZ3 and HU3. 
The remaining rows contain two cases each, so the case showing a positive 
outcome is dropped, in line with the research design’s focus on deconsolidation, 
expressed as the absence of the outcome. Table 4.6 shows the adjusted 
dichotomized data. This strategy results in the exclusion of ten cases. The 
remaining 18 are evenly distributed over time, with six cases covering each of 
                                               
12 Note that in this case the term ‘or’ maintains its regular semantic meaning and is not 
equivalent to the logical OR. 
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the 2005-2008, 2008-2011 and 2011-2014 intervals. It is also important to note 
that none of the ten CEE countries are completely excluded through this strategy 
- each country is represented in at least one time interval. With the logical 
contradictions in the original data now resolved, the next step is to draw up the 
adjusted truth table (Table 4.7) including all logical remainders. The new truth 
table shows a moderate degree of limited diversity, with four cases being 
covered individually by unique expressions. 
A natural criticism of this strategy would point out that it operates on a 
positive selection bias, especially since one third of the cases are dropped as a 
result. Admittedly, six of the ten cases are indeed excluded because they do not 
conform to theoretical expectations. In effect, this sets up a less demanding test 
for the model by limiting the population to a subset of most likely cases. 
However, as I explained in Chapter 3 when arguing for the use of csQCA over set-
theoretic approaches that preserve more fine-grained information, a less 
demanding test is not necessarily a problem at this analytical stage. It is essential 
to keep in mind that it is not the full model that is being tested here: the 
international integration and civil society components of external 
embeddedness are either partly or completely excluded due to 
operationalization issues. As such, setting up a more difficult test by preserving 
a larger number of cases that challenge the theoretical form of the model at this 
point may undermine the following analytical stage by producing empirical 
regularities that are less relevant to the complete theoretical form of external 
embeddedness. 
 Regardless, this exclusion strategy offers two valuable pieces of 
information. Firstly, it begins to address a question of scope: to what extent can 
embeddedness, in this form, explain QOD fluctuations in CEE countries? The 
answer, with a third of the cases excluded, is: not very well. This implies that, 
although we cannot derive any information about the necessary or sufficient 
character of international integration or civil society from the QCA stage, they 
are indeed essential to a robust explanation. The second piece of information 
singles out the cases that do not conform to the theoretical expectations of 
external embeddedness. And, although no countries are fully excluded over the 
2005-2014 period, three of them - Poland, Latvia and the Czech Republic - are 
eliminated over two out of the three intervals. This may be used as a starting 
point for a more in-depth, within-case analysis about their trajectory in relation 





Table 4.7 Adjusted truth table 
E S P B D Incl. PRI Cases 
0 1 0 0 1 1 1 CZ1, EE1 
0 1 1 0 1 1 1 LT1, PL1, SI1 
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 LV3, LT3 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 SI3 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 EE2 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 RO3 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 BG2, HU2, LT2, SI2, SK2 
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 SK3 
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 HU1, BG3 
1 0 0 0 ? - - - 
1 0 0 1 ? - - - 
1 0 1 0 ? - - - 
1 0 1 1 ? - - - 
1 1 0 0 ? - - - 
1 1 0 1 ? - - - 
1 1 1 1 ? - - - 
 
 
4.3.2. Analysis of necessity 
 
The analysis of necessity is focused on three points. Firstly, substantive 
interpretation is given only for those necessary conditions that have a high 
degree of relevance. Secondly, theoretical assumptions are used to check 
whether there are any ‘hidden’ necessary conditions that are observed 
empirically, but the analysis has omitted. And finally, theory testing is conducted 
for necessity. 
 
Interpreting necessary conditions 
 
Table 4.8 show the conditions, or combinations thereof, that emerge as 
necessary, both for D and ~D. In this section, they are interpreted in terms of 
relevance and relationship with theory, while the substantive interpretation of 




How is the relevance of a necessary condition determined? Goertz 
(2006) notes that there are many conditions in social science that can be 
interpreted as necessary, but the fact that they occur so commonly reduces their 
impact on the outcome. For example, the fact that a democratic country holds 
regular elections does not say much about the quality of its democracy, since all 
democracies hold regular elections. Moreover, given empirical evidence, this 
criterion alone cannot even differentiate accurately between democracies and 
non-democracies. In practice, there are no observable cases that would 
contradict the statement ‘holding regular elections is a necessary condition for a 
high levels of QOD’, but there is also little significance in the knowledge. Thus, 
regular elections are a necessary but fairly trivial condition. 
The relevance of necessity parameter (RoN), suggested by Schneider and 
Wagemann (2012, p. 235-237) takes values between 0 and 1 and assesses 
whether a condition is trivial or relevant. Values closer to 1 indicate higher 
degrees of relevance, while those closer to 0 suggest trivialness. Since there is no 
clear recommendation for a threshold of relevance, this analysis focuses on 
those conditions with a relevance of necessity higher than 0.800. 
 
 
    Table  4.8. Analysis of necessity 
Necessary for D   Necessary for ~D 
  Incl. RoN Cov.   Incl. RoN Cov. 
S~B 1.000 1.000 1.000 ~S+
B 
1.000 1.000 1.000 
~B 1.000 0.818 0.778     
   
 
Firstly, S~B is necessary for D. In other words, an improvement of the 
social context, combined with a smaller level of bargaining power, is a necessary 
condition for improving QOD. Indeed, Table 4.7 shows that in all countries where 
QOD improvement has occurred, there are corresponding changes in social 
context and bargaining power. This has occurred particularly between 2005 and 
2008 where positive democratic trends kept up after eight out of ten CEE 
countries gained EU membership. Six of them – Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia – represent this necessity relation consistently. 
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The 2011-2014 interval is less represented here because QOD has mostly been 
on the decline during that period, with the exception of Latvia and Lithuania. On 
the other hand ~B is also necessary by itself, although it shows a lower degree of 
relevance than in combination with S. This ties in with the analysis of sufficiency: 
since both S~B and ~B are necessary conditions, they must appear in all terms of 
a solution formula for sufficiency (see Section 4.3.3 below). When all possible 
conditions are considered, there are three possible explanations for QOD 
improvement: ~ES~P~B explains cases CZ1 and EE1; ~ESP~B explains LT1, PL1 and 
SI1; and ESP~B explains LV3 and LT3. The first two expressions can be minimized 
to ~ES~B, leaving, in effect, two sufficient explanations for improvement. The 
fact that both S~B and ~B are necessary conditions is likely an artefact of how 
they interact with other conditions as part of complex solution terms prior to 
minimization.  
Moving on to QOD decline, it is apparent that no single condition stands 
out as necessary, but that the inclusive disjunction ~S + B is necessary for ~D: in 
all cases where a decline in QOD occurs, either a deteriorating social context or 
an increase in bargaining power are present. Interestingly, based on the rules of 
Boolean algebra, ~S + B is the negation of S~B, meaning that the most relevant 
necessity relations for the absence and presence of the outcome respectively, 
are symmetrical in logical terms. However, this is not the case for theory. In the 
set-theoretic translation of embeddedness, the corresponding formulas for the 
presence and absence of the outcome are: 
 
ES + ~P~B → D 
~E~S + PB → ~D 
 
Note that ~S + B is both observed empirically as a necessary expression, 
and contained in the theoretical form above. On the other hand, the empirically 
observed S~B is absent from the theoretical expression describing the presence 
of the outcome. This already has some implications for theory testing by 
indicating that, in its most parsimonious form, the embeddedness model is 
better at explaining deconsolidation, compared to QOD improvement. Whether 
this is the case in more substantive terms will be examined further in the analysis 
of sufficiency and through process tracing.  
In sum, first part of this analysis reveals two significant necessary 
conditions for the improvement and decline of QOD respectively. S~B is 
necessary for a positive democratic trend, while its logical negation, ~S + B, is 
necessary to explain negative trends, and also reflects theoretical expectations 
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accurately. But are these the only necessary conditions, or is QCA – which, after 
all, makes use of logical remainders – likely to omit conditions whose necessity 
can be justified empirically? The following section clarified whether this is indeed 
the case by attempting to find such a hidden condition. 
 
Searching for hidden necessary conditions 
 
Schneider and Wagemann (2012, p. 221-225) explain that limited diversity, 
indicated by the presence of logical remainders, may lead to a situation where a 
condition that is necessary based on the empirical data at hand may be omitted 
in the analysis process. Is this the case here? In order to answer this question, it 
is essential to remember that a necessary condition is always a super-set of the 
outcome, meaning that if the condition is present, the outcome is also present.  
In Table 4.7, in all observed combinations where ~E is present, ~D is also 
present. In other words, a deteriorating economic context could be a necessary 
condition for a decline in QOD. Why, then, does ~E not appear among the 
necessary conditions in the initial analysis? After all, it is the only individual 
condition that behaves in this way, while ~S and B appear as part of a disjunction. 
Furthermore, if ~E were to emerge as a necessary condition, it carries theoretical 
implications that contradict the basic assumptions behind the embeddedness 
model, according to which conditions the economic context alone cannot explain 
democratic changes, and should be considered in conjunction with the social 
context.  
Schneider and Wagemann suggest the reason why some necessary 
conditions may be hidden is that, in determining the most parsimonious solution, 
some untenable logical remainders are inadvertently taken into account. In this 
case, if ~E is determined to be necessary for ~D based on truth table 
observations, any logical remainder where E is present should not be allocated a 
hypothetical outcome ~D. Since it is therefore impossible to determine what the 
outcome may be, all logical remainders where ~E is absent should be excluded 
from the analysis of sufficiency, and only those configurations with observed 
outcomes should be taken into account. There are, however, no logical 
remainders where ~E is present in Table 4.7, so in effect all logical remainders 
are excluded. Based on this, we can assume that ~E is indeed a necessary 
condition due to its consistent behavior in relation to ~D and absence from any 
untenable assumptions. However, Cooper et al. (2014) explain that, while 
Schneider and Wagemann’s approach of excluding untenable assumptions 
appears sound at first glance, a deeper examination reveals that it is likely to 
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‘find’ hidden necessary conditions through a mechanism that generates logical 
contradictions. Using their argument and bringing logical remainders back into 
the analysis, I will explain why ~E is not, in fact, a necessary condition.  
The first step in this demonstration is to consider a counterfactual 
argument: assume that ~E is indeed necessary for ~D, as is apparent empirically. 
In Boolean terms, this is equivalent to saying that E is sufficient for D. Similarly, 
there is already empirical evidence that ~B is necessary for D, which is equivalent 
to B being sufficient for ~D. To summarize: 
  
                   Statement 1: E is sufficient for D 
                   Statement 2: B is sufficient for ~D 
 
If both statements are true simultaneously, what happens if a subset of both E 
and B is found in the logical remainders in Table 4.7? There are actually two of 
these: E~S~PB and E~SPB. If a hypothetical outcome were to be allocated to 
either, it would be impossible to determine what that should be, since the first 
statement indicates the outcome should be present, while the second, that it 
should be absent. Thus, the assumption that ~E is a hidden necessary condition 
for ~D generates logical contradictions that cannot be reconciled with other 
empirical evidence. Cooper et al. explain that, while Schneider and Wagemann’s 
approach seeks to mitigate the impact of limited diversity on empirical research, 
it should be used cautiously to uncover necessary conditions. It is possible, based 
on incomplete data, to make valid (if incomplete) statements about sufficiency. 
Testing for necessity, however, requires much more rigor and can be done 
confidently only when all instances of the condition’s absence have 





                                               
13   Alternatively, going with Schneider and Wagemann’s approach involving untenable 
assumptions related to logical remainders, ~E could be considered a hidden necessary 
condition, but the relevance of its necessity is in question. It is true that, since ~E does not 
occur in any of the logical remainders, there is no risk of it being included in any untenable 
assumptions. But ~E is a commonly occurring condition in the data regardless of which 
outcome is associated with it. Therefore, it could be counted as necessary, but trivial 
condition for ~D. 
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Necessity and theory testing 
 
The interpretation of necessity for this analysis are summed up as follows:  
● S~B is a necessary condition for D; its logical negation ~S + B is 
necessary for ~D 
● ~E is not a hidden necessary condition for ~D 
● Related to the theoretical assumptions laid out in section 4.3.2, 
neither ES nor ~E~S are necessary conditions for D and ~D 
respectively 
 
The most important finding is that the analysis of necessity provides 
empirical support for the embeddedness model when explaining democratic 
deconsolidation, but there is no similarly consistent evidence that it is able to 
explain QOD improvement just as well. On the one hand, the results contradict 
the assumption of symmetry that Merkel himself makes. On the other hand, they 
satisfy QCA’s principle of asymmetry by uncovering logically, but not 
theoretically, opposite explanations for logically, but not theoretically, opposite 
phenomena. This is a particularly strong argument in favor of reorganizing the 
embeddedness model to account for asymmetry. The original approach is 
attractive thanks to its clarity. However, a closer examination through the lens 
of set theory reveals the need for a key addition: when applied to multiple cases 
with different outcomes, it is unlikely that embeddedness is able to explain both 
the decline and improvement of QOD.  
 
 
4.3.3. Analysis of sufficiency 
 
The goal of sufficiency analysis is to find alternative, inclusive explanatory paths 
for the outcome, commonly known as solution formulas. As with necessity, the 
presence and absence of the outcome is examined separately, because the 
principle of asymmetry indicates that the explanations for each will likely 
different permutations of conditions, rather than opposites. In the previous 
section I have already determined that two conditions, S~B and ~B are necessary 
for D, and ~S + B is necessary for ~D. This means that all solution formulas found 
in this section will be subsets of these necessary conditions.  
Following QCA practices, there are three types of solutions for each 
outcome. The conservative solution is obtained by taking into account only those 
truth table rows that have corresponding empirical cases, and making no 
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assumptions about logical remainders. As the most complex solution, it is also a 
subset of all other possible solutions (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, p. 324) 
The second type, the intermediate solution, is based on eliminating logical 
remainders, commonly by introducing assumptions about logical remainders 
that are in line with so-called ‘directional expectations’: based on what theory 
assumes about each individual condition, a logical remainder is expected to 
produce, or fail to produce, one of the two possible outcomes.  This is usually 
handled automatically with the software, by including directional expectations 
for each condition in the R code. Finally, the most parsimonious solution is the 
one that uses the least possible number of conditions and combination of the 
AND/OR operators. In the following section I present all three types of solutions 
for the presence and absence of the outcome (six in total) and then give 
substantive interpretation only to the intermediate solutions. 
  
Sufficient conditions for QOD decline 
 
The conservative solution 
 Terms       incl      PRI      cov.r    cov.u    cases 
 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
~E~S    1.000  1.000  0.727  0.182  SI3; EE2; RO3; BG2,HU2,LT2,SI2,SK2 
~EB      1.000  1.000  0.818  0.273  EE2; BG2,HU2,LT2,SI2,SK2; SK3; HU1,BG3 
 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
  
First, the meanings of the parameters appearing in the solutions should be 
clarified. The two solution terms listed in the left-most column represent 
alternative sufficient explanatory paths for the outcome. In the case of the most 
conservative solution, it is either ~E~S or ~EB that explain the outcome ~D. The 
inclusion column (incl) refers to the minimum sufficiency inclusion score 
specified during the minimization procedure required for a non-remainder 
configuration to be coded as positive (Thiem and Dușa, 2013, p. 92). Typically 
this is used in fuzzy set analysis to determine which cases ‘pass’ a certain 
specified threshold in order to be included in the analysis, but since this analysis 
deals with crisp sets, any scores lower than 1 do not make sense and, indeed, 
should not occur. Similarly, the proportional reduction of inconsistency (PRI) is a 
parameter that is more telling in the case of fuzzy sets, and reflects the extent to 
which a condition (or in this case, solution term) is simultaneously a subset of 
the presence the absence of the outcome. In the case of crisp sets, however, 
values lower than 1 would, once again, not make sense, and would be excluded 
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from the analysis should they occur. Next, raw coverage (cov.r) refers to the 
proportion of cases, out of the total number of cases showing the outcome, 
which is covered by a solution term. Unique coverage (cov.u) applies to cases 
that are only covered by one of the solution terms. In this case, the values of raw 
and unique coverage are the same between the two solution terms, but cov.r 
and cov.u vary due to the fact that three cases are explained by both solution 
terms 
 
The intermediate solution 
Terms       incl      PRI      cov.r    cov.u    cases 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
~E~S   1.000  1.000  0.727  0.182  SI3; EE2; RO3; BG2,HU2,LT2,SI2,SK2 
~EB     1.000  1.000  0.818  0.273  EE2; BG2,HU2,LT2,SI2,SK2; SK3; HU1,BG3 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The use of directional expectations in determining sufficient explanations means 
that, at this point, the logical remainders the conservative solution ignores come 
into play. In practice, directional expectations are applied when the theoretical 
expectations specified in Table 4.1 are introduced in the automated analysis. 
Both E and S are expected to have a positive impact on D, while P and B are 
expected to have a negative one. The theoretical reverse also applies. Thus, the 
directional expectations are (E = 1, S = 1, P = 0, B = 0) when discussing D, and (E 
= 0, S = 0, P = 1, B = 1) when discussing ~D. Introducing this information into the 
analysis should eliminate all logical remainders which do not comply with 
theoretical assumptions about the conditions and outcome. The overlap 
between the conservative and intermediate solutions suggests that all 
simplifying assumptions were dropped. This solution is also more in line with the 
theoretical assumptions of embeddedness. The first solution term indicates that 
a deterioration of both economic and social conditions was a factor in the 
deconsolidation common in 2008-2011. The second term highlights the interplay 
of economic conditions and bargaining power.  
It should also be noted that looking closely at the configurations of 
individual cases reveals that the solution formula is much closer to the 
theoretical expression ~E~S + PB compared to the results concerning QOD 
improvement, which are shown in the following section. It is true that P is absent 
from the intermediate solution, but this is because a rise in populism has not 
been observed in three out of the ten cases: Estonia, Slovenia and Slovakia in 
2011-201414. Had these cases not been present in the analysis, the intermediate 
                                               
14 See Table A.4. in the Appendix 
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solution would have been ~E~S + ~EPB, which closely overlaps with the 
theoretical expression. This is an interesting addition given the empirical 
knowledge of the region and time frame. Most cases of deconsolidation, as the 
original data indicates, occurred in 2008-2011, which covers the height of the 
financial crisis in Europe, as well as the post-crisis recovery period. This is well 
reflected in the pattern of overall sharp economic decline, followed by varying 
degrees of recovery, which was mainly shaped by countries’ different 
approaches to crisis management. 
Economic factors do indeed play a crucial role in the region’s democratic 
transformation, and the empirical evidence supports some long established 
theoretical claims about the link between economy and democracy, as well as 
the political consequences of the financial crisis, and how populism feeds 
Euroscepticism. The positive relationship between socio-economic conditions 
and democracy dates back to Seymour Lipset’s classic proposition that ‘the more 
well to do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy’ (Lipset 
1959, p. 75) and has since been tested extensively and confirmed over large data 
sets. Common factors explaining the occurrence of democracy are wealth, 
industrialization, urbanization and education (Lipset 1959; Vanhanen 1984, 
1989). The longevity of a democratic regime is also an important determinant in 
whether or not democracy will continue to survive, as Przeworski et al. (1996) 
suggest: older democracies are less likely to deteriorate than those which 
recently completed transition from an authoritarian regime. In a more recent 
study of the favorable conditions of economic growth, specific to CEE countries, 
Próchniak (2011) found that structural factors, such as high shares of services in 
the total GDP, high shares of working-age population and human capital, to be 
particularly relevant. Along with these, conditions of financial stability, like 
investment rates, low budget deficits and public debt, and low, stable inflation 
and interest rates, played an important role in the differentiated growth in the 
region, both during transition and after accession. 
The embeddedness model adds the social context as a sine qua non 
condition for preserving and improving democracy. As previous results show, the 
addition is indeed a necessary one. From a strictly economic point of view, if 
matters of equality are excluded, then Lipset’s hypothesis that the more ‘well to 
do’ a country is, the more likely it is to preserve its democracy, does not really 
hold. Firstly, although all CEE countries transitioned to market economies 
roughly over the same period, the different paths they took towards this goal 
resulted in substantial differences in wealth. Strictly in terms of GDP/capita, as 
of 2007, Bulgaria and Romania are situated at the lowest end of the wealth 
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spectrum (with 4,900 and 5,600 euro/capita respectively), while the Czech 
Republic and Slovenia show the highest levels (15,200 and 17,500 euro/capita 
respectively). There is also a large gap between Romania, Bulgaria and the 
following lowest GDP country in the region (Poland with 8,500 euro/capita). This 
data (Eurostat 2016b) indicates, in tandem with Lipset’s hypothesis, that 
countries in the upper tier should be able to maintain their levels of democracy, 
while those in the lower tier should have lower-quality democracy or expect 
deterioration. However, empirical evidence on democratic changes shows that 
this is not the case, at least for high- and middle-wealth CEE countries. Both 
Slovenia and the Czech Republic experienced a decline in QOD after 2008, while 
mid-wealth countries were somewhat of a mixed bag. For example, Latvia 
improved steadily throughout the decade, while Hungary declined. In the case of 
Romania and Bulgaria, both lower-wealth countries by a large margin, the 
hypothesis can be confirmed, not just in terms of GDP/capita but also, for 
instance, in the lower levels of industrialization. Both Romania and Bulgaria have 
large shares of the population working in the agricultural sector (30.4% and 
19.4% respectively in 2012) compared to the other CEE countries and older 
member states (EU Agricultural Economics Brief, 2013a) and neither was able to 
avoid deconsolidation after accession. 
Divorcing the impact of economic factors from social conditions provides 
a very limited picture. True enough, the financial crisis was the main culprit 
during 2008-2011, but its effects were far reaching in the areas of 
unemployment, inequality and prospects of poverty (see Table 4.9) Furthermore, 
public dissatisfaction with domestic economic conditions also fueled populist 
support and, indirectly, Euroscepticism. The majority of CEE countries which 
experienced deconsolidation are concentrated in the 2008-2011 period, 
coinciding with the height of the crisis in Europe. Of ten cases, only Hungary has 
been on a downward slope since 2005 and continued to destabilize since 2011.  
In-depth research into the effects the financial crisis had in the region is 
relatively sparse, aside from reports by the IMF and the European Central Bank 
(ECB 2010, IMF 2017), as well as several case studies focused mostly on the Baltic 
countries and Hungary (Győrffy, 2015; Kattel, 2010; Kattel and Raudla, 2013; 
Flamm, 2012). A combination of being rather on the periphery of the financial 
crisis, and weaker compared to Western economies, meant that the CEE 
countries were hit in a different way, and with different consequences, than 
older EU members. For one thing, due to the more pronounced cyclicity of 
developing economies, CEE countries tended to follow a pattern of sharper 
decline and faster post-crisis recovery (Győrffy, 2015). For another, some 
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international economic and financial links, in particular the strong presence of 
foreign banks in CEE banking systems, actually had an overall stabilizing effect 
due to interventions aimed at reducing the initial blow.  
 





CASE GDP INFLATON GOV. DEBT GINI POVERTY UNEMPLOYMENT 
BG2 -2 8.39 2.2 -0.9 4.3 5.7 
EE2 -2 6.98 1.6 1 1.3 6.8 
HU2 -4 10.86 9.1 1.7 3.3 3.2 
LT2 -3 8.55 22.6 -1.5 4.8 9.6 
RO3 -3 7.57 5.2 1.5 -0.6 -0.4 
SI2 7 4.68 24.8 0.4 0.8 3.8 
SI3 0 4.95 34.3 1.2 1.1 1.5 
SK2 -4 5.21 21.9 2 0 4.1 
Source: Own calculations based on data in the Appendix 
 
The consequences and responses to the financial crisis in CEE countries 
were differentiated, but several common traits can be identified. Firstly, fiscal 
consolidation became the main objective of crisis management, whereby 
governments were concerned with reducing budget deficits and debt 
accumulation. Secondly, Dietrich, Knedlik and Linder (2011) explain that a 
banking and a currency crisis occurred in the region at the same time, but once 
again, with different consequences and in a different form compared to Western 
countries closer to the crisis’ epicenter. 
For example, the Baltic countries succeeded in maintaining relatively 
stable exchange rate regimes, while other currencies, such as those of Poland 
and the Czech Republic, saw a more serious depreciation. But perhaps the most 
far-reaching consequence was the dilemma of state intervention in response to 
the crisis (Staehr, 2010). In addition to controlling deficits and debt, governments 
also had to intervene to limit socio-economic consequences, such as GDP 
decline, increased unemployment, its impact on poverty, and potential for 
creating social unrest. However, this emphasized the extent of their fiscal 
vulnerabilities and placed constraints on the public sector’s prospective 
contribution to economic stabilization and growth. 
The CEE countries that experienced a serious economic downturn can be 
included in one of four categories based on their responses (Terazi and Senel, 
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2011; Staehr, 2010). In the first category, Slovenia and Slovakia benefited from 
their membership in the Economic and Monetary Union in terms of maintaining 
their credit ratings, but suffered a decline in exports. This was particularly 
evident in Slovakia, as one of the largest per capita automobile producers in the 
world. These countries, along with Poland and the Czech Republic, counted on 
more proactive economic policies to counteract the crisis. Bulgaria and Estonia’s 
response to the ensuing sharp GDP decline was to tighten budgetary discipline, 
a policy which allowed them to keep the budget deficit under 3%. Hungary and 
Romania were among the more serious casualties of the crisis and were forced 
to turn to the IMF in order to finance their deficits. Initially, this had a stabilizing 
effect, but also constrained the national governments through loan 
conditionality. Finally, Lithuania is somewhat of an outlier, in that it saw a sharp 
GDP drop, but was able to finance its deficit without turning to the IMF for 
support. 
Governments’ approaches to crisis management spilled over into 
unemployment, increased inequality and higher risk of poverty. Here too, effects 
differed, with the Baltic states being hit earlier and more severely. Rising 
unemployment also had an impact on some long-established patterns in the 
working age population, which had persisted since before accession (Vidovic, 
2012). On the one hand, the gender unemployment gap was temporarily 
reversed, with men being more affected than women. Higher male 
unemployment rates occurred in all CEE countries except Poland, Slovakia and 
the Czech Republic (Eurostat, 2014). In some cases, the gap was quite significant. 
For instance, in 2009 female unemployment in Lithuania and Estonia was at 8.7% 
and 8.9% respectively, while male unemployment was 13.3% and 13.4%. The gap 
was smaller in the three countries with more female unemployment (Poland: 
8.6%/7%; Slovakia: 11.2%/9.1%; the Czech Republic: 6.6%/4.6%). On the other 
hand, youth unemployment, common in the region before accession, also rose, 
most notably in Lithuania, where it reached nearly 20% (Eurostat, 2016d, 2017a). 
The risk of poverty also increased once the crisis hit. Eurostat defines this 
indicator as the percentage of population experiencing at least one of the 
following: income poverty, severe material deprivation, and living in a household 
with very low work intensity. Growing unemployment particularly affected the 
latter component, defined as the number of persons living in a household where 
members of working age worked less than 20% of their total potential in the 
previous 12 months. In addition to unemployment and income poverty, severe 
material deprivation also deepened during the crisis. Of all CEE countries 
experiencing deconsolidation during the crisis, Bulgaria and Romania were the 
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most affected, with 43.6% of Bulgarians and 29% of Romanians living with 
material deprivation in 2011. In Hungary, 23.4% of the population was living in 
the same conditions, 19% in Lithuania, 10.6% in Slovakia, 8.7% in Estonia and 
6.1% in Slovenia. Structurally, women were more affected nearly across the 
board, although the unemployment trend did not follow the same pattern. Age-
wise, younger people (15-29 years old) were more affected in Estonia, Hungary, 
Romania and Slovakia, while the elderly (60 years and over) were at increased 
risk in Bulgaria and Slovenia (Eurostat, 2017a, 2017b).  The crisis’ socio-economic 
impact and the governments’ approach to mitigating it mainly by cutting 
spending and increasing taxes, led to public discontent and, as the intermediate 
solution partially shows, increased the presence and influence of populist 
parties. 
Interestingly, although populism does not feature in the intermediate 
solution, increased support can be observed in the majority of cases, but was 
particularly influential in Bulgaria (2008-2014), Hungary (2005-2014) and 
Lithuania (2008-2011). Bulgaria is one of the success stories of populism in the 
region, with three parties standing out. The National Movement of Stability and 
Progress (NDSV) and the Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) 
gained seats in Parliament shortly after their formation, and were able to 
participate in government coalitions. Ataka, which had a more radical-nationalist 
platform, was less successful, but still managed to secure seats consistently 
between 2005 and 2013 (Nordsieck, 2017). Analyzing these parties’ respective 
electoral performance, Cholova and De Waele (2014) suggest the existence of 
three waves of populism in Bulgaria, starting with the 2001 parliamentary 
elections, and continuing until 2012-2013. NDSV and GERB followed a similar 
pattern of initial flash performance (Pauwels, 2014, p. 63) followed by declining 
support in the following elections, after failing to fulfill their ambitious promises. 
Cholova and De Waele explain that the main source of populist success in 
Bulgaria is voters’ dissatisfaction with the economy, and the lack of prospects for 
positive changes. In the last decade, Eurobarometer surveys for the crisis period 
show that between 80% and 95% of Bulgarian respondents considered the 
economic situation of their country to be negative (Eurobarometer Interactive, 
accessed 2 June 2017). Contributing to the lack of prospects was also massive 
emigration, which caused Bulgaria to lose close to one quarter of its population 
since the early 90s. In this context, populist parties adopted a strategy of political 
accommodation to secure public support. However, in the long run, their 
inability to make good on electoral promises affected their legitimacy in office. 
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Hungary is another typical illustration of the electoral consequences of 
economic turmoil. Before the crisis, Hungarian politics were fairly polarized 
between two stable electoral blocs, with the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) 
the left, and the Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz) on the right, gradually 
incorporating the conservative electorate of other, smaller parties (Mészáros et 
al., 2007). The financial crisis had a serious impact in Hungary, and the policies of 
MSZP, constrained by IMF loan conditionality, led to dwindling support from 
impoverished voters. Austerity measures included budget and wage reduction, 
tax increases and caused a surge in both unemployment and inflation (Becker, 
2010). In this context, Fidesz and the more radical Movement for a Better 
Hungary (Jobbik) were the big winners of the 2010 parliamentary elections at the 
expense of MSZP, which lost over half of its supporters from the 2006 elections 
and only managed to secure 20.9% of votes (Nordsieck, 2017). In contrast, Fidesz 
broke the 50% threshold, with 52.9% of votes. In addition, Becker (2010) finds a 
correlation between the deteriorating economy and Jobbik’s electoral 
performance in regions with previously strong support for MSZP. Socio-economic 
problems, such as declining GDP, high unemployment, high proportion of 
poverty and increasingly xenophobic sentiments perpetuated by right-wing 
politicians, resulted in former MSZP voters effectively changing their political 
affiliation. The victory also encouraged Jobbik to frame poverty and welfare cuts 
in terms of a national threat (Varga, 2014). 
Populist support in Lithuania was more moderate compared to Bulgaria 
and Hungary, although the consequences of the crisis were similarly 
pronounced. Support for  conservative Order and Justice Party (OJP) increased in 
the 2008 parliamentary elections, but the party only won 10.6% votes and 15 of 
the 141 seats, in the context of low electoral turnout (Jurkynas, 2009). A similar, 
but slightly better performance came from the National Resurrection Party (TPP), 
which won 15.10% votes but later merged with the Liberal and Center Union and 
no longer held any seats after the 2012 elections. OJP has been part of the 
Lithuanian parliament over the entire 2005-2014 period, but only as the fourth 
largest party with low overall political impact (Nordsieck, 2017). Mainstream 
political actors, such as the center-right Homeland Union and the Social 
Democratic Party of Lithuania, remained consistently more influential. Lithuania 
confronted the financial crisis in the context of previously sustained economic 
growth, and diminished taxes, but also budget deficits that increased during the 
crisis. In response, the government tightened fiscal discipline early into the crisis. 
It increased VAT, income and other taxes while also pursuing a retrenchment 
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policy that resulted in cutting spending, wages and other social benefits (Davulis, 
2013) 
The cases of Bulgaria, Hungary and Lithuania illustrate different aspects of 
the crisis’ political consequences. Bulgaria and Hungary, which were hard-hit by 
the crisis, saw a significant surge in populist support, along with the rise of more 
radical right-wing parties like Ataka and Jobbik. Populist staying power, however, 
was quite different. In Bulgaria, the failure to fulfill electoral promises in the 
context of economic decline in an already weak economy led to voter 
disenchantment, so the initial success of these parties turned out to be neither 
lasting, nor capable of offering a solution to the overall dissatisfaction with the 
economic climate. On the other hand, Hungary had a more consolidated populist 
presence and voter base. MSZP’s poor crisis management resulted not only in a 
radicalization of the political scene, but in electoral migration from one long-
established mainstream party towards Jobbik, which capitalized on Hungary’s 
precarious economy by framing the consequences of the crisis in decidedly 
nationalistic terms. The situation in Lithuania was almost entirely different. 
Although support for populism had been consistent since 2005, it was also quite 
weak throughout the crisis. This is surprising, given that the government’s 
response was to increase taxes and cut social spending, a fiscally sound approach 
that nevertheless resulted in increased unemployment and lower wages. Still, 
the likely reason why right-wing parties were not able to gain a foothold is that 
they could not draw on a wide enough electorate for support, or convince voters 
to change affiliation, as Fidesz and Jobbik had done. 
In Hungary and Bulgaria, where the crisis caused an upturn in populist 
support, economic concerns were at the core of both party programmes and 
voter expectations – not surprising considering the socio-economic climate. But 
did more populism also translate into more Euroscepticism and, by extension, 
increased bargaining power? As with the case with QOD improvement, the main 
component driving bargaining power in CEE countries is Euroscepticism. The 
other two components register very little change. Shares in the total EU GDP 
fluctuated both ways, but in negligible amounts. Voting power remained 
unchanged during 2008-2011 because no new members had joined the EU to 
affect proportionality. Later, in 2011-2014, it decreased following Croatia’s 
accession. This leaves Euroscepticism to be examined in both its popular and 






Table 4.10. Components of bargaining power 
CASE SHARE IN EU GDP VOTING POWER EUROSCEPTICISM 
BG2 0.03 0 2.44 
BG3 0 -1.11 7.67 
EE2 0 0 9.18 
HU1 0.04 -0.24 4.04 
HU2 -0.08 0 5.54 
LT2 -0.02 0 4.98 
SI2 -0.02 0 17.24 
SK2 0.02 0 13.68 
SK3 0 -0.53 5.96 
Source: Own calculations based on data in the Appendix 
 
While public attitudes towards the EU did not deteriorate in CEE countries as 
strongly as elsewhere in the EU, the crisis reversed the ‘accession effect’ that had 
previously caused an overall drop in Euroscepticism. Serricchio, Tsakatika and 
Quaglia (2013) distinguish between three groups of EU members based on 
changes in public Euroscepticism. None of the CEE countries fall into the category 
of countries where Euroscepticism remained constant. Most experienced 
moderate increases of 1-6%, with Slovenia (+12%) and Lithuania (+9%) as 
outliers. Furthermore, looking at the link between Euroscepticism and public 
perceptions of economy at the tail end of the crisis, Serricchio et al. find a 
strongly negative perception of the countries’ economic situation (between 60% 
and over 90% of respondents), but negative attitudes towards EU membership 
are more moderate. In the CEE countries where bargaining power is a condition 
of deconsolidation, negative economic perceptions are particularly strong: 91% 
in Hungary and Lithuania and 93% in Bulgaria (Eurobarometer 75, 2011). But 
public opinion on EU membership was both lower and more differentiated. In 
Hungary 21.9% of respondents stated that they see EU membership as a bad 
thing, while in Lithuania and Bulgaria percentages were lower (15.6% and 9.7% 
respectively). In general these countries fit within the EU-wide conclusions of 
Serricchio et al. about the link between economic climate and EU membership: 
while the public has a generally very negative perception of their country’s 
economic situation, it does not appear to be the main source of Euroscepticism 
With little evidence of strong public Euroscepticism, one possible 
hypothesis is that populist parties were mainly responsible for driving up 
Euroscepticism. Flamm (2012) finds that, although parties were divided on 
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European integration, opposition went across the political spectrum. For 
example, in Hungary Jobbik had an obvious radical right-wing stance, but 
Bulgarian ATAKA did not explicitly position itself either on the right or the left, 
instead emphasizing nationalism as its core value. Between 2008 and 2011 
support for populism grew considerably in Hungary and, to a lesser degree, in 
Bulgaria and Lithuania. The main actors and their political trajectories are already 
clear at this point, so the remainder of this section focuses briefly on their 
stances with respect to integration and the EU. 
In Hungary, Jobbik marketed itself via strongly xenophobic and anti-
Western language, framing the country’s EU membership in terms of 
‘colonization, which resonated with poorer voters in the eastern region of 
Hungary. Fidesz, which took over power from MSZP and formed the government 
in 2010, also adopted a more aggressively nationalist and anti-EU rhetoric, 
particularly with regard to the EU’s strict fiscal demands at the height of the 
crisis. In Bulgaria, ATAKA put forward a list of twenty principles that establish its 
strongly nationalist stance. For example, they maintain that taxation should 
reflect ‘the capabilities and needs’ of Bulgarians rather than the external 
requirements of the IMF and World Bank. The party also calls for complete 
neutrality, withdrawal from NATO and – more drastically – a renegotiation of EU 
accession chapters that resulted in unfavorable terms for Bulgaria (Novaković, 
2008). The case of Lithuania is somewhat vaguer. In its 2008 electoral program 
the Order and Justice Party takes a surprising pro-EU stance by stating that 
Lithuania’s membership would encourage the country’s economic development 
and offer opportunities for the enrichment of Lithuanian science and culture 
(Balcere, 2011). In this respect, the OJP makes few references that would clearly 
position it as an anti-EU or anti-Western party. 
Thus, populism, while present in all three cases, had a different impact on 
party-based Euroscepticism in each. In Hungary two influential right-wing parties 
took strongly nationalist stances and were openly critical of the EU in the context 
of the economic crisis, which bolstered popular Euroscepticism. During the same 
period Bulgaria had the most radically anti-EU party among the three cases, but 
ATAKA’s much weaker popular support meant that it could not become a strong 
vector of Euroscepticism in the country, where public Euroscepticism after the 
crisis was also the lowest among all CEE countries. Finally, Lithuania remains an 
ambiguous case despite the long-term presence of populism, as the rise in 
Euroscepticism cannot be explained by the OJP’s political program, and the 
party’s voter base was in any case quite small. Most likely, public Euroscepticism 
can be explained by looking at the domestic socio-economic impact of the crisis. 
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Another two possible explanations for how Euroscepticism fluctuated in 
the region should be taken into account. Firstly, while party-driven 
Euroscepticism was very much present in Hungary and Bulgaria, much of the 
criticism aimed towards international actors during the crisis was directed 
towards the IMF and the World Bank rather than the EU. While Jobbik and ATAKA 
both pushed for less external involvement into their countries’ politics and 
economies, neither advocated directly for leaving the EU, which would suggest 
that, surprisingly, their brand of Euroscepticism is softer than first assumed 
(Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2008, p. 7-8). Another possible explanation relies on 
how public Euroscepticism is typically measured in the Eurobarometer reports. 
Questions like ‘Is EU membership a good or bad thing?’ and ‘Do you tend to trust 
or distrust the EU?’ are rather vague. This is well reflected in the high 
percentages of ‘Neither good nor bad’ or ‘I don’t know’ responses. The impact of 
the crisis in the region, although quite severe, did not radically alter public 
perceptions of the EU. As conditions of deconsolidation, the economy, populism 
and Euroscepticism do, of course, interact. But while the link between populism 
and the economy is evident, the links between the economy and Euroscepticism, 
and populism and Euroscepticism respectively, are weaker. 
  
The most parsimonious solution 
Terms   incl      PRI      cov.r    cov.u    cases 
             ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             B           1.000  1.000  0.818   0.273   EE2; BG2,HU2,LT2,SI2,SK2; SK3;  HU1,BG3 
             ~S         1.000  1.000  0.727   0.182   SI3; EE2; RO3; BG2,HU2,LT2,SI2,SK2 
            ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
The difference between the intermediate and most parsimonious 
solutions is that ~E has been eliminated. Much of the explanation for this lies in 
the previous explanation about why ~E is not a hidden necessary condition, 
although from the data it appears that it should be. If ~E had indeed been 
necessary, it would have also appeared in every term in the solution above. The 
(un)necessary character of ~E is, however, quite interesting. From the QCA 
standpoint, it is already clear that it is not necessary. But the substantive 
interpretation of the intermediate solution provides empirical evidence that ~E 
was a pivotal factor in deconsolidation, affecting all other conditions present in 
the most parsimonious solution. Two technical lessons can be drawn from this 
contradictory finding. The first is that there is much value in interpreting the 
intermediate solution over the most parsimonious one. The most parsimonious 
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solution may seem attractive for its ability to reduce information to its simplest 
form, while at the same time saying something about all cases of interest. 
Nevertheless, parsimony comes at a cost that may be quite significant when 
emphasizing the technical aspects of QCA. Proving that ~E is not a hidden 
necessary condition from a set-theoretic perspective is straightforward, as can 
be seen in section 4.3.2 of this chapter. But this is one of the points where the 
language of logic fails to reflect reality. If interpretation had been based on the 
most parsimonious solution instead, results would have found, inevitably, that 
~E plays an important role in the evolution of ~S, P and B together, therefore 
showing that it is more value in focusing on the intermediate solution from the 
beginning.  
The second lesson follows from the first and deals with the weight 
researchers may be tempted to place on QCA as a technique over more detailed 
follow-up studies. QCA is formulaic, as indeed it aims to be. But the ability to 
produce a neat explanation for complex phenomena does not make it infallible. 
This is why the process of obtaining solution formulas, as well as information on 
necessary conditions, is only one step in a more complex approach to empirical 
data. The difference between the intermediate and most parsimonious solutions 
explaining deconsolidation is a cautionary tale about QCA usage. Both results are 
technically correct, but in practice any attempt at substantive interpretation for 




Sufficient conditions for QOD improvement 
  
The conservative solution  
  Terms      incl      PRI  cov.r  cov.u   cases 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
~ES~B   1.000  1.000  0.714  0.286  CZ1,EE1; LT1, PL1, SI1 
  SP~B   1.000  1.000  0.714  0.286  LT1,PL1,SI1; LV3,LT3 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------   
 
 The conservative solution, which uses only the observed positive configurations, 
shows the most complex configurations explaining QOD improvement in the 
region. The first solution term indicates that a combination of economic 
recession combined, surprisingly, with an improvement of social conditions and 
a decline in bargaining power is one of the explanatory factors of this trend in a 
114 
 
limited number of CEE countries. The other maintains the improved social 
conditions/declining bargaining power combination, but shows that populism is 
also present in the mix. Although both economic conditions and populism 
disappear once directional expectations are introduced, there is nevertheless a 
more substantive interpretation of their presence: firstly, economic decline is 
present over the 2005-2008 period but, compared to the crisis and post-crisis 
periods, it is quite small (See Table A.1 in the Appendix). Thus, the presence of 
economic decline in the solution is a consequence of dichotomization which, at 
this stage of the analysis, does not discriminate between degrees. A more in-
depth analysis of the cases would certainly have to account for the intensity of 
economic decline and its differentiated consequences. Similarly, a possible 
explanation for the counter-intuitive presence of populism in the second solution 
term is that Euroscepticism is not an implied feature of populism. Therefore, the 
presence of populism does not preclude a decline in bargaining power.  
 
The intermediate solution 
Terms   incl     PRI      cov.r   cov.u   cases 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
S~B    1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  CZ1,EE1; LT1,PL1,SI1; LV3,LT3 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
The intermediate solution above shows that the reduction of complexity 
has eliminated two INUS conditions that appear in the conservative solution. 
Both ~ES~B or SP~B have been reduced to S~B, which now covers all seven cases 
and is equivalent to the necessary condition uncovered in the previous section 
of this chapter. The original raw data from Table 4.2 is used to interpret this 
solution substantively. This is necessary because the choice of crisp-set QCA 
inevitably leads to loss of information, so not all cases of QOD improvement 
should be interpreted in the same way. This is where differences in degree must 











Table 4.11. Conditions of QOD improvement 
CASE S B D 
CZ1 3.03 -1.5 0.38 
EE1 3.27 -3.43 0.84 
LT1 5.67 -0.68 1.04 
LT3 2.83 -1.64 2.49 
LV3 4.13 -2.55 0.23 
PL1 9.73 -1.75 0.59 
SI1 0.83 -1.35 0.02 
Source: Calculations in the Appendix 
 
With only a few exceptions, all cases in this category have seen a decline in 
poverty and unemployment rates, and an increase in the equality of income 
distribution as indicated by smaller Gini coefficient values (Table 4.12). 
Interestingly, social context does not follow the same patterns as economic 
context – quite the opposite, in fact. As Table 4.6 indicates, of the 18 cases 
included in the adjusted data, there are 10 where S receives a score of 1, but only 
two (Latvia and Lithuania in 2011-2014) where E receives the same score 
(interestingly, these are also the only two cases where S has seen a positive 
trend, but the levels of inequality rose slightly). This means that increasing levels 
of equality and a decline in the population at risk of poverty do not occur as a 
consequence of economic growth over the same period. 
 
 Table 4.12. Components of social context (S) 
CASE GINI POVERTY UNEMPLOYMENT 
CZ1 -1.3 -4.3 -3.5 
EE1 -3.2 -4.1 -2.5 
LT1 -1.8 -12.7 -2.5 
PL1 -3.6 -14.8 -10.8 
SI1 -0.4 0 -2.1 
LT3 2 -5.8 -4.7 
LV3 0.4 -7.4 -5.4 
Source: Calculations in the Appendix 
 
Untangling the relationship between economic growth and inequality, 
which is reflected in all three dimensions of the social context shown in the table 
above, is surprisingly difficult in Central and Eastern Europe. For one thing, 
evidence from the post-accession period cannot be interpreted accurately 
116 
 
without examining the transition processes that carried former communist 
countries on the way to EU membership. For another, there is currently less 
research on how the social context in these countries has evolved after 
accession, compared to a wealth of studies dealing with the first post-communist 
decade. 
Transition was a complex process leading to economic, social, political 
and cultural changes that did not happen independently of eachother. This is well 
reflected in the literature on pre-accession transformations in the region, which 
finds evidence that inequality is not strictly linked to economic processes, but is 
also influenced by ethnically motivated social exclusion and low levels of political 
representation. In general terms, Kuznets (1955) notes that the stage of 
economic development a country is traversing has a significant impact on 
inequality. Higher levels of inequality can be observed in less developed 
economies due to the fact that a disproportionate amount of wealth is owned by 
a small, high-income segment of the population. But there are also less obvious 
findings, such as a weaker link between inequality and growth, compared to 
growth and poverty (Deininger and Squire, 1996) 
An increase in levels of inequality after the fall of communism is well 
documented in Central and Eastern Europe (Bandelj and Mahutga, 2010; Peters 
et al. 2010) but research focusing on the post-accession period is relatively 
sparse. Bandelj and Mahutga (2010) hypothesize that the multi-dimensionality 
and systemic changes of the transition period explain rising inequality through 
four processes: privatization, redistributive state retrenchment, ethno-
nationalist discrimination and foreign investment penetration. With regards to 
the first, the authors argue that a large private sector created premises for 
differentiation between social categories (for instance, differences in income 
between individuals working in the private and public sectors) and thus greater 
levels of inequality. On the other hand, the relationship between inequality and 
state retrenchment should be inverse: higher levels of state expenditure should 
contribute to the reduction of inequality.  Social exclusion on ethnic grounds is a 
particularly thorny problem in Central and Eastern Europe. Social and cultural 
fault lines deepened between ethnic majorities and minorities, perhaps most 
visibly in the case of Roma communities across the region. This led to further 
economic and political exclusion through discrimination on the labor market and 
lack of effective political representation. Finally, the impact of foreign 
investment on socio-economic equality is, somewhat surprisingly, negative. In 
post-communist countries, foreign direct investments were heavily 
concentrated in the trade, business and financial sectors, creating a category of 
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high-income managerial positions that forced a significant wage gap between 
employees in multinational and domestic companies and attracted skilled 
workers in the foreign sector. Bandelj and Mahutga test their hypotheses in the 
same ten CEE countries used in this analysis, by looking at the impact that the 
size of the private sector, government expenditure, size of ethno-national 
minorities and foreign direct investment inflow per capita had on the Gini index. 
They find that, during the first decade of transition, there was no significant link 
between economic development and income inequality trends. There was, 
however, a positive relationship with the size of the private sector, while higher 
government spending helped reduce inequality. There is also substantial 
empirical support for the hypothesized relationship between ethnic cleavages 
and inequality. Furthermore, foreign direct investments correlate positively with 
inequality and also appear to affect its connection with the size of the private 
sector. 
Another explanation is proposed by Pryor (2014), who finds that, in the 
early 2000s, growth in GDP/capita, government expenditure for social 
protection, trade openness and systemic transition, all correlate negatively with 
inequality in Central and Eastern Europe. Similarly, Rose and Viju (2014) find that, 
between 1990 and 2006, inflation, private sector size and whether a country is 
considered low, middle or high income had significant effects on inequality as 
measured by the Gini index. In both high income countries (Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) and middle income countries (Bulgaria, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania) inflation and private sector size correlated positively 
with inequality. The effect of GDP/capita was also found to be positive in the case 
of middle-income countries, and negative for high income ones. The effect, 
however, is not significant, further corroborating previous findings about the link 
between economic growth and inequality. With regards to unemployment, 
Vidovic (2002) identifies six common trends among CEE countries prior to 
accession: (a) significant regional variations in unemployment; (b) rising long-
term unemployment; (c) unemployment disproportionately affecting women; 
(d) increasing youth unemployment; (e) unemployment disproportionately 
affecting less educated, less skilled workers; (f) higher risk of unemployment for 
minorities. These patterns both reflect the causes of inequality discussed above, 
and indicate the general structure of the population at risk of poverty. 
At this point, the picture of the pre-accession social context in CEE is 
fairly clear: the early stages of transition to capitalism were marked by more 
inequality compared to those in the countries’ previous socialist regimes, and 
research covering the first decade of transition suggests that this state of affairs 
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continued into the early 2000s. Relatedly, the economic and social contexts 
defined in this dissertation do not seem to go hand-in-hand in a way that would 
allow an examination of the favorable economic context as the basis of more 
equal social conditions. What has changed to enable these cases to maintain a 
positive trend in equality measures while confronting worsening economic 
conditions over the same period? 
Much of the transition period in Central and Eastern Europe overlaps 
with the countries’ accession process, with all ten formal membership 
applications being submitted between 1990 and 1996, and has been significantly 
shaped by it. I suggest that, in the absence of consistent empirical research, the 
effect of the accession process on inequality should be approached along three 
dimensions. The first refers to eligibility in the form of the Copenhagen criteria, 
which establish the basic conditions for membership. Thus, in order to become 
an EU member, a candidate must first have stable institutions that guarantee 
democratic rule, human rights and the protection of minorities. Secondly, it must 
have a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with the 
competitiveness of older members. And thirdly, it must have the capacity to 
implement the obligations of membership and align itself with the political goals 
of the EU. In addition to these criteria, the implementation of the Community 
acquis, the corpus of all current EU legislation, is a sine qua non condition of 
membership. In its present format, the acquis has 35 chapters ranging from 
environmental issues to security and defense policy. Three of these are of 
particular interest to understand transformations in the social context. Chapter 
19 on social policy and employment deals with labor law, equality, workplace 
safety and anti-discrimination. Chapter 11 on agriculture and rural development 
formulates rules that members must adhere to in order to maintain the EU’s 
common agricultural policy (CAP) and includes, among other things, measures 
for developing rural areas. And finally, Chapter 23 on judiciary reforms and 
fundamental rights indicates that member states must be able to guarantee the 
fundamental rights of their citizens. 
The Copenhagen criteria, together with the acquis, create the legal and 
political basis for membership and require substantial reforms. For this purpose, 
during the accession period candidate countries were able to access EU financial 
instruments whose purpose was to support these changes in several key areas. 
The most significant of these was the PHARE fund, which had two main 
objectives: to assist the administration of candidate countries in developing the 
capacity to implement the acquis and in particular align its industry and 
infrastructure with Community standards, in areas such as environment, 
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transport and working conditions. ISPA and SAPARD were two other financial 
instruments accessible to candidates from 2000 to 2006. The former was aimed 
at environmental and transport-related reforms, while the latter supported 
agricultural and rural development. 
The integration process did not come to a definitive halt after accession. 
Conditionality continued in a more diluted form, this time in relation to the 
process of joining the Schengen are and the Euro zone. (Haughton, 2009). 
Adopting the common currency requires new members to adhere strictly to the 
Maastricht (or convergence) criteria, which establish the levels of inflation, 
government budget deficit, debt-to-GDP ratio, exchange rate and long term 
interest rate a country must fulfill in order to be able to adopt the Euro. Out of 
the ten CEE countries five have so far switched to the common currency: Estonia 
(2011), Latvia (2014), Lithuania (2015), Slovakia (2009) and Slovenia (2007). 
Another important vector of continuing integration was the Lisbon 
strategy, in effect in all member states between 2000 and 2010, whose aim was 
to create jobs, and encourage innovation and socio-economic growth. According 
to the European Commission guidelines introduction (European Commission, 
2005), the strategy’s key areas were: (a) to invest in lifelong learning projects in 
order to create a more skilled workforce in response to globalization; (b) to 
promote research and development and encourage collaborations between 
universities and research institutions across Europe; (c) to reduce the 
environmental impact of economic growth by promoting environmentally-
friendly technologies and slowing the pace of climate change. After 2010 the 
Lisbon strategy, largely considered a failure, was replaced by the Europe 2020 
program. 
Although it failed to produce the expected, far-reaching objectives set 
up in 2000, the Lisbon strategy did have a significant impact in Central and 
Eastern Europe, particularly in the area of unemployment and reduction of social 
disparities. Rodriguez et al. (2010, p. 62-70) examine nine indicators related to 
employment and inequality in EU between 1997 and 2007 and find that, while 
there was an overall increase in employment rates (including for women and 
older workers) and relatively high levels of youth education, a few problems, 
such as long-tern unemployment and high poverty rates, persisted in some 
countries. Some of the changes occurring in CEE countries were quite significant 
when compared to the old member states. For instance, the unemployment rate 
was cut nearly in half between 2001 and 2007 in countries like Poland, Slovakia 
and the Baltic states. Long-term unemployment rates followed a similar path, 
although overall changes were less dramatic. Consistent reductions occurred in 
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Poland, Slovakia, the Baltic countries and, to a lesser degree, in Slovenia and the 
Czech Republic. Unemployment, both long and short-term, highlights some 
differences between the new member states. Despite significant reductions, 
Slovakia, Poland and Hungary show consistently higher unemployment rates 
compared to the EU-25 average, while the Baltics, Slovenia and Czech Republic 
well below that point (Eurostat, 2017a). The percentage of population at risk of 
poverty (living below the poverty threshold of 60% of national median disposable 
income) follows a different – and quite surprising – trend (Eurostat, 2016d, 
2017b). In 2007 there were more people at risk of poverty compared to 2001 in 
almost every EU member state, although there were differences the levels of 
poverty and degrees of change. Among CEE countries, Poland and the Baltics 
have some of the highest at-risk rates, while Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia 
and Hungary are situated below the EU-27 average.  
In terms of education, there is a notable discrepancy between the 
percentage of population in each country that has completed at least upper 
secondary education (ages 20-24) and those pursuing further education or 
training (25-64). CEE countries have some of the highest (and most stable over 
time) rates of secondary education completion. On average, between 2006 and 
2014, this percentage has fluctuated between 92.2% in Slovakia, and 78.8% in 
Romania, compared to the EU-27 average of 79.5%. However, with few 
exceptions, the population involved in some type of adult education (aged 25-
64) is well below EU-27 values. On average, between 2006 and 2014, the lowest 
percentages are observed in Romania (1.6%) and Bulgaria (1.7%), while the 
highest, above the EU-27 average of 9.7%, are in Slovenia (14.4%) and the Czech 
Republic (8.5%) (Eurostat, 2017c). 
Although on the surface these results suggest that the Lisbon strategy 
was largely beneficial to the EU’s newest member states, the problem is a little 
more nuanced. de la Porte and Jacobsson (2010) argue, for example, that the 
employment strategy model of social investment does not fit well with the socio-
economic realities of the new member states for three reasons: weak social 
partnerships, lack of resources at the local level and the failure of political elites 
to prioritize social investments over addressing short-term issues. Meanwhile, 
Davoine et al. (2008) focus on the quality of work under the European 
Employment Strategy (included in the Lisbon strategy as of 2005). They find that, 
compared to the old member states, CEE labor markets show several specific 
characteristics: lower levels of participating in training and education, a higher 
gender pay gap and higher impact of labor on parenthood (particularly women) 
and, relatedly, the lowest levels of childcare availability for children up to three 
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years old. On the other hand there are no significant differences between old 
and new member states in terms of job satisfaction and job market segregation 
between men and women. Coupled with the gap between the percentage of 
population that has completed a form of secondary education, and the markedly 
lower percentages of those engaged in adult education, these indicators suggest 
two things. Firstly, while there was a quantitative decrease in the sources of 
inequality since accession, such as lower unemployment and poverty levels, 
qualitative changes are not so clear cut. For instance, higher employment for 
women did not translate into a significant bridging of the pay gap, and some 
structural problems still specifically affect working women. Similarly, higher 
levels of education completion do not automatically result in a more skilled 
workforce without further training and specialization – which empirical evidence 
shows is lacking in the region. The second aspect these indicators highlight is that 
quantitative changes may appear significant on their own, but compared to 
similar transformations in the old member states, they show that for CEE 
countries integration is an ongoing process whose focus has moved from 
updating infrastructure and harmonizing legislation, to more concrete socio-
economic aspects of catching up with the EU. 
These systemic transformations dating back to the early 1990s are not a 
consequence of transition to a market economy, as much as a necessity for 
integration. The same is true for democracy, although the normative aspect of 
whether CEE countries treated democratization as the goal and integration as 
the means, or vice-versa, is complex and does not lend itself well to regional 
generalizations.  It is worth, at this point, to continue the discussion in the 
context of integration and turn to the impact of bargaining power in combination 
with the social context. 
From the onset, there is no clear theoretical link between the two 
conditions. The original goal of operationalizing them was to create a more 
complex background for examining democracy in light of integration. As such, 
there was no default expectation that the two would interact. In this research, 
bargaining power is used as an expression of a member state’s potential to 
disrupt the EU’s domestic impact. The underlying assumption is that, in case of 
democratic deconsolidation, a country with high enough bargaining power 
should be able to oppose or prevent the EU from implementing the appropriate 
sanctions.  
Bargaining power has three dimensions: economic (a country’s share in 
the EU’s total GDP), institutional (voting power in the Council) and political 
(public skepticism for integration). In the case of CEE countries, the first two 
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components do not vary considerably from one period to the next, and do not 
have a major impact on the country’s bargaining power. The situation is quite 
different in countries such as Germany, France or Great Britain, where variations 
in these individual components would translate into noticeable variations in the 
overall bargaining power. In the new member states, the source of significant 
variation comes from citizens’ trust, or lack thereof, in the EU. In the 
intermediate solution, a decrease in bargaining power occurs across the board.  
 
Table 4.13. Bargaining power (B) components 
CASE SHARE IN EU GDP VOTING POWER SKEPTICISM 
CZ1 0.29 -0.24 -4.55 
EE1 0.03 -0.09 -10.24 
LT1 0.07 -0.14 -1.97 
PL1 0.70 -0.61 -5.35 
SI1 0.04 -0.09 -4.00 
LV3 0.02 -0.16 -7.50 
LT3 0.02 -1.86 -3.07 
Source: Own calculations in the Appendix 
  
Institutionally, variations in voting power are a technical consequence of 
enlargement. Between 2005 and 2014 there were two intervals where voting 
power variates, affecting all EU members to some degree. In 2005-2008 this was 
caused by Romania and Bulgaria joining the EU, and resulted in an overall 
decrease in voting power for all other CEE countries, and across the board in the 
old member states. From 2008 to 2011 there was no change. In 2011-2014 voting 
power varied again due to Croatia’s accession in 2013, but proportionality 
changes, resulting in increased voting power for larger, old member states, and 
another overall decrease in CEE countries.   
It is worth noting that under current voting procedures in the Council, all 
ten CEE countries acting in tandem only have the power to influence the 
outcome of the vote in two situations: when unanimity is required, or in cases 
where the rule of reinforced qualified majority (which must include at least two-
thirds of member states) applies. The countries may, under special conditions, 
form a blocking minority if their total population represents over 35% of the 
population of all participating countries. But realistically this is difficult to attain, 
considering that the total population of CEE countries currently amounts to less 
than 20% of the EU population. 
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The situation is similar for the share of countries’ GDP in the total EU 
GDP. Although changes have been positive, indicating an increase for all cases, 
they are minor compared to the equivalent share of larger, older member states. 
Germany, France, Italy and Great Britain together consistently make up around 
60% of the EU’s total GDP whereas CEE countries together only amount to 6 - 
7.5% of the total. An increase of the share of GDP is thus not likely to impact the 
overall amount. The main source of CEE countries bargaining power thus remains 
public trust in the EU. 
It is not surprising that the levels of skepticism with regards to the 
benefits of integration would be lower immediately after accession and maintain 
a negative momentum for a while. However, it should also be noted that 
declining confidence in the EU, which occurred later in the decade-plus since 
accession, is not an isolated phenomenon specific to CEE countries, but extends 
to older member states as well. There are numerous approaches in literature to 
Euroscepticism. For example, a distinction can be made between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
Euroscepticism, depending on how political parties position themselves on the 
national level with regards to integration (Taggart 1998; Taggart and Szczerbiak, 
2008; Leconte, 2010). Hard Euroscepticism can be observed in parties that 
explicitly oppose integration or believe their country should withdraw from the 
EU. In turn, parties that exhibit soft Euroscepticism are not against integration 
altogether, but oppose the EU in certain policy areas or when they believe 
‘national interest’ should be given priority (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2008, p. 7-8). 
In a more nuanced approach, Leconte (2010) distinguishes between 
utilitarian, political, value-based and cultural Euroscepticism, depending on the 
specific object of opposition. For utilitarian Euroscepticism, it is the gains and 
costs of integration, while political Euroscepticism is expressed in response to 
ceding domestic institutional attributions to a supranational system. Relatedly, 
value-based Euroscepticism criticizes external interference in more fundamental 
areas, such as human rights, justice, or public order. Cultural Euroscepticism is 
born out of distrust of Europe in a broader sense, due to perceived 
incompatibilities between cultural or historical aspects. Magone (2015) further 
expands the typology of Euroscepticism by comparing it to concepts such as 
Eurocriticism (essentially a pro-European attitude that nevertheless advocates 
for changes in current procedures and policy areas), Eurodisenchantment 
(caused by the perception that the EU has failed its supporters) and 
Euroenthusiasm (an expression of full support for the European project.) 
In this analysis I operationalize skepticism as an expression of public 
distrust in the EU, using data from the Eurobarometer surveys. The notion of 
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‘trust’ is admittedly rather vague, but I opted for it (instead of, for instance, 
support for integration or attachment to Europe) because the results can be 
compared to similar data on trust in national democratic institutions. This is 
especially interesting for the assumption that bargaining power goes hand-in-
hand with the potential for democratic deconsolidation. Concretely, I measured 
skepticism as the percentage of respondents in each country who replied 
negatively to the question ‘Do you tend to trust or not to trust the European 
Union?’ (This includes ‘I don’t know’ answers). Where two surveys were 
conducted during the same year, the results are averaged. Changes for the 
relevant cases are shown in Table 4.13. 
Literature has thus far identified two sources of declining trust in the EU: 
public attitudes and party-based Euroscepticism. With regards to the former, 
Schlenker (2012) studies the attitudinal model towards EU membership 
prevalent in the CEE countries that joined in 2004. She differentiates between 
instrumental reasons for support (economic prosperity, freedom of movement, 
positive changes in personal circumstances), normative reasons (attitudes 
towards democracy in the EU) and expressive reasons (attachment to the EU or 
one’s own country, cultural identity). Schlenker hypothesizes that the 
importance of these categories changes before and after accession: instrumental 
arguments for support become more important after accession, normative 
arguments less so, while the weight of expressive arguments is constant 
throughout.  Although she finds, unsurprisingly, that there is an overall decrease 
in public enthusiasm towards membership over time, the explanatory dynamic 
of the three arguments is different from the one expected. Firstly, instrumental 
reasons for supporting integration are already very important before accession, 
but declined after 2004 (although the author suggests the economic crisis 
brought such concerns back). The importance of normative arguments has not 
changed significantly after accession, but the expressive reasons, contrary to the 
original hypothesis, had less explanatory power after 2004. The second source 
of Euroscepticism is party-based and it is best explained by the distinction 
between hard and soft Eurosceptisicm (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004; 2008). As 
the two concepts suggest, Euroscepticism does not exclusively characterize far-
right parties. Although there is a higher concentration on the right (where parties 
use Euroscepticism to market themselves to voters), it is present all across the 
political spectrum, with mainstream parties leaning towards soft Euroscepticism. 
How do the two types of Euroscepticism interact in the case of CEE 
countries? Firstly, five of cases covered by the S~B solution term (LT1, PL1, SI1, 
LV3, LT3) are countries where populist parties hold seats in the countries’ 
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parliaments during the corresponding time period. However, early in the post-
integration period their influence had either not picked up speed (as is the case 
of Latvia’s National Alliance and Lithuania’s Order and Justice Party) or was 
unable to undercut the initial public enthusiasm over EU accession. The evidence 
of an ‘accession effect’ is unfortunately rather difficult to find in numbers, 
although the pattern of decline and increase in public Euroscepticism during 
2005-2008 and 2008-2011 respectively is quite evident, as are the mixed 
attitudes of 2011-2014. In combination with low support for Eurosceptic parties, 
the overall picture does explain the presence of ~B in the solution formula, but 
it should be emphasized that the link between S and ~B is more tenuous, both 
theoretically and empirically.  
In the remaining two cases covered by S~B (CZ1 and EE1), populism was 
not a major presence on the political scene, to mobilize public Euroscepticism. In 
Estonia, the limitations imposed on registering new parties (requiring them to 
have at least 1,000 members) made it difficult for small, grassroots movements 
to become effective political actors (Auers and Kasekamp, 2013). A few right-
wing players, such as the Conservative People’s Party and the Estonian 
Independence Party, were indeed active during the reference period, but did not 
hold any seats in the country’s legislative body at any point between 2005 and 
2014. Similarly, populism did not play a significant role in the Czech Republic 
prior to 2013, when two parties entered the parliament: the Action of 
Dissatisfied Citizens (ANO 2011) held 47 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 
nine in the Senate, while Dawn of Direct Democracy (Úsvit) won a more modest 
14 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Císař and Štětka (2016) comment that this 
rise of populism has begun transforming the established party system. 
Previously, the Czech democracy had featured a stable and closed party system 
centered around four mainstream parties which, argues Hanley (2012), were 
ideologically integrated with the Western European party families. The 2005-
2008 interval observed in this analysis overlaps, then, with a period of political 
stability. Democracy in the Czech Republic continued to improve until 2011, but 
the following period saw a downward turn. These overall trends should not be 
interpreted in a deterministic way, or even, in the absence of more sold 
evidence, as being related. Such associations may seem attractive, particularly 
when they align so neatly. But the theoretical assumption that a surge in 
populism, together with more bargaining power, has a negative impact on 
democracy does not account for the scope of this impact, and certainly does not 






 The most parsimonious solution 
Terms   incl      PRI      cov.r   cov.u   cases 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
S*~B    1.000  1.000  0.778  0.556  CZ1,EE1; LT1,PL1,SI1; LV3,LT3 
  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         
Interestingly, the most parsimonious solution is identical to the 
intermediate one, so it does not require additional substantive interpretation. In 
set-theoretic terms, their equivalence simply means that the intermediate 
solution is not a subset of the most parsimonious one, but that they overlap. The 
likely reason for this is that the parsimonious solution takes into account all 
simplifying assumptions (i.e. those logical remainders that contribute to the 
Boolean minimization process), while the intermediate solution only uses those 
logical remainders that comply with directional expectations. The fact that these 
solutions are identical means that all simplifying assumptions are also 
configurations that comply with directional expectations. 
 
Sufficiency analysis and theory testing 
 
From a set-theoretic perspective, it is more difficult to interpret the conditions 
of QOD improvement than those of decline. The latter also do a better job of 
reflecting theoretical claims about the dimensions of external embeddedness, 
particularly with regards to the relationship between economic and social 
development. The empirical evidence presented in this chapter shows that, 
where deconsolidation is concerned, a corresponding worsening of both 
economic and social conditions can be observed. The other explanatory path is 
very similar to the set-theoretic translation of embeddedness, with the addition 
of declining economic conditions in combination with rising support for populism 
and an increase in bargaining power. 
One of the results from the earlier analysis of necessity in this chapter is 
that, while the economic context may appear to be a hidden necessary condition 
for deconsolidation, a closer look reveals that that is not the case. Sufficiency 
analysis, however, shows that the economic transformations of 2008-2011 were 
crucially important for the substantive interpretation of the solution. The 
intermediate formula, which features ~E in both terms in combinations with ~S 
and B respectively, allows the inclusion and interpretation of P and is in fact very 
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similar to the Boolean form of embeddedness - ~E~S + PB. The only difference 
appears in the second solution term (~EPB instead of PB) which further 
emphasizes the explanatory power of ~E. 
Theory testing for the presence of the outcome is less straightforward 
because the two formulas differ quite a bit (compare S~B and ES + ~P~B). The 
discrepancy between them has a similar explanation to the one discussed during 
theory testing for necessity. The solution formula S~B shows that, while S is a 
necessary condition, and so appears in both solution terms, it does not need to 
be combined with E, as Wolfgang Merkel claimed originally. In other words, E 
does not have as much explanatory power for D as ~E has for ~D, but a higher 
quality of democracy cannot be achieved without a favorable social context. In 
combination with the early, mostly positive consequences of EU accession, and 
weak or absent domestic support for populism, this makes up a complex, but 
likely region-specific picture. Since most cases of QOD improvement are 
concentrated in the 2005-2008 period, it is very important to note that the newly 
completed accession process had far-reaching economic, social and political 
consequences that are most visible during the first reference period. Where the 
financial crisis is central to explaining deconsolidation, integration (in a more 
substantive interpretation not limited to bargaining power) is the main condition 
responsible, more or less directly, for QOD improvement. The specificity of both 
geography and time frame means that, should a similar analysis be conducted on 
old member states, the results will be quite different. For one thing, accession as 
a mobilizing factor is absent. For another, using bargaining as a surrogate for 
integration draws a completely different picture in the case of countries like 
Germany, France or Italy, whose large economies and voting shares in the 
Council mean that they have much more potential to make an impact individually 
– something that CEE countries cannot achieve even working in tandem. 
In sum, Central and Eastern Europe lends more empirical support for 
embeddedness when applied to deconsolidation, with the inclusion of economic 
context in both solution terms. For improvement, however, the explanation is 




4.4. Post-analysis: revisiting theory 
 
In section 4.2 of this chapter I translated democratic embeddedness into set-
theoretic language, which made it easier to observe how well theoretical 
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expectations are supported by empirical findings. Nevertheless, there are some 
inevitable discrepancies between the original model and its set-theoretic form, 
resulting from the number of assumptions needed to make verbally expressed 
sentences amenable to Boolean rules. Truthfully, this is more interpretation than 
translation, and Wolfgang Merkel likely did not intend his model to be used this 
way. The set-theoretic approach does, however, contribute to refining the 
original version by showing exactly how the dimensions of external 
embeddedness interact with eachother – something Merkel does not specify. 
Furthermore, this analysis shows an example of how theory testing can be 
achieved with QCA. While the results presented here are specific to Central and 
Eastern Europe, the same steps can be used to replicate it elsewhere, and note, 
in particular, whether conditions occur in similar or completely different 
combinations. 
What exactly is lost in translation between the original model and its set-
theoretic form? At first glance, the most obvious difference is that, if the 
presence of conditions explains the presence of the outcome, then the 
asymmetric character of QCA dictates that their absence should not describe the 
absence of the outcome, as Merkel states that they do. The assumption that 
there are different explanations for the two situations is, however, more 
plausible than the original formula, simply because no expectations are specified 
about how the conditions interact. From this point of view, it is enough to treat 
the original statements about the dimensions of external embeddedness as 
directional expectations, rather than the sole object of empirical testing. The 
second discrepancy comes from differences between the theorized expressions 
and the empirical results. To clarify: there were no expectations that the two 
would coincide perfectly, but that their intersection would show the degree to 
which theory is reflected in the findings, and what empirical observations can 
add to theory, with the caveat that this may be population-specific. 
What would a ‘back translation’ of the results look like compared to 
Merkel’s original model? First, it must be emphasized that in QCA, the logical OR 
is an inclusive disjunction, which means that two or more explanations for the 
same outcome exist at the same time. In the case of the set-theoretic formula 







The dimensions of external embeddedness that have a destabilizing 
effect on the quality of democracy are: a combination of deteriorating 
economic and social conditions, OR15 a combination of declining 
economy, rising support for populism, OR higher bargaining power in 
relation to the EU. 
 
Excluding populism, which does not feature in the original formulation, 
the main difference between the two is that the Boolean expression excludes the 
interaction of economic context conditions and integration. Is this a translation 
error? At first glance, it would seem so, considering how Merkel implies that all 
three dimensions must be present at the same time16. But looking back to 
Chapter 3 and the basic principles of QCA, it is clear that the two do not actually 
contradict eachother. There are three reasons for this. Firstly, equifinality 
indicates that two or more sufficient terms can exist at the same time, so what 
the set-theoretic translation is saying is, in effect, that all three dimensions of 
external embeddedness are present, but in different combinations. 
Furthermore, the formula does not imply that integration alone is one of the 
factors enhancing or affecting democracy (in other words, it is not by itself 
necessary and sufficient) but that another condition – in this case support for 
populism – must also exist. 
Secondly, the set-theoretic form arguably contradicts the original model, 
because the latter is expressed in a symmetrical way, while asymmetry is both a 
principle and one of the main analytical strengths of the set-theoretic approach. 
But this is also not necessarily true. QCA does not exclude symmetry in principle. 
It states that perfectly symmetrical explanations are empirically implausible, but 
not impossible: under certain (admittedly very specific) conditions, there may 
well be empirical support for symmetry.  
Thirdly, the theoretical formula ES + ~P~B is the model’s most 
parsimonious expression: it gives the ‘bare bones’ explanation, using the 
smallest possible number of conditions and interactions. This does not preclude 
more complex expressions equivalent to conservative or intermediate 
expressions, where more complex combinations can be examined. Thus, 
translation errors are only apparent, and the two formulations do not contradict 
eachother. To be fair, making sense of this process requires a careful navigation 
of assumptions that the original model does not make explicit. But the outcome 
                                               
15 Note: logical OR 
16 For comparison: an assumption-free set-theoretic translation of the original form of 
external embeddedness would be ES~B → D, where ES~B is both necessary and sufficient.  
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– and the main theoretical contribution of this dissertation – is an understanding 
of how the dimensions of external embeddedness interact and reinforce or 
weaken eachother 
 
4.4.1. Revisiting the cases 
 
Sufficiency analysis for deconsolidation reveals an interesting feature of QCA, 
which is useful in choosing individual cases for a follow-up analysis: the method 
allows a distinction between individually irrelevant and most typical cases for 
each solution formula. The irrelevant case category is quite straightforward here: 
if the focus is on deconsolidation, then none of the cases where improvement 
occurs should be taken into account. Among the most typical cases, cases that 
are uniquely covered cases by one solution term and multiple coverage can be 
distinguished, depending on the number of terms featured in the solution. This 
can be seen in all cases, except for Slovenia, Slovakia and Romania (2011-2014), 
which are covered by one solution term each.  
These categories, as mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, are 
useful in case selection. There are a few recommendations in QCA literature for 
the types of cases that should be chosen depending on the follow-up method 
(Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). For a comparative study of two cases – which 
is the focus of the following chapter –the outcome of interest is first determined. 
Theory testing thus far has shown that CEE countries give more empirical support 
to external embeddedness when looking at deconsolidation. It would be useful, 
then, to follow this up with a more detailed analysis of the factors that 
contributed to decline but have not been accounted for in the QCA stage. It is 
particularly important to give more substantial interpretation to the EU’s 
domestic impact, since its operationalization as bargaining power only tells one 
side of the story. The results from this chapter show that the low levels of 
bargaining power did not lend CEE countries a significant influence compared to 
older member states, and that political parties were not able to mobilize the 
apparent public disenchantment with integration. But QCA reveals nothing 
about the EU’s capacity to apply sanctions in response to deconsolidation. 
To address this, I propose looking at two typical cases for 
deconsolidation. Romania (2011-2014) is a uniquely covered case where 
deconsolidation is explained mainly by a combination of social and economic 
factors. In addition to being a late-comer and therefore able to maintain a 
positive democratic momentum even in the context of the economic crisis, 
Romania offers an interesting look into the EU’s channels for domestic impact 
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through the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism, which has been in place 
since 2007. The other case I propose for analysis is Hungary (2008-2011) which 
is covered by both ~E~S and ~EB solution terms. Hungary is an unusual case 
among CEE countries in that it has been on a path of gradual deconsolidation 
since 2005 and is currently somewhat of a wildcard in the context of rising 
populism across Europe. Additionally, the EU does not have a formal instrument 
similar to the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism in place for preventing 
democratic backsliding in Hungary. Coupled with the fact that Hungary has been 
better able to resist EU pressure compared to Romania (Sedelmeier, 2014), this 
provides a good set-up for examining some of the informal, ad-hoc approaches 
the EU has taken in response. Case selection is discussed in more detail in the 




4.5.  Summary and next steps 
 
The aim of this chapter was to address an extended version of the main research 
question in this dissertation: what were the conditions explaining democratic 
transformations in Central and Eastern Europe after EU accession? The findings 
show that, rather than grouping together countries which follow similar 
trajectories, there are distinct characteristics for each of the three analytical time 
intervals. With few exceptions, cases of QOD improvement occurred during the 
2005-2008, immediately following the EU’s eastern enlargement. Two cases of 
improvement occur in 2011-2014 in Lithuania and Latvia. Romania was also able 
to maintain a positive trend following its delayed accession in 2007, but after 
2008-2011 began to decline. At the opposite end, all but one cases of decline 
occurred between 2008 and 2014, with most happening during the 2008-2011 
interval. Hungary is a notable exception showing consistent deconsolidation 
across all three intervals.  
All ten CEE countries are represented at least over one interval, but 
Poland and Czech Republic are only included for 2005-2008. Meanwhile, Slovenia 
and Lithuania are present for the entire 2005-2014 period, while the remaining 
countries are present for two out of three intervals. Overall, the evolution of 
democracy in the region follows a straightforward path: accession had an initial 
positive impact in nearly all CEE countries, which were able to maintain 
momentum until 2008. The economic crisis led to an almost immediate 
downturn in the majority of cases, although the Czech Republic, Latvia and 
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Poland still experienced an improvement during intervals excluded from this 
analysis. Newcomer Romania experienced the same positive impact of accession 
during 2008-2011, but Bulgaria did not. The 2011-2014 interval is somewhat of 
a mixed bag. Lithuania was able to recover from the democratic downturn, and 
Latvia maintained a consistently positive trend from 2005 to 2014. On the other 
hand, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia all declined. It is also interesting that the 
adjusted case selection discussed in section 4.2.1 left almost as many cases of 
decline as improvement, considering that in the original data set is almost as 
even.  
The conditions explaining the two outcomes were as follows: for 
improvement, it was found that S~B was a necessary and highly relevant 
condition, which also satisfies the criterion of sufficiency in the intermediate 
solution. Deconsolidation is explained by deteriorating socio-economic 
conditions, or a combination of the impact of the economic crisis, and weaker 
bargaining power in relation to the EU, to which growing support for populism is 
also added in the majority of cases. These findings lend empirical support to the 
embeddedness model and serve as an example of how QCA can be used in theory 
testing. Although none of the results contradict the basic theoretical 
assumptions of embeddedness, evidence for deconsolidation is more robust in 
relation to the theory’s original form. In addition, it shows that initial QCA results 
should not be taken for granted without careful examination: as discussed 
extensively above, the economic crisis turned out to be an essential factor in 
deconsolidation, although the most parsimonious solution suggests otherwise. 
Finally, these results pave the way for a more detailed study of the 
processes linking the conditions uncovered in this chapter to their respective 
outcomes. In the following chapter, I look at the cases of Hungary and Romania 
during 2008-2011 and 2011-2014 respectively to address this dissertation’s third 
research question: how does process tracing uncover further background and 













Explaining deconsolidation in Hungary and 
Romania 
 
This chapter follows up on the QCA analysis. Its goal is twofold: to place two 
simplified explanations of deconsolidation in a wider context, and to find 
whether there is any substantial evidence supporting the impact of civil society 
and EU vulnerability on the QOD. Methodologically this part of the analysis uses 
process tracing applied to two cases: Hungary and Romania.  
The chapter is divided into three sections: in the first I expand the QCA 
translation of the democratic embeddedness model to include civil society and 
EU vulnerability and describe the specific questions, types of evidence and ways 
of testing the validity of causal explanations detailed through process tracing. In 
the second part I present an explanation of the types of defective democracy 
that best describe Hungary and Romania, the goal being to pinpoint further 
evidence of how external and internal embeddedness are linked in the two cases. 
Finally, moving into the process tracing section I search for substantial evidence 
for the two explanations of deconsolidation found in the previous chapter (~E~S 




5.1. Expanding the theorized explanations for 
deconsolidation 
 
A brief reminder of how Merkel’s theory of democratic embeddedness was 
translated into set-theoretic language follows. In order to formalize the theory a 
few assumptions were needed: firstly, that none of the single conditions is by 
itself necessary to produce the outcome. Secondly, that conditions E and S must 
occur together and, consequently, that their conjunction ES is a sufficient 
condition for D. And finally, that no clear statements could be derived about B 
and P other than that they too are sufficient for the outcome. At the pre-analysis 
stage there was insufficient information to determine which conjunctions they 
may appear in, so the solution at that point was to take into account all possible 
combinations. Based on these three assumptions, Merkel’s explanation for 




~E~S + PB -> ~D 
 
QCA revealed a new piece of information: that P and B do indeed 
typically occur together, because the only component of B that changes 
significantly is public Euroscepticism, while voting power and overall 
contributions to the EU’s economy show only minimal fluctuations. However, 
these changes alone do not necessarily contribute to a greater bargaining power 
in the absence of populist forces to actively mobilize them. The cases where 
strong populist parties are present within the legislative body experience varying 
degrees of decline in Euroscepticism. Conversely, when looking at 
deconsolidation P and B also typically appear in the same conjunction as ~E, in 
all but three cases (Estonia in 2008-2011, Slovakia and Slovenia in 2011-2014). 
Based on this, it follows that prominent populist forces and public 
Euroscepticism, which is quite common among member states once the post-
accession ‘honeymoon period’ ended, play off eachother in ways that can indeed 
affect the QOD, but separately they do not have a significant negative impact. 
The good news is this new information about how P and B interact does 
not change the theoretical solution formula explaining ~D. The formula does 
change, however, if when bringing in the two additional conditions theorized in 
Chapter 2, but excluded from the QCA analysis due to operationalization issues. 
Civil society (hereafter C) and EU vulnerability in relation to its member-states 
(V) can now be added to the explanation for deconsolidation as ~C and V 
respectively: in theory, a less engaged civil society and vulnerable EU both leave 
member states poorly equipped to deal with deconsolidation. In their initial 
state, ~C and V are treated the same as P and B, in that no initial assumptions 
can be made about the combinations they may appear in. With this information 
in mind, the complete QCA translation of the embeddedness model for 
deconsolidation becomes: 
 
~E~S(PB + ~C + V) + PB(~C + V) + ~CV -> ~D 
or 
~E~S + PB + ~CV -> ~D 
 
In other words, a new potential explanatory path is added into the mix which, in 
line with QCA principles, is an alternative explanation to ~E~S and PB, but the 
three can exist simultaneously.  
What about the intermediate solution that resulted from the QCA 
analysis? As the previous chapter shows, explaining deconsolidation in CEE 
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countries is more consistent with the theory than the explanation for democratic 
improvement. The only difference between the theorized and actual 
explanations is that in the intermediate solution the term PB usually appears in 
combination with ~E instead of a stand-alone - and for the purpose of this case 
study, this only applies to Hungary. Furthermore, the solution term ~E~S has 
already been observed in both Romania and Hungary, so rather than using 
process tracing to look for evidence that it has occurred, further 
contextualization is required. On the other hand, it is still necessary to 
understand how PB impacted democracy in Hungary. While P has been observed 
in Romania during the 2011-2014 period, it has not emerged as a relevant 
condition during the QCA stage, and the related B has weakened during this 
interval. Finally, at this point ~CV is at a purely theoretical stage and first needs 
to be observed and then contextualized. Thus, in this chapter process tracing is 
used to untangle three causal mechanisms originating in the conditions of 
external embeddedness, along these questions: 
1. How did ~E~S contribute to deconsolidation in Hungary and Romania? 
2. How did the rise of populism impact QOD in Hungary, as well as the 
country’s relationship with the EU? 
3. To what extent did ~CV contribute to deconsolidation in either, or 
both of these countries? 
 
 
5.2. Types of evidence 
 
Beach and Pedersen (2013, p. 99-100) explain that, in process tracing, predicted 
evidence rather than data observation is used, and observations only become 
evidence after being put in the context of case-knowledge. A methodological 
reminder from Chapter 3: four types of evidence are used in process tracing. 
Pattern evidence refers to observing statistical patterns that support the causal 
inference. Sequence evidence can be found in the chronology of certain relevant 
events. The mere presence of trace evidence confirms that the hypothesized 
relationship exists, completely or in part. Finally, account evidence deals with the 
content of relevant empirical data. 
In order to examine these three causal mechanisms, the types of useful 
evidence should be established. To begin with, even in the absence of specific 
case knowledge, the ~EPB conjunction suggests a sequence: dissatisfaction with 
economic performance encouraged the rise of right-wing populism, which, in 
turn, increased the country’s bargaining power due to its potential to mobilize 
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public Euroscepticism. Looking for sequence evidence - proof that the events 
took place in this specific order - is a good place to start. Bringing in some 
preliminary case knowledge on Hungary during 2008-2011 provides a more 
nuanced picture that already partly serves as sequential evidence. The advent of 
the economic crisis in 2009 coincides with the growing instability and dwindling 
popularity of the ruling Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), which later lost the 
2010 elections to its long-time rival, right-wing party Fidesz. However, this chain 
of events only partially serves as sequential evidence. It remains to be seen 
whether the rise of populism also had an impact on Hungary’s bargaining power 
with the EU, as well as whether, and how, it affected procedural aspects of 
democracy.  
Finding evidence to link ~E~S to deconsolidation is somewhat trickier 
because, while Merkel argues that socio-economic conditions act as a stabilizing 
element of democracy, the dispute is still not settled on whether socio-economic 
prosperity is a prerequisite or a product of a consolidated democracy. Schmitter 
and Karl (1991) suggest that democracy does not necessarily perform better 
economically than non-democracies. In asking what democracy is, and is not, 
they argue that procedural aspects are more significant in defining this type of 
political system than its results. For citizens, however, results play a crucial role. 
A democratic government’s failure to ensure prosperity or manage an economic 
crisis realistically affect its chances of re-election. In this case, looking for 
statistical trends, particularly linking poor economic performance with 
deepening poverty and social exclusion, can serve as pattern evidence. 
Additionally, public reactions, such as protests or petitions, in response to 
unpopular economic policies may offer sequence, trace or account evidence, 
depending on their nature.  
The status of ~CV as a source of causal paths is the most ambiguous at 
this point. The occurrence of ~EPB and ~E~S in relation to deconsolidation has 
already been observed, and the remaining task is to turn these observations into 
relevant evidence. On the other hand, there are no observations showing that 
~CV is present in either Hungary or Romania, so the first step here is to observe 
it. If this is possible, the same approach to evidence as before will be used. At 
this point, however, the uncertain status of ~CV requires a more rigorous 
treatment. In order to do so, it is necessary to build empirical tests to evaluate 






5.3. Building empirical tests  
 
Having previously used QCA puts the analysis in a somewhat tricky 
situation: since the explanations are not mutually exclusive, conditions have a 
low degree of uniqueness. This is at least the case for Hungary, which is covered 
by both ~EPB and ~E~S solution terms. Romania is only covered by ~E~S but it is 
still not prudent to assume uniqueness from the start, as evidence supporting 
~CV as an alternative explanation may also be found. The situation, then, is as 
follows: Both ~E~S and ~EPB have high degrees of certainty and low degrees of 
uniqueness. The hoop test is suitable in this case: failure to find relevant evidence 
reduces confidence in the explanation but does not outright disconfirm it.  
On the other hand, ~CV has low degrees of both uniqueness and 
certainty, so it would require a straw in the wind type of test. Straw in the wind 
tests are generally weak and do not strengthen confidence in the causal 
explanation. Neither failed nor successful tests of this kind are of much 
consequence for the causal inference. However, Bennet and Pedersen (2013, p. 
105) recommend that, when maximizing certainty/uniqueness tests, priority 
should be given to certainty. The particular problem with the theorized relation 
between ~CV and deconsolidation is that, in this form, it deals with the absence 
of certain factors or processes. For instance, finding evidence that there have not 
been any anti-government protests in the wake of controversial decisions is easy, 
but it does not lend much explanatory power to the relationship. Similarly, in the 
case of EU vulnerability, the lack of intervention is not by default an explanation 
for deconsolidation. On the other hand, if there is evidence for the reverse, 
namely that civil society and EU interventions have indeed had an impact on anti-
democratic government actions, it is more reasonable to assume that the 
absence of these actions would have had a negative impact. The solution I 
suggest is to look at this relationship from the opposite direction and in a more 
restrictive way, as follows: 
 
If relevant evidence can be found that civil society actions and formal EU 
sanctions occurred following controversial government decisions AND 
evidence that they had an observable positive impact, then there is 
support for ~CV as an alternative explanation of deconsolidation.  
 
The conditions, type of evidence and empirical tests used in this analysis are 




Table 5.1. Summary of questions, evidence and tests for case study 
 
EXPLANATION QUESTION TYPE OF EVIDENCE EMPIRICAL TEST 





populism? Is there 
evidence of mobilizing 
public 
Euroscepticism? 
Sequence (~E - P - B 






~E~S Is there evidence of 
deepening poverty 
and social exclusion 
linked to poor 
economic 
performance? Is there 
















~CV Is there evidence of 
effective civil society 







Account (content of 
public protests, EU 
documents) 




5.4. Deconsolidation in Hungary and Romania 
 
5.4.1. What kind of defective democracy? 
 
Hungary and Romania were selected not only for the timing and the 
nature of the explanation, but also for the fact that they both moved from 
relatively consolidated towards defective democracies. As Ágh (2016a) points 
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out, much of the narrative regarding CEE countries has, in recent years, turned 
from one of QOD and consolidation, towards one of deconsolidation. Hungary 
and, to a lesser extent Romania, are textbook representations of this narrative. 
But what type of defective democracies are they? 
The Democracy Barometer, which is associated with the internal 
embeddedness concept, allows one to observe how the values of partial regimes 
evolve over time, and pinpoint which ones present particular problems - in other 
words, to determine the type of defective democracy each country belongs to. 
There is no exact correspondence between the partial regimes described by 
Merkel and the indicators measured by the Democracy Barometer, but an 
approximation is quite straightforward. According to the Democracy Barometer 
codebook prepared by Merkel et al. (2016) some of the principles included in the 
index can be used to measure these partial regimes as follows: 
 
Table 5.2. Partial regime measurements 
 
PARTIAL REGIME CORRESPONDING MEASUREMENTS 
Division of power and horizontal 
accountability 
Mutual constrains of constitutional 
powers, rule of law, competition 
Civil rights Individual liberties, public sphere 
Elections and political rights of 
participation 
Participation 
Effective power to govern Government capability 
 
It is important to note that, in most cases, a partial regime is covered by more 
than one measurement, while in the case of the effective power to govern, the 
measurement is more complex than the original concept: in addition to the 
absence of non-elected veto powers that could potentially interfere with the 
government’s activity, the corresponding Democracy Barometer measurement 
also includes an evaluation of government resources, stability and public 
support. That being said, the following tables show the how these components 
of internal embeddedness changed in Hungary and Romania over their 









Table 5.3. Internal embeddedness in Hungary 
COMPONENT 2008 2009 2010 2011 CHANGE 
Mutual constraints 45 49 47 46 +1 
Government capability 57 56 56 60 +3 
Individual liberties 88 86 81 81 -7 
Rule of law 54 52 51 55 +1 
Public sphere 46 46 46 46 0 
Competition 61 61 47 41 -20 
Participation 42 40 37 37 -5 
QOD 56 55 52 52 -4 
Source: Democracy Barometer (2016) 
 
 
Table 5.4. Internal embeddedness in Romania 
COMPONENT 2011 2012 2013 2014 CHANGE 
Mutual constraints 39 39 40 41 +2 
Government capabilities 44 37 38 40 -4 
Individual liberties 51 47 52 51 0 
Rule of law 30 26 29 34 +4 
Public sphere 25 25 26 26 +1 
Competition 79 78 61 61 -18 
Participation 40 42 45 48 +8 
QOD 46 44 43 44 -2 
Source: Democracy Barometer (2016) 
 
Precisely determining what type of defective democracy Hungary and 
Romania are is, of course, not straightforward, since the partial regimes 
influence one another and, as shown in the tables above, decline occurs in more 
than one area. But I suggest that, when deciding on the type of defective 
democracy, two aspects should be taken into account: which element was most 
affected by decline, and which was weakest throughout the period. In both 
countries competition was most affected, with a decline of 20 and 18 points in 
Hungary and Romania respectively. Other affected areas were individual liberties 
in Hungary (-7) and government capabilities in Romania (-4). As for the weakest 
categories, participation in Hungary shows both the weakest scores and the 
lowest value (37) among all categories at the end of the reference period, with 
an overall decline of 5 points. In Romania, the public sphere, consisting of 
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elements such as freedom of association, freedom of opinion and media diversity 
and neutrality, is the weakest, with scores of 25-26 throughout the period.  
These findings suggest that, according to Merkel, both Hungary and 
Romania are at the intersection of the illiberal and delegative types of defective 
democracy. In Hungary, all significant decline occurred between 2009 and 2010, 
especially in the areas of competition (from 61 to 47) and individual liberties 
(from 86 to 81). This corresponded to the change of regime after the long-time 
ruling MSZP lost to Fidesz. In Romania major changes were not concentrated 
during a single period, but a notable decrease in competition, from 78 to 61, was 
also associated with an electoral year: 2012 saw the sweeping victory of the 
Social Liberal Union coalition, which won 60.1% of Senate seats and 58.6% of 
seats in the Chamber of Deputies (The Central Electoral Bureau, 2012a). 
Although these findings require much more context, they offer important hints 
for understanding deconsolidation, together with the explanations uncovered by 
the QCA analysis. In practice during process tracing I will for evidence that 
establish causal links between the observed dimensions of external 
embeddedness with those characteristics that make Hungary and Romania 
illiberal/delegative democracies.  
 
 
5.4.2. Preliminaries: transition modes and the systemic 
origins of deconsolidation 
 
In his 1991 book, Democracy and the Market, Adam Przeworski 
distinguishes between two phases of democratic transition. The first is 
liberalization, a process whereby reforms are introduced in an authoritarian 
regime via already existing splits among political elites and the actions of 
independent civil society actors. The second phase is democratization, which is 
achieved mainly through institutional change, which introduces and maintains a 
system of contestation. Przeworski actually defines democracy as a system in 
which parties lose elections (Przeworski, 1991, p. 10), noting that competition 
inside an institutional framework and the alternation of elites in power are 
essential. The following stage in the process is democratic consolidation: a 
democracy is considered consolidated when the institutional framework 
established during transition is accepted by all political actors and contestation 
works on the basis of parties and candidates playing by the same rules that result 
in victory or defeat at the polls.  
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According to this approach, transition modes were different in Romania 
and Hungary. To begin with, Hungary experienced reforms towards political 
competition prior to 1989. According to Racz and Kukorelli (1995) Hungary was 
at the forefront of reform in the communist bloc since the 1970s. From 1968 
economic reforms led to a gradual liberalization, and in the 1985 elections voters 
were able to choose candidates to nominate and elect, which was unique among 
communist regimes in the region. On the other hand, Romania did not 
experience liberalization in the sense that Przeworski understands it. Elements 
of resistance from within the Romanian Communist Party, largely dominated by 
Nicolae Ceaușescu’s personality cult, were more symbolic than effective, so by 
the late 1980s there were no viable driving forces for reform.  
The stark difference in transition modes between the two countries is 
perhaps best illustrated in how their respective communist regime change came 
to an end: through round-table negotiations in Hungary, and a violent revolution 
in Romania. However, instead of a renewal of the political class, the fall of 
communism resulted in a kind of continuity that transferred power to elites 
formerly belonging to the countries’ respective communist parties. This too was 
different in Hungary and Romania. In the former, old communist elites were 
more open to embracing reform, while in the latter they remained closer to their 
original ideological stances. These different approaches had a long-term impact, 
not only on how key political actors were established, but also in terms of public 
perception and trust. Pop-Elecheș (1998) explains that successor parties in 
Hungary and Romania resulted from the communist parties’ breaking into 
factions. The Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (MSZMP) broke into MSZP, 
which was more reformist and went on to become one of the country’s main 
political forces, cultivating an image of professionalism; and the hard-liner 
MSZMP II, which later became the Labor Party. At first MSZP tried taking a 
midway stance between the reformed version of communism that started taking 
shape in the 1970s-1980s and the Western model of social democracy and, 
during the 1990s, firmly positioned itself close to the latter. However, there was 
still a notable continuity of elites between the MSZP and its communist 
predecessor: by the mid-1990s, nearly a fifth of MSZP members had been high-
ranking officials in the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party and a third had filled 
mid-ranking positions. Combined with MSZP’s victory in the 1994 parliamentary 
elections, where it won 54% of seats, this led the Hungarian right to caution 
against the risk that communism may be reinstated. MSZP responded to the 
criticism by forming a ruling coalition with the liberally-oriented Free Democrats, 
who were especially critical of former communist rule. (Pop-Elecheș, 1998). The 
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choice proved to be advantageous for MSZP in the long term by further 
establishing its democratic credentials with the public.  
In Romania the successor party situation is more complicated due to the 
way in which regime change occurred. Immediately after the December 1989 
Revolution, which resulted in the execution of communist leader Nicolae 
Ceaușescu, the National Salvation Front (FSN) was created by former Communist 
Party members to act as interim government in preparation for the country’s first 
democratic elections. Soon after, FSN reorganized itself into a political party and 
went on to win the legislative elections in 1990. By 1993, it had already split into 
two factions: the Romanian Party of Social Democracy (PDSR) and the 
Democratic Party (PD). Later, these became the Social Democratic Party (PSD) 
and the National Liberal Party (PNL) respectively, and remain major players on 
Romania’s political scene today.  
However, FSN’s early commitment to democracy was much more 
questionable than that of MSZP, given its members’ hesitation clearly renounce 
their communist ancestry. Ion Iliescu, FSN’s figurehead and the first 
democratically elected president of post-communist Romania, referred to the 
country’s new regime as an ‘original democracy’, emphasizing flexibility over 
stark reforms. Literat (2012) shows that Iliescu justified FSN’s legitimacy in three 
ways. Firstly, he made it clear that the organization was a natural product of the 
December 1989 revolution, rather than a staged coup d’etat. Secondly, he 
reframed FSN’s non-democratic practices as evidence of political fluidity, by 
using the term ‘original democracy’ in the sense of ‘creative’ or ‘innovative’ 
rather than ‘initial’ (Literat, 2012, p. 29), and by FSN’s decision to get involved in 
the country’s first democratic elections as both organizer and candidate, despite 
claiming at first to be an interim government. In the meantime, FSN had nearly 
quadrupled its ranks with members from the former Romanian Communist Party 
and drew public criticism for participating in elections that they also organized. 
And thirdly, FSN painted itself as an instrument of political and economic 
salvation. Indeed, one of FSN’s first moves after seizing power in December 1989 
was to abolish many of Ceaușescu’s restrictions on access to food and basic 
amenities, which established the Front’s popularity with the public early on.  
Thus, two versions of communism and transition can be observed in 
these cases since the 1980s, in line with Przeworski’s model of democratic 
transition. In Hungary there was a negotiated revolution (Pop-Elecheș, 1998), 
with an organized and ideologically distinct opposition already developed in the 
1980s and the MSZMP accepting a multi-party system. Romania failed to 
experience pre-transition liberalization, and the setting for transition was still 
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dominated by a largely unreformed political organization, which evolved into 
one of Romania’s current major parties. These factors had a long-term impact on 
the countries’ politics that extends into the reference periods for this chapter. 
 
 
5.4.3. Hungary: Europe’s worst-case scenario in the making 
 
Tracing the political consequences of crisis mismanagement 
 
Hungary’s economic woes predate the global financial crisis and are largely the 
cause of why the country was so severely hit, becoming the first in the region to 
resort to IMF support in order to manage its effects. The timeline of economic 
instability and its related political crisis can be traced back to two periods of 
systemic changes. First the transitional crisis of the early 1990s resulted in high 
levels of unemployment and social exclusion, which the weak state failed to 
manage efficiently, leading to people perceiving the effects of democratization 
in the form of socio-economic decline (Ágh, 2016b, p. 280). The second 
transformation period, one of deepening political instability, came in the 2000s, 
when Hungary saw an increase in foreign-owned government debt. In 2006 the 
ruling Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) experienced a massive loss of public trust 
after Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány admitted to lying about the government’s 
ability to stabilize the economy and control the impending crisis. As a result, the 
party lost massively in the 2006 local elections. Prime Minister Gyurcsány 
resigned in 2009, and the following year MSZP lost dramatically in the 
parliamentary elections, when Fidesz came into power, with Viktor Orbán at 
leading the new government. A series of socio-economic and institutional 
reforms followed, which set Hungary on the road to becoming what Orbán 
referred to in 2014 as an ‘illiberal state’ (Orbán, 26 July 2014) 
Market reforms in Hungary started in the late 1960s and continued in 
various forms until the start of the transition period. The initial recession caused 
by market economy transition lasted between 1989 and 1993 and resulted in 
massive bankruptcy, a 30% drop in employment and an increase in non-
performing loans in the banking sector (Győrffy 2015, p. 135). The 2000s saw a 
period of prolonged campaigning, when politically-driven spending increased 
government debt by nearly 20% between 2001 and 2008 (The European 
Commission, 2014b, p. 185). Coupled with higher taxes aimed at reducing the 
size of the informal economy and low levels of employment, this weakened 
Hungary’s business environment and translated into low contributions to the 
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state budget and a deepening of social insecurity and exclusion. Hungary’s low 
economic credibility was the main reason for its massive, high-interest foreign 
indebtedness, which left the country vulnerable to external market changes 
(Magas 2012, Dietrich et al., 2011). As a result, although technically on the 
periphery of the financial crisis, Hungary was the first EU country to turn to 
international lenders for support in 2009. The loan was conditioned by the 
government taking measures to ensure fiscal consolidation and resulted in 
unpopular austerity measures. 
To explain how Hungary turned from one of Europe’s success stories of 
neoliberal transformation into an economically vulnerable nation, Fabry (2011) 
separates the country’s struggle with the global financial crisis in three phases. 
Initially, the beginning of the subprime mortgage crisis in the USA was not 
considered a threat, largely because Central and Eastern Europe had previously 
enjoyed significant credit-led economic growth, with over $300 billion in foreign 
direct investments entering the region since the 1990s - more than $60 billion of 
which went into Hungary. This generally positive outlook left the impression that 
the EU’s newest member states would remain on the periphery of the crisis. 
However, the deepening of the crisis set off a second stage where the 
combination of the small size of CEE economies and their high dependency on 
foreign capital and exports stoked investors’ fears that the crisis would spill over 
into these markets. The economic openness of CEE indeed eventually proved to 
be a recipe for disaster for precisely these reasons. Fabry explains that Hungary 
is a typical example of how openness transferred the effects of the crisis into the 
country: the proportion of foreign trade in Hungary’s GDP was 161.4% in 2008, 
70% of which was with advanced economies. Coupled with its high consolidated 
government debt (65.9%) this forced the country to turn to international lenders 
for support, for a bailout package of $25.1 billion. The IMF provided two thirds 
of the loan, with the EU and the World Bank covering the rest. By the time 
Hungary resorted to financial support, the crisis had hit the economy head-on. 
Although comparatively less affected than the Baltic countries, Hungary still saw 
a significant drop in GDP and exports, and a rise in unemployment in 2009.  
The IMF agreement required the Hungarian government to tackle fiscal 
consolidation and avoid transmitting the effects of the crisis further out in the 
region. Financial support was conditioned by strict policy measures 
(International Monetary Fund, 2008, p. 6): in exchange for the package Hungary 
had to implement reforms which translated into nominal wage freeze, a 
reduction of welfare programs, raising statutory retirement age and cutting 
salaries in the public sector. At this point in the crisis, the economic effects had 
146 
 
already begun to translate into a political crisis: Ferenc Gyurcsány’s was replaced 
by Gordon Bajnai, former Minister of National Development and Economy, after 
his resignation in 2009. Despite lack of popular support, Bajnai continued to 
implement austerity measures. 
 










added at basic 
prices 
Unemployment 
BG -4.9 -11.8 -8.0 6.8 
CZ -4.1 -14.6 -12.1 6.7 
EE -13.9 -23.0 -21.5 13.8 
H
U 
-6.7 -18.7 -17.7 10.0 
LV -18.0 -10.7 -16.5 17.1 
LT -14.7 -11.9 -13.2 13.7 
PL 1.7 -8.5 -3.7 8.2 
RO -7.2 -3.3 -0.3 6.9 
SK -4.8 -15.1 -18.2 12.0 
SI -8.1 -18.1 -15.5 5.9 
Source: Fabry (2011) p. 207 
 
The economic burden imposed by the IMF agreement was, however, not 
the only cause of political crisis. MSZP’s dwindling credibility among voters and 
government instability that followed were exacerbated in 2006, when Gyurcsány 
addressed what became known as the Őszöd speech to the MSZP members of 
the parliament. The address was supposed to be confidential, but was recorded 
and broadcast, leading to mass anti-government protests. In the speech, 
Gyurcsány admitted that for nearly two years the MSZP had lied to voters about 
the government’s capacity to manage the economy efficiently, recognizing that 
the party was ‘beyond the country’s possibilities to such an extent that [they] 
could not conceive that a joint government with the Socialists and the liberals 
would ever do’ and that ‘[they] did not actually do anything for four years.’ 
(Gyurcsány, 26 May 2006). The event provoked massive protests throughout the 
autumn of 2006 and marked the beginning of MSZP’s decline. It led to massive 
losses for the party in the 2006 local elections and culminated with its defeat to 
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right-wing Fidesz in the 2009 parliamentary elections. 2009-2010 marked the 
turn towards what Attila Ágh (2016b) refers to as the worst-case scenario of 
deconsolidation in the region. By January 2010 the European Commission judged 
that the austerity measures adopted in Hungary had been successful: the 
budgetary deficit was maintained at 3.9% of GDP and the budget adopted in 2010 
was in line with agreed economic targets (Almunia, 2010, January 27). 
 
The 2011 constitutional reform: setting the scene for 
deconsolidation 
 
In a discussion of how debates have been framed in Central and Eastern Europe 
since the 1990s, Attila Ágh (2013) suggests that the region has been dealing with 
a triple crisis of democracy over a short period of time: a transition crisis in the 
early 1990s, a post-accession crisis in the late 2000s, made worse by the onset 
of the global financial collapse, and recently, an apparent crisis of QOD, which 
translates into deconsolidation. As the previous discussion regarding the political 
effects of the financial crisis established, Hungary fits neatly into this approach 
and is an especially relevant case for understanding deconsolidation, not only in 
a socio-economic, but also institutional context. The previous discussion offers 
pattern and sequence evidence consistent with the assumption that economic 
collapse was followed by a power transfer to a right-wing populist regime that 
quickly established itself as the driving force of an overhaul of Hungarian politics.  
Before 2010, Hungary was a ‘chaotic democracy’ (Ágh, 2016b, p. 279) 
where weak formal institutions and strong informal ties between politics and the 
business world resulted in a weak state that proved to be poorly equipped to 
deal with the systemic changes of the 1990s and 2000s. At the same time, 
Hungary also experienced a crisis of participation, which created an ‘emptied 
democracy’ (Ágh 2016b, p. 280) that further weakened formal institutions. The 
2010 parliamentary elections saw a disintegration of a party system that had 
been stable for 25 years: a sound defeat of the Hungarian left, an uncontested 
victory for Fidesz and validation for the extreme right-wing Jobbik, which entered 
the Parliament for the first time with 16.3% of votes. This is the political scene 
which Fidesz took over that year. 
But should Fidesz’s massive success be understood as a public mandate 
for political reform, or was it more likely the result of a large-scale anti-MSZP 
vote? Although Fidesz framed its victory at the polls as a ‘revolution’, the party 
seemed to understand that much of its success rested on the popularity nosedive 
that MSZP suffered starting in 2006. This was reflected in the negative campaign 
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strategy the party adopted before the 2010 elections: a simple strategy where, 
rather than presenting a comprehensive government program, it focused on the 
incompetent and corrupt character of MSZP’s rule (Batory, 2010; Muller, 2011). 
Fidesz’s campaign was otherwise largely non-specific on policy issues. In March 
2010 the party published a manifesto, ‘The Politics of National Affairs’, which 
offered several attractive but vague objectives regarding wages and job security, 
while specific policy issues were presented as authored by individual Fidesz 
members which, suggests Bathory (2010, p. 4), makes it unclear whether these 
policies are more in line with their author’s opinions, or should be taken as 
electoral commitments from the party. This strategy, together with MSZP being 
forced on the defensive and the absence of other significant political rivals, 
worked in their favor. It gave Fidesz, in collaboration with Christian Democratic 
People’s Party, a two-thirds super-majority that, as will become clear in this 
section, proved to be the Achilles’ heel of Hungary’s already deteriorating 
democracy.  
The diffuse character of Fidesz’s electoral campaign, along with 
parliamentary majority, left the party with enough elbow room to introduce wide 
political, legal and socio-economic reforms, starting with a new constitution. The 
document was quickly drafted and implemented between 2010 and 2011, and 
came into force on January 1st, 2012. Prior to 2011 there had been no major 
changes in Hungary’s Constitution since the fall of communism. The country’s 
fundamental law, in force since 1989, guaranteed a system of checks and 
balances, safeguarded competition through a multi-party system, and granted a 
political roles to minority parties. Therefore, examining the legal changes 
imposed by the new constitution and their institutional effects would serve as 
account evidence for the claim that the seizure of power by Fidesz started the 
process of democratic erosion in Hungary.  
On the surface, the new constitution adheres firmly to democratic 
values, which are proclaimed in the document’s preamble: equality, protection 
of human dignity, freedom of speech, opinion and assembly, right of access to 
information and protection of minorities (Government of the Republic of 
Hungary, 2011a) Article C1 also formally maintains the principle of division of 
powers and protection against exclusive exercise of power. Furthermore, the act 
condemns the former communist regime as tyrannical and proclaims the 1949 
constitution, which provided the basis for Hungary’s post-communist 
fundamental law, invalid. Since its adoption in 2011, the act was amended 
several times based on Hungary’s Constitutional Court’s decisions and 
recommendations from the Venice Commission.  By itself, then, the new 
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constitution did not raise too many red flags at first. However, Ágh (2016b) 
argues that in practice it set up the premises for a one-party state capture by 
eroding the system of checks and balances and using the two-thirds super-
majority as a way to control key state institutions.  
I propose that three pieces of account evidence can be found in the 
constitutional reform process. Firstly, the method by which the new constitution 
was drafted, debated and eventually adopted was undemocratic due to lack of 
transparency and public consultation. Secondly, its adoption was preceded by 
legal changes that ensured the new act could not be easily contested and that 
there was no accessible mechanism in practice to prevent the constitution from 
entering into force. And finally, parts of the law’s text clearly indicate the areas 
where Hungary’s hitherto consolidated democracy could be destabilized.  
The first piece of evidence is the most straightforward and relates to how 
the constitution was drafted and implemented. Only three months after the 
elections, an ad-hoc Parliamentary Constitution Drafting Committee was 
established, and started working on the new document in July 2010. The final 
version was signed by the President of Hungary in April 2011, with a few 
amendments required by the Constitutional Court. The Constitution, in its final 
form, would come into force at the beginning of 2012. In a document issued in 
June 2011 the Venice Commission warned that, while part of the 
recommendations it had offered in discussions with Hungarian officials over the 
new constitution draft were indeed adopted, the constitution-making process 
lacked transparency, and the tight schedule did not allow for proper 
consultations, either with the other parties in the Parliament, or with the 
Hungarian society (The Venice Commission Opinion 621/2011). In the latter case, 
a questionnaire was mailed out to citizens to consult on the content of the new 
text (Balogh, 2011, March 2) but the response rate was only 11% and the 
government did not make the results public (Krugman, 2012, January 21). The 
lack of effective consultations and speed with which it was adopted meant that 
in practice Fidesz engaged in constitutional engineering with the express aim of 
entrenching itself in power (Uitz, 2015, p. 280).  
The second piece of evidence comes from the period preceding 
constitutional reform, when a series of institutional changes were implemented 
in order to limit power checks on the executive and dramatically reduce the 
ability of rival political actors to attack the new constitution by legal means. 
These occurred in five steps (Bankuti et al., 2012). Firstly, Fidesz made it easier 
to change the constitution without consulting opposition parties by removing the 
requirement for a four-fifths vote to decide on the rules for drafting a new 
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constitution. Previously, this had functioned as a safety-net rule that served 
minority parties. With the four-fifths requirement now out of the way, Fidesz 
could use its constitution-making two-thirds majority.  
The next step was to put several measures in place that would weaken 
Hungary’s Constitutional Court. The Court was the most important check on 
Fidez’s power, along with, to a lesser degree, the ordinary judiciary and 
Prosecutor’s Office. It guaranteed that the Parliament operated within its 
constitutional limits and created an adequate institutional framework for 
implementing legislation. One of the Court’s essential democratic instruments 
was the actio popularis (Bankuti et al., 2013; Lembecke and Boulanger, 2013) 
which allowed any citizen to petition the Constitutional Court for a review after 
a law had come into effect. In practice, this increased the Court’s opportunities 
to enact legal review and meant that it could act as a check on power in virtually 
any field. Fidesz passed constitutional amendment against the Court in three 
areas. First, in June 2010, shortly after winning the elections, it changed the 
election procedure for Court judges. Candidate no longer needed to be 
nominated by a majority of parties in the Parliament, but rather two-thirds of 
the total votes, which meant that the party could nominate convenient 
candidates. The second change, in October 2010, limited the jurisdiction of the 
Constitutional Court in the area of fiscal legislation: now judicial reforms were 
limited to taxation and budgetary matters, and the Court could no longer review 
human rights infringements pertaining to property, equality under the law and 
judicial procedure - all of which are more easily infringed through fiscal means. 
In effect, Fidesz no longer had to worry about constitutional checks on fiscal 
decisions. Thirdly, Fidesz voted to raise the number of judges from 11 to 15, 
taking advantage of the fact that it could nominate loyal candidates and ensure 
a favorable majority in the Court and thus ensure that constitutional reform 
would not be impeded. 
With a recently weakened Constitutional Court, Fidesz’s next move was 
to establish control over the Electoral Commission. It began by establishing, that 
after the 2010 elections, members of the Commission would be newly elected 
by a parliamentary majority after each general election. As with the 
Constitutional Court, this established Fidesz’s firm grip on the Commission’s 
composition, with seven out of ten votes controlled by the party. This step was 
particularly important because one of the Electoral Commission’s attributes was 
to examine all referenda before opening them to the public. With its new 
composition, the Commission could now block initiatives against Fidesz, in 
support of which the opposition might attempt to mobilize the popular vote. The 
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final change the ruling party made before the constitutional reform, was to pass 
media restrictive legislation: all media outlets were required to register with the 
state and produce a ‘balanced’ output with ‘relevance to the citizens of Hungary’ 
(Dunai, 2014, February 19). Fidesz also created a supervisory body, the Media 
Council, whose composition is also decided in the Parliament and therefore is 
dominated by Fidesz. 
With these five legislative changes in place, Fidesz confidently moved on 
to drafting the new constitution, and the document’s content serves as the final 
piece of account evidence for the party’s role in driving deconsolidation. To begin 
with, one of the most important institutional aspects of the old constitution was 
maintained: a unicameral Parliament whose attributions include electing the 
President of the republic for a five-year term and appointing cabinet members 
based on the Prime Minister’s nominations. One change that was proposed 
regarding the Parliament was reducing the number of members from 386 in 
2011, to 200 in later legislatures - a change that was finally implemented after 
the 2014 elections, where Fidesz won 133 votes on a joint list with the Christian 
Democratic People's Party (The Hungarian National Assembly, n.d.) The new 
constitution also explicitly condemns the old 1949 constitution as ‘tyrannical’ 
and, as a result, delegitimizes its validity, which was, in practice, an amendment 
of the 1949 law.  
The most substantial changes continued to concern the judiciary, and 
the Constitutional Court in particular (Bankuti et al., 2013). In addition to the 
limits imposed through the laws, discussed previously, the new constitution got 
rid of the actio popularis review, replacing it with a requirement stating that 
reviews can only be initiated by one fourth of Parliament member, the 
government or the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights. But, given that after 
2010 there is no unified coalition in the Parliament that could issue such a review, 
this change acts as another self-serving control mechanism for Fidesz. The new 
constitution also extended the Court’s limitation on fiscal reviews, ensuring that 
it only had the competence to review new fiscal laws once the government’s 
public debt fell under 50% of GDP - a thing unlikely to happen in the future.  
In addition, the new constitution also undermined the independence of 
the ordinary judiciary by altering the process of appointing judges and reducing 
the retirement age, effectively forcing around 300 judges, including from high 
level positions in the Supreme Court and Appeal Court, into early retirement. The 
newly open positions would be filled with Fidesz-backed nominations, including 
the head of the National Judicial Office, elected by a two-thirds majority in the 
Parliament for a term of nine years. In addition to the judiciary, the government 
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also increased its input into monetary policy decisions, and the composition 
National Bank leadership, by giving the Prime Minister the power to appoint vice-
presidents. Going further, it established that the Commissioner for Fundamental 
Human Rights (the Ombudsman) would be elected by the same two-thirds 
parliamentary majority that has been frequently used up to this point. In 
practice, these changes meant that virtually every important state institution 
was now under Fidesz’s political control, in line with the claim that Hungary 
illustrates a case of state capture (Ágh, 2016b) in a former established 
democracy.  
In this light, it is somewhat frustrating that the impact of the new 
Hungarian constitution are outside the scope of this dissertation, but the timing 
also leaves the reader in an interesting position where they can look back on 
these changes through the lens of events that have occurred in the meantime. 
Concerns about the new constitution’s restrictive and undemocratic nature 
turned out to be justified, as Hungary experienced a democratic rollback through 
the first, and later second, Orbán regime, which now places it among Europe’s 
semi-consolidated democracies, behind Romania and Bulgaria (Schenkkan, 
2017). The country’s increasingly authoritarian slant has turned it from one of 
Europe’s ‘good students’ of democracy, into a political force that has learned to 
use populism and Euroscepticism as a bargaining chip. However, despite 
bargaining power occurring as part of the explanation for deconsolidation in 
Hungary, its scope is very limited between 2008 and 2011. As an explanatory 
condition, bargaining power (B) experienced a small upwards trend due to a 
slight increase in public Euroscepticism, and the beginning of post-crisis 
economic recovery. But looking at the institutional relationship between the 
Hungarian government and the EU, as the next section shows, no significant 
increase in bargaining power can be observed.  
 
The Hungary-EU relationship in light of constitutional 
changes 
 
The beginning of 2011 placed the relationship between Hungary and the EU 
under interesting auspices: in the year’s first semester Hungary was expected to 
over the presidency of the Council of the European Union. The rotation had 
already been established before Fidesz’s sweeping electoral victory, leaving EU 
officials to deal with an unpredictable new government that had already begun 
implementing legislation with worrying effects on the system of checks and 
balances. The initial outlook was, however, cautiously optimistic. In a press 
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statement following a meeting in January with the Hungarian presidency, the 
head of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso stated:  
 
‘I am myself fully confident in Hungary’s democracy and rule of law. This 
country is a democratic country, Hungary has known in a not so distant 
past what totalitarian regimes are. Prime Minister Orbán himself was 
fighting against totalitarian regimes. This is a democratic country and I 
think it is important that we have no doubts about it. And I think it’s 
important also that the Prime Minister [...] take all the necessary steps 
for this to be clear in Hungary and outside Hungary’ (Barroso, 2011, p. 4-
5) 
 
Despite the initial positive note, the EU did not brush off Hungary’s 
constitutional reform as superficial. The main concern it raised was the extent to 
which there was a risk that the new fundamental law would deviate from the 
EU’s values and legislation (Bragyova, 2013). Furthermore, the EU did not, at that 
point, have any means to force changes on parts of the constitution that read as 
explicit threats to democratic norms. However, it could, through its institutions, 
issue formal opinions and recommendations to counteract deconsolidation. One 
such document was the comprehensive Opinion of the Venice Commission on 
the New Constitution of Hungary, issued in June 2011, shortly after the drafting 
process was completed. The Commission’s Opinion unpacked issues from the 
constitution’s text, with special focus on institutional changes and respect for 
human rights. The main goal of the Commission’s evaluation was to establish 
whether the new constitution is in line with the principles of rule of law and 
democratic standards of EU member states, and compatible with the European 
Convention of Human Rights. It also noted that the adoption of the constitution 
was not an isolated event, but part of a comprehensive reordering of Hungarian 
politics, and the lack of transparency that had plagued the process from the 
beginning was enough to raise questions about its democratic character. Among 
the problems the Venice Commission highlighted, five are particularly sensitive 
for QOD.  
 
i. Ambiguity and lack of transparency 
Aside from the failure to consult the public on the content of a 
fundamental law, the drafting process has also left detailed regulations 
concerning politics and society to ‘cardinal laws’, which call for two-third 
majority votes, including on issues that should normally be left to ordinary 
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political processes. If left in this form, a series of socio-economic, financial, 
cultural and religious policies would, in practice, be dictated by a Fidesz-
controlled majority, further expanding the party’s control over everyday politics.  
 
ii. The legal effects of rejecting the old constitution 
One of the notable points included in the constitution’s preamble is the 
rejection of the 1949 constitution. At first glance, this fits neatly into Fidesz’s 
discourse on revolutionizing politics and breaking away from the past, but 
paradoxically, the unambiguous statement that proclaims the old constitution as 
‘tyrannical’ creates a situation of legal ambiguity. The Venice Commission 
Opinion points out that, if the statement is meant to have legal consequences, it 
can be read as leading to ex tunc (from the onset) nullity, which, in legal terms, 
would mean that all acts coming into force under the former constitution would 
lose their legal basis, becoming themselves null. The consequences would 
include the loss of legitimacy of basic democratic institutions, such as the 
Parliament, and the erasure of the case law of the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court, and its contribution to helping Hungary grow into an established 
democracy. The dilemma arising from this formulation goes even further: if the 
Parliament has lost legitimacy the moment the old constitution was rejected, 
then it cannot draft and enact a new constitution - which the Fidesz-majority 
Parliament has done. The only interpretation of that rejection, the Venice 
Commission suggests, is as a political statement with no legal ramification: a way 
of clearly separating Hungary’s established democracy from its authoritarian 
past. This reading also finds support in the closing provisions of the new 
constitution, which mention the existing 1989 constitution as its legal basis. 
However, including such a vague and easily misinterpreted statement in the new 
act’s opening remains a problem.  
 
iii. The status of ethnic minorities 
The new constitution draws two potentially problematic distinctions 
regarding ethnic minorities living in Hungary, and Hungarian minorities living 
elsewhere. The latter in particular has the potential to interfere in inter-state 
relations because of the claim that Hungary bears responsibility towards 
Hungarians living outside the country’s borders. Another issue is that there is no 
clear constitutional guarantee for the protection of minority languages, although 





iv. Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
Staying within the lines of human rights issues, the new constitution 
defines a family as the union between a man and a woman, ‘as the basis of the 
nation’s survival’. Two things are important here. First, Article XV(2) states that 
‘Hungary shall ensure fundamental rights to every person without any 
discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, gender, disability, language, 
religion, political or other views, national or social origin, financial, birth or other 
circumstances whatsoever’ but it does not explicitly list sexual orientation, 
leaving ‘other circumstances whatsoever’ open to interpretation. And secondly, 
the article does not technically deviate from the European Convention of Human 
Rights, given that there is no European consensus on same-sex marriage. Both of 
this leave sexual orientation in an ambiguous position when it comes to cases of 
discrimination, although it should be noted that same-sex civil partnerships are 
under limited legal protection in Hungary since 2009. 
 
v. Further constraints on press freedom 
In addition to tightening control over both public and private press in 
preparation for the new constitution, Fidesz also fails to present a constitutional 
press freedom guarantee. In Article IX, the freedom of the press is not stated as 
an individual right, but as an obligation of the state, which makes it dependent 
on the state’s willingness to enact its obligation. It also delegates the 
establishment of clear rules for press freedom and its supervision to a cardinal 
law but does not outline the purpose and context of how this law is to be 
enacted. 
At this point in time the EU had not, and indeed could not, do much, 
other than pointing out where Hungary deviates from shared norms and values, 
and giving adequate recommendations. The only tools with legal and financial 
consequences that applied to Hungary were the transposition and infringement 
mechanisms, which typically apply to market, environmental and employment 
issues, and cannot be expanded to cover such broad institutional and human 
rights violations. It would be several years before harder options, such as 
suspending Hungary’s voting rights, would be discussed as viable responses to 
the country’s increasing violations of democratic norms (De Baume, 2017), But 
another factor should be taken into account, aside from the lack of effective 
response mechanisms: with the Fidesz government in office for less than a year, 
the EU did not, at that point, have much reason to worry about authoritarian 
tendencies, and Hungary did not have any significant bargaining power. It had 
won the elections riding off voters’ resentment for MSZP, rather than feeding 
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public Euroscepticism and, this early on, the new Hungarian government seemed 
no less willing to play by the rules of the European scene than its predecessor. 
The take-away point of this analysis, then, is neither that the EU was particularly 
vulnerable in relation to Hungary, nor that it could have prevented 
deconsolidation by acting early but did not manage to do so. Instead, what this 
analysis highlights is how the kind of legal engineering Fidesz used to capture the 
Hungarian state can quickly set the scene for democratic backsliding and, in the 
absence of equally well defined legal control, can turn a previously established 
democratic country towards authoritarianism. In other words, this illustrates 
how an increasingly fragile internal embeddedness (a defective, illiberal 
democracy) made worse by weak external embeddedness - in this case with 
special reference to international integration.  
 
 
5.4.4. Romania and the trials of a fragile democracy 
 
Inherited conflicts and an ongoing political crisis 
 
Romania’s deconsolidation in 2011-2014 is in many ways a culmination of earlier 
symptoms: austerity measures imposed during the financial crisis, the economy’s 
failure to recover to pre-crisis levels, a lack of structural reforms, and declining 
trust in governments that have repeatedly given priority to political in-fighting 
over efficient ruling. As in Hungary’s case, the mismanagement of the financial 
crisis led to a transfer of power when it became clear that the incumbent 
government was unable to efficiently manage its consequences, and resorted to 
unpopular austerity measures in exchange for external support. So far the cases 
seem quite similar, but there are a few important differences. Firstly, although 
there are several strong parties on Romania’s political scene, most notably the 
Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the National Liberal Party (PNL), the two 
legislatures that coincided with 2011-2014 experienced both coalition 
governments and a good deal of party reshuffling within them. While the 
coalitions themselves proved to be unexpectedly resilient despite their growing 
unpopularity and the country’s economic hardships, the inner party conflicts, 
frequent rearranging of cabinets and lack of efficiency created an image of 
instability, with political and financial consequences on Romania’s relationship 
with the EU.  
The second difference is that, despite the change in government, the 
effects of the economic crisis were more far-reaching over time than in Hungary, 
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partly for the same reasons that can be observed there, but mostly because of 
the governing coalitions’ low capacity to pass legislation and implement reforms 
efficiently. 
Finally, the third difference is the direction in which the transfer of power 
occurred. In Hungary, left-wing MSZP lost to conservative right-wing Fidesz, 
which, as shown in the previous section, led to state capture by a party with 
increasingly open authoritarian tendencies. In Romania, the transfer took place 
between two mixed, and seemingly ideologically incompatible, coalitions. After 
the 2008 elections one such coalition, consisting of the Democratic Liberal Party 
(PDL), Social Democratic Party (PSD) and Conservative Party (PC) took office. 
President Traian Băsescu argued at the time that this was necessary to ensure a 
nearly 70% parliamentary majority in order to control the effects of the crisis 
(Romania Nations in Transit Report, 2010). PDL-backed politician Emil Boc was 
designated as prime minister.  
At first, the Romanian government had not planned on turning to 
international aid to manage the crisis, but eventually, and despite concerns from 
the opposition as well as coalition partner PSD, it entered talks with the IMF, the 
European Commission and the World Bank for a 20 billion Euro loan. Similarly to 
Hungary, financial support was conditioned by a series of austerity measures, 
which the government needed to adopt in order to ensure fiscal consolidation. 
This resulted in wage cuts in the public sector, layoffs and employment freezes, 
pension cuts and reduction of public spending. Unsurprisingly, although Romania 
managed to stay within IMF targets, these policies made the Boc government 
highly unpopular, both with voters and within the ruling coalition.  
2009 brought the first signs of instability in the coalition, and a change 
in the parliamentary power balance when PSD left to up with PNL in the 
opposition. Despite the party’s earlier concerns about the effects of the austerity 
package, the break did not occur due to ideological differences, but rather as a 
consequence of growing political tensions between PSD and PDL. Earlier that 
year, PSD interior minister Dan Nica claimed that PDL was preparing to commit 
fraud in the upcoming presidential elections but failed to present credible 
evidence and was removed from his position. The conflict was further stocked 
when PSD voted in favor of a legal investigation of two PDL members for high-
level corruption. After finally breaking away from the ruling coalition PSD joined 
up with PNL and, as a result, changed the balance of power in the Parliament. 
Despite the loss, however, the remaining coalition proved to be unexpectedly 
stable throughout 2009-2010 and managed to press forward with its austerity 
measures. 2010 saw mounting tensions over cuts in public spending and 
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unpopular structural reforms, worsened by the government and opposition to 
set aside political differences and focus on the country’s much needed economic 
rehabilitation (Romania Nations in Transit Report, 2010). 
All of this painted a highly polarized picture of Romania’s political scene 
at the beginning of 2011, with an unpopular center-right coalition in 
government, a PDL-backed Traian Băsescu on his second presidential term, and 
an unlikely but powerful PSD-PNL coalition in the opposition. The following 
period would see a transfer of power towards the opposition and a personal 
conflict between Traian Băsescu and PSD leader Victor Ponta, which would 
further destabilize Romanian politics.  
 
Dysfunctional power checks and low government capability 
 
The ruling coalition managed to remain in power through 2011, but its capacity 
to carry out reforms was stalled by the prospect of losing the 2012 parliamentary 
elections. The most important target of reforms that year were state-owned 
enterprises (Ștefan and Ioniță 2012). The strong informal ties between politics 
and the business world that had developed in Romania since the 1990s often put 
these enterprises at the center of corruption scandals. Many benefited from 
preferential contracts with the state, while others had accumulated large debts 
or were effectively bankrupt but continued to function with political support. 
Therefore in 2011 the IMF agreement focused on reforming corporate 
governance within these companies, which the government did by issuing an 
emergency ordinance (Romanian Government, 2011 - EO 109) rather than 
allowing the ordinary legislative process to take its course. The ordinance 
established, among other things, that no one who had been prosecuted for 
fraud, abuse of public funds, bribery or engagement in other forms of corruption, 
could be an administrator in such an enterprise (Art. 6). A related reform 
objective was to get rid of performance bonuses in several public institutions in 
line with government spending cuts. Much like state-owned enterprises, this 
system of bonuses was used by politicians and businesses to work around legal 
budgetary processes. Bonuses were rarely given based on merit, because 
performance targets were only vaguely defined. In effect, Stefan and Ioniță 
(2012) explain, this system had established itself as a ‘feudalistic model’ of 
political clientelism, where the leadership of state-owned companies could 
distribute funds in a discretionary manner. Therefore, the goal of the reforms 
imposed by the IMF and the EU to eliminate such practices was, in a broader 
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sense, meant to address the problem of clientelism in this area, and establish 
guarantees that it could not be reintroduced.  
Aside from informal business-politics relationship as a source of 
corruption, Romanian politics also struggled with a dysfunctional system of 
checks and balances: the narrow majority held by the governing coalition, along 
with the Parliament’s tendency to get caught up in political spats and neglect its 
legislative responsibilities interfered with the coalition’s effective power to 
govern. As a result, the executive branch often had to circumvent the legislative 
process by passing emergency ordinances. In several cases important issues, 
such as a new Labor Code or rules for promoting judges to the High Court of 
Cassation and Justice were left to such acts. Emergency ordinances, which, as the 
name implies, are normally used to pass legislation in cases of emergency where 
the parliamentary process would take too long, have immediate legal effect. 
They can be debated and suspended later, but on short term they skew the 
legislative-executive balance in favor of the latter and, by extension, weaken the 
basis of the entire democratic process. The problem of emergency ordinances is 
a persistent one throughout the 2011-2014 period, with a total of 429 such 
documents being issued over four years (Romanian Chamber of Deputies, 2011, 
2012, 2013, 2014). Despite promises from the government to stop abusing this 
legislative option, little progress was made in the following legislature to restore 
democratic balance on this front.  
A change of leadership occurred in 2012, and the months leading up to 
the parliamentary elections were marked by increasing political and social 
tensions. In January 2012 there were massive street protests in Bucharest and 
other major cities (Ioniță, 2012) demanding the resignation of the president and 
prime minister, both members of center-right PDL, in response to a legislative 
proposal to partly privatize the healthcare system. Protesters also expressed 
discontent over the sweeping austerity measures that had negatively impacted 
their socio-economic condition since the crisis: in particular wage cuts in the 
public sector, pension freezes and tax hikes. The protests resulted in Prime 
Minister Emil Boc’s resignation in February and the nomination of Mihai Razvan 
Ungureanu, another member of PDL. Ungureanu, however, was only able to 
keep the ruling coalition together until April, when the cabinet fell to a no-
confidence vote in the Parliament.  
PSD leader Victor Ponta was appointed prime minister in May 2012 
heading the new Social Liberal Coalition (USL) comprising of opposition allies PSD 
and PNL, together with the Conservative Party (PC). As with their predecessors, 
ideological differences did not seem to affect the coalition’s stability, and USL 
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managed to capitalize on voters’ anti-PDL sentiments by winning an important 
first victory in the year’s local elections. (The Central Electoral Bureau, 2012b) 
However, the Ponta government quickly found itself plagued with accusations of 
corruption, this time less concerned with bribery and the misuse of public funds, 
but the personal track record of Victor Ponta himself. An article published in the 
international science journal Nature presented credible evidence that the prime 
minister had plagiarized his 2003 doctoral dissertation (Schiermeier, 2012). In 
response, Ponta denied the accusations (The New York Times, 20 June 2012), but 
the scandal, along with Ponta’s personal rivalry with Băsescu, would influence a 
series of institutional reforms that USL began passing in the summer of 2012 
(Wagner et al. 2013). Firstly, USL led a vote in the Parliament to impeach 
president Băsescu, on the grounds that he had supposedly overstepped his 
constitutional powers by interfering with the work of the prime minister. Băsescu 
had survived a similar attempt during his first term in 2007, the PSD-friendly 
majority in the Parliament voted against him, and a referendum was called to 
decide whether he would be forced to step down before the end of his term. 
However, low turnout brought the legality of the referendum results into 
question and, although Băsescu was suspended for nearly two months, he 
eventually returned into office in August 2012.  
Meanwhile, the Ponta government had proceeded with several 
institutional changes to weaken PDL and entrench itself into power. Firstly, it 
removed three key PDL officials from their positions: the leaders of both 
chambers of the Parliament, and the Ombudsman, all three replaced with loyal 
PSD members. Ponta also issued two emergency ordinances reducing the 
Constitutional Court’s ability to check on parliamentary decisions and changing 
the rules of the impeachment referendum process in an additional attempt to 
secure Băsescu’s removal. In response to the plagiarism accusations against 
Ponta, the government also replaced the members of the National Council for 
Attestation of Titles, Diplomas and University Certifications, which was 
investigating the case, with people loyal to the prime minister. Both measures 
drew sharp criticism: the former, from Romania’s Constitutional Court and the 
EU, for abusing emergency ordinances, and the latter from academics worried 
about the credibility of a Council that would undoubtedly rule in Ponta’s favor.   
Despite already provoking political scandals and trying to limit the power 
of the judiciary, USL won a decisive victory in the elections in December, which 
gave the coalition a majority in both chambers of the Parliament and let Ponta 
keep his position as prime minister under a reinstated president Băsescu. But 
PSD had not overlooked the elections in their legislative attempts to secure their 
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grip on power. Six months before the elections USL had introduced a proposal 
for a first-past-the-post electoral system to replace the proportional system in 
place at the time. If approved, it would have helped USL win more seats in the 
Parliament. However, the Constitutional Court ruled against it. USL won 58.6% 
seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 60.1% in the Senate, but on a rather low 
voter turnout of 41.7%. The Right Romania Alliance, which included PDL, won 
less than 20% and the newly formed People’s Party-Dan Diaconescu (PP-DD) led 
by a media personality, entered the Parliament as well, on a populist platform 
(The Central Electoral Bureau, 2012b) 
Shortly after the elections, president Băsescu and Prime Minister Victor 
Ponta signed a power-sharing agreement to avoid future conflicts and put an end 
to Romania’s prolonged political crisis. The cohabitation pact, as it was known, 
gave priority to the president on issues of defense, foreign policy and 
representation in the European Council, while the prime minister handled social 
and economic policy, and intergovernmental relations (Dimulescu et al. 2014). 
However, despite an optimistic start, tensions within USL started 
mounting in 2013. PC, the small, conservative coalition member, whose position 
in the Parliament depended on stable alliances, had broken with PSD in the 
previous governing coalition, but now aligned itself with PNL to ensure that it 
would remain in power. Another source of conflict emerged when a 
constitutional reform was proposed to limit the powers of the Presidency. The 
goal was to remove the president’s power to nominate the prime minister, and 
to only be able to refuse the nomination of a cabinet minister once. The 
impression that Ponta continued to push legislation based on his personal 
conflict with President Băsescu made the constitutional reform a particularly 
thorny issue within USL. Since Băsescu was not allowed to run for a third term, 
the coalition had made an internal deal which would give the Presidency to PNL 
after the elections in 2014, while PSD would keep the Prime Minister’s office. 
Thus, the reform proposal fed PNL’s suspicion that PSD planned to strengthen its 
executive powers at the expense of PNL in the upcoming presidential mandate. 
The coalition finally broke up in early 2014, after PNL tried to replace a PSD 
cabinet member accused of corruption with Klaus Iohannis, a popular local 
politician who Ponta saw as a threat. In response, PSD blocked his nomination. 
However, after the coalition’s breakup Iohannis took over PNL leadership and 
negotiated the formation of a coalition together with PDL, to back Iohannis as 
Ponta’s main presidential rival.  
USL’s breakup brought about a major party reshuffling on Romania’s 
political scene (Dimulescu et al. 2015). The Christian Liberal Alliance (ACL), 
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supporting Iohannis’ candidacy, was now the main center-right force in Romania, 
and a handful of new parties were formed, backed by Traian Băsescu and other 
liberal politicians who chose to remain outside ACL. An even more significant 
consequence of USL’s internal discord, along with ongoing accusations of 
corruption plaguing the coalition, was Ponta’s dramatic loss of the 2014 
elections. After winning the first round against Iohannis, the Prime Minister, who 
had not resigned his office once he became a candidate, faced accusations of 
using his position to rig the elections. Diaspora voting, where Iohannis won 
nearly three times as many votes as Ponta (The Central Electoral Bureau, 2014a), 
was a particularly salient issue that led to protests both abroad and in Romania. 
The Ponta government was accused of letting administrative hurdles, such as 
complicated voting procedures and a shortage of personnel at the polls, interfere 
with diaspora voting (Sibinescu, 2016). In the wake of protests, the government 
attempted to remedy some of the issues, such that the turnout almost doubled 
abroad between rounds. The final results went in favor of Klaus Iohannis, with 
54.4% of votes (The Central Electoral Bureau, 2014b). 
Despite the election of another center-right-backed president, PSD 
maintained its parliamentary majority and Victor Ponta remained in office 
despite a tense relationship with president Iohannis. He was forced to resign one 
year later, when his government once again found itself in the midst of a 
corruption scandal: in October 2015, more than 60 people died in a nightclub fire 
that revealed a trail of low-level corruption cases that pointed to a PSD-backed 
district mayor in Bucharest. The event caused the largest street protests in 
Romania since 1989 (Clej, 2015) and resulted in Victor Ponta’s resignation and 
the formation of a technocrat government, which led Romania until the 2016 
parliamentary elections, when it was replaced by PSD leadership once again.  
 
The EU’s role in preserving democracy in Romania 
 
Unlike Hungary, where the problem was the rapid decline of a consolidated 
democracy, Romania’s democracy has experienced nearly three decades of poor 
consolidation, which the political squabbles and low government capacity of 
2011-2014 worsened further. Gallagher (2005) points out several long-term 
factors that have undermined Romania’s chance to become a functional 
democracy. Firstly, political elites inherited from their previous authoritarian 
counterparts the notion that voters are a subservient, easily manipulated mass, 
rather than active citizens. Combined with the country’s history of centralized 
rule this resulted in a strong dependence on the state that continued after the 
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fall of communism. Secondly, five decades of communist rule left an 
authoritarian mark on political culture: the idea that politics is a hierarchical 
system, which citizens have little effective control over, and which produces 
corruption and social inequality. On the other hand, in light of this dependence, 
the fact that Romania had developed into a state that was at once too big and 
too weak created frustration with its inability to respond to its citizens’ needs 
(Gallagher 2005, p. 331). Relatedly, the long-standing problem of in-fighting 
among political elites led to a climate of low credibility and inability, regardless 
of the government’s political colors, to implement reforms efficiently. In 
Romania, more so than in Hungary, the promise of EU accession provided an 
external stimulus for positive change. And, much like Hungary, once the 
mechanism of conditionality controlling the accession process was removed, 
there were few effective incentives left to ensure that the countries would not 
experience democratic backsliding.  
Romania’s late accession, along with Bulgaria’s, stood as evidence that 
the country had failed to maintain the pace of structural reforms required 
throughout the accession process. As a result, after gaining membership in 2007, 
the two countries became the subject of a newly created instrument, the 
Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM). The mechanism, consisting of 
yearly reports by the European Commission, is still currently in place and its aim 
is to monitor the countries’ progress in the areas of corruption, judiciary 
independence and reform, and organized crime (The European Commission, 
2012b). It differs from conditionality in that, while effective in some areas, it is 
‘more carrot than stick’: the CVM is tied to support for reforms, including access 
to financial aid from the European Structural and Investment Funds, but few 
effective sanctions for failure to comply with its requirements. Despite its 
inconsistent effectiveness, the CVM is nevertheless an example of the few 
formal, well-regulated instruments that the EU has at its disposal to keep 
democratic backsliding in check.  
In practice, the European Commission compiles a yearly report based on 
consultations with Romanian authorities, civil society actors, relevant 
international organizations and independent experts. After accession four 
benchmarks were established for Romania (The European Commission, 2011b). 
The country was required to: (a) ensure a more transparent and efficient judicial 
process by improving the capacity of the Supreme Council of the Magistracy; (b) 
establish an integrity agency responsible for checking assets and potential 
conflicts of interest among politicians; (c) build on previous progress and 
continue to conduct non-partisan investigations into cases of high-level 
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corruption; and (d) fight corruption at the local level. Between 2011 and 2014 
the Commission’s CVM reports highlighted some of the areas where Romania 
made progress following the Commission’s recommendations, but also made 
clear that there are several areas in which the country continued to lag behind. 
Perhaps the most worrying of these is that positive trends tend to be inconsistent 
from one year to the next due to frequent changes in government (EC 2012a, EC 
2012b). 
Two areas of reform are considered particularly successful under the 
CVM. The first is the slow improvement of judicial independence, reflected in the 
passing of more transparent legislation and the ability to effectively investigate 
corruption among political elites. The second is the positive track record of the 
National Anti-Corruption Directorate (DNA) in opening cases, particularly of high-
level corruption. During 2011-2014 Romania also introduced new civil, criminal 
and procedural codes, created the National Integrity Agency, improved 
transparency of the Constitutional Court and drafted a comprehensive anti-
corruption strategy. However, several long-standing problems persisted. One of 
these is that, despite a notable increase of high-level corruption cases under 
scrutiny, the process remains slow and often results in insufficient sanctions. 
There has also been political and administrative resistance towards these 
investigations and inconsistent transparency in the process of amending the 
Criminal Code (The European Commission, 2014). Another issue the Commission 
highlighted is related to Romania’s dysfunctional system of checks and balances: 
despite earlier engagements to reduce the number of emergency ordinances, 
Romanian governments continued to resort to these through the entire period - 
a concern also expressed by the Venice Commission and the Council of Europe 
(The European Commission, 2013).  
The CVM, and by extension the EU, had a noticeable positive effect on 
strengthening the judiciary branch in Romania and thus fixing some of the 
imbalances plaguing the country’s system of power checks. But its efficiency has 
been limited, partly because of the inconsistent application of proposed 
measures by Romanian authorities, and partly because the mechanism cannot 
respond with strong sanctions to the failure to comply. In practice, it can make 
recommendations and give assistance, but the only formal sanction it is able to 
apply is continued monitoring. Nevertheless, the case of Romania reflects a 
stronger degree of external embeddedness in the area of international 
integration compared to Hungary, where the EU’s capacity to intervene and 
prevent democratic backsliding is even smaller. In Romania, decline was a 
consequence of building democracy on fragile foundations, and of prolonged 
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political conflicts, sometimes of a personal nature, which led to the state 
neglecting much-needed reforms.  
Corruption and power imbalances favoring the executive and legislative 
branches over the legislative also persisted beyond 2011-2014 and took a 
worrying turn in the beginning of 2017 when the newly appointed PSD 
government attempted to pass an emergency ordinance (OUG 13/2017) that 
would have effectively decriminalized official misconduct, reduced prison 
sentences and left it unclear whether a criminal investigation would prevent its 
subject from holding a public office (The Romanian Government, 2017) The 
ordinance was soon retracted, however, after another massive wave of anti-
government protests, which had become a frequent occurrence on Romania’s 
political scene since 2012. In fact, Romania is an interesting case study for the 
effectiveness of civil society in preventing instances of democratic backsliding. 
Combined with the CVM, it offers sequence and account evidence that the ~CV 
explanatory path - or rather, its reverse - has indeed had an impact on 
democracy. This explanation is further examined in the following section. 
 
5.4.5. Evidence for the impact of civil society and EU 
vulnerability 
 
Is there evidence that civil society and the EU have acted successfully in tandem 
to prevent democratic backsliding in Romania and Hungary? The previous two 
sections already give some hints in this direction, but before looking into them 
further, a short reminder of Wolfgang Merkel’s conceptualization of civil society 
follows.  
Merkel suggests that civil society, as an element of external 
embeddedness, fulfills four functions (Merkel 2004, p. 45-47): (a) protects the 
individual from arbitrary state power; (b) supports the rule of law and balance of 
powers; (c) educates citizens and recruits political elites; and (d) provides a 
democratic space for marginalized groups to promote their interests. If all these 
functions are fulfilled, then civil society can provide effective checks on power 
and have an impact on how political agendas are designed and implemented. 
However, this concept, much like the others in the embeddedness model, is an 
ideal case scenario. Therefore I suggest that, in practice, failure to find convincing 
evidence for all four functions does not automatically mean that there is no 
evidence for the impact of civil society as a whole. After all, the reason this part 
of the analysis considers the reverse of the theorized relationship (C~V -> D) is 
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that looking for the absence of evidence is rather nonsensical. More to the point, 
if there is substantial evidence that at least one of the four functions of civil 
society has contributed positively to democracy in Romania or Hungary, this 
dissertation will treat it as evidence in favor of the explanatory path.  
The other component of this explanation, EU vulnerability, was 
previously defined as the EU’s inability to intervene effectively in situations of 
democratic backsliding - whether because it lacks the legal or administrative 
instruments to do so, or because high bargaining power puts the country in a 
position where it can ignore the EU’s impositions. The reverse means that there 
is evidence of successful EU responses to domestic anti-democratic tendencies. 
The two conditions will be examined in the following sections. 
 
The role of civil society in Hungary 
 
While there are no major legal obstacles in the way of registering a civil society 
organization (CSO), the civil arena in Hungary was dealing with several ongoing 
problems by the beginning of 2008 (Nations in Transit Hungary report, 2009) 
Firstly, underfunding and high taxation made it difficult for CSOs, especially 
smaller ones, to function effectively. Another problem, which became especially 
serious after Fidesz came into power, was increased reliance on state funding 
over private funding, which had dropped since the 2000s. A third issue was a 
radicalization and politicization trend within the civil society. 2008 saw the rise 
of the Hungarian Guard (Magyar Garda), an extreme right, nationalist 
movement, as more active and visible. The Guard initially provoked negative 
reactions, both from within the civil society, which staged ad-hoc protests to 
oppose it, and the state, which banned the group at the end of 2008.  
Underfunding, reliance on state financing and personnel shortages 
caused by high payroll taxes remained persistent throughout the reference 
period (Nations in Transit Hungary report, 2010). On the other hand, a public 
donation scheme allowed citizens to transfer 1% of their income tax to a CSO of 
their choosing, and several business figures provided significant private 
donations through foundations and funding projects, especially in support of 
youth education in economically weak regions. However, these positive changes 
were insufficient to break the dependency on state funding. This became a 
particularly difficult issue in 2010, when the newly instated Fidesz government 
froze several important funding sources for CSOs, such as the National Cultural 
Fund, the National Civil Fund and the Research and Technology Innovation Fund 
(Nations in Transit Hungary report, 2011). In addition to cutting funds, Fidesz also 
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withheld previously approved grant payments and began discussing a radical 
reform of the funding system after claiming that the National Civil Fund awarded 
grants on questionable merits. Indeed, in 2011 the main sources of public 
funding for the sector was cut drastically, by nearly 60% (Kovács, 2012). The 
Composition of the National Civic Fund was also changed: previously 90% of its 
leadership were civil society representatives, but under the new reforms this 
number was cut down to 30%, with the remaining positions being chosen by the 
government. As in other areas of Hungarian politics, Fidesz used this strategy to 
establish its political influence among CSOs.  
Despite the grim outlook, Hungary’s civil society experienced a few 
positive trends. While the difficult economic situation of 2008-2009 led to rising 
radicalization, it also encouraged the emergence of a few civil initiatives whose 
purpose was to put forward reforms for healthcare, pensions and tax systems - 
in short, some of the areas that were hit the hardest by austerity measures. The 
business sector - most notably the Reform Alliance - also became involved in 
drafting proposals (Nations in Transit Hungary report 2009). Another positive 
aspect was that, despite suffering financially, the Hungarian civil society 
managed to remain relatively strong through the power transition. In 2010 there 
were about 50,000 active registered organizations, ranging from small 
associations to watchdog organizations monitoring political processes (Nations 
in Transit Hungary report, 2011). Also notable is the fact that in 2011 a local 
movement called One Million for the Freedom of the Press in Hungary managed 
to gain extensive support through the use of social media and, together with 
other NGOs, organize the largest anti-governmental protests since the fall of 
communism in Hungary, condemning Fidesz’s authoritarian tendencies (Kovács, 
2012, p. 247). 
It is interesting that, until the 2011 protests there were no significant 
anti-governmental movements in Hungary compared to the ones provoked by 
the political crisis in 2006-2008. Fidesz’s sweeping victory led to a significant 
increase in public trust in the government, from 14% in 2009 to 40% in 2010. 
Although trust declined to 26% by the end of 2011, it did not sink to previous 
levels under the Orbán government (Eurobarometer Interactive, accessed 11 
December 2017). This is perhaps why, before Fidesz’s authoritarian streak 
became difficult to ignore, eliciting protests in 2011, Hungary’s civil society scene 
had been relatively quiet and had not built itself into a coherent force that could 





The role of civil society in Romania 
 
There were significant changes in the state and political impact of Romania’s civil 
society beginning in 2011-2012. Previously, that arena had enjoyed little 
influence, both in its ability to mobilize citizens, and to participate in policy-
making. Like Hungary’s civil society, Romania’s also suffers from underfunding, 
with only a small share of its finances being supported through donation 
schemes. Unlike its Hungarian counterpart, however, Romania’s civil society 
proved surprisingly capable, in recent years, to stall or prevent controversial 
reforms and bolster anti-corruption efforts.  
CSOs in Romania enjoy a higher degree of public trust compared to state 
institutions, whose image has been heavily affected by the prevasive corruption 
scandals and political in-fighting of the post-communist decades. Trust does not, 
however, translate into consistent financial support. In 2011 Romania had public 
funding scheme in place that was similar to Hungary’s, whereby citizens could 
donate 2% of their income taxes to NGOs or religious organizations of their 
choice, but fewer than 10% of Romanians actually chose to do so (Ștefan and 
Ioniță, 2012). But despite resource shortages, civil society became an 
increasingly visible player in Romanian politics. 
Perhaps surprisingly, given the public discontent with Romania’s 
precarious socio-economic situation after the financial crisis, it was 
environmental organizations that proved particularly effective in mobilizing 
citizen support and volunteer action. One of the most notable and enduring 
examples is the Roșia Montană environmental movement, launched in response 
to a controversial law authorizing a mining project for the largest opencast gold 
mine in Europe, run by the Canadian Roșia Montană Gold Corporation 
(Dimulescu et al., 2014). Prior to 2013, the bill had been stalled for over a decade, 
failing to secure the needed environmental licenses. After their victory at the 
polls in 2012, the USL government re-opened the case for authorization. In 
response, the Roșia Montană environmental movement organized a series of 
marches, demonstrations and sit-ins over a period of five months. At the time 
these were the largest street protests in the country since 1990 and, significantly, 
the first instance of Romanian civil society using social media in a coordinated 
way to spread information and organize events. A similar series of protests, albeit 
on a smaller scale, were directed against Chevron’s fracking project near the 
village of Pungești. Here, too, social media played a key role in spreading 
mobilizing and securing public support (Cmeciu and Coman, 2016). Meanwhile, 
the Roșia Montană movement continued to be active in 2014. Several protesters 
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were fined for breaking the 60/1991 law, which required the organizers of public 
gatherings to notify authorities in advance and obtain authorization for their 
collective action (Dimulescu et al., 2015). Despite the hostile attitudes of 
politicians, who labelled protests as illegal and potentially violent, the Roșia 
Montană movement was a success: initially the Ponta government appeared to 
concede to public demands but, in a last-ditch effort to have the bill passed, 
established a special committee in the Parliament to examine the project further. 
The Parliament eventually rejected the bill (Salvați Roșia Montană, 19 November 
2013) 
Aside from environmental issues, protests were also held earlier in 2011-
2012, demanding socio-economic reforms to support those affected by the long-
term consequences of the financial crisis. Their effect was political, rather than 
substantial: Emil Boc, who was Prime Minster at the time, resigned, and the 
ruling PDL party experienced massive losses in terms of political image, which 
USL was able to capitalize on and win the 2012 elections (Wagner et al., 2013). 
But protesters’ demands for substantial reforms were not met, as USL proved, in 
turn, to be an inefficient government. In late 2014 the presidential elections, 
where Victor Ponta ran against liberal Klaus Iohannis, provoked a new wave of 
protests when accusations emerged that the diaspora vote had been deliberately 
encumbered by the government through additional administrative requirements 
that slowed down the voting process and allowed only a fraction of Romanian 
citizens to vote abroad. Since the elections were in practice managed by the 
Ponta government, this was seen as a fraudulent attempt to sway the vote in the 
Prime Minister’s favor. As a result, spontaneous protests broke out, both abroad 
and in Romania, demanding fewer administrative hurdles and better 
management at polling stations outside the country in the second round. 
Although the situation did not improve significantly, the protests, which largely 
mobilized online, had an effect on how the two candidates changed their 
campaign strategies between rounds. While Ponta continued to promote his 
original electoral program and refused to address fraud claims, Iohannis adopted 
a new strategy that picked up on voters’ new concerns and communicated with 
protesters online (Sibinescu, 2016). 
Despite enjoying an unprecedented rise in activity, the failure of the civil 
arena to influence public policy remained a problem. This was in part because 
protests had thus far failed to produce a sustainable political movement: they 
usually mobilized small, diverse groups over relatively short periods of time, so 
cohesion was low and the groups tended to disperse once protests ended. It was 
only later, in 2015, that a grassroots movement, the Save Romania Union, was 
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able to coalesce into a political party and garner enough support to enter the 
Parliament. The point remains, however, that Romania’s civil society established 
itself as a political force by its success in a few key areas: the reversal of damaging 
environmental policies, contributions to anti-corruption efforts, and influencing 
the structure of Romania’s political scene. The 2011-2014 period was also 
essential for the continuing development of civil society. Although protests 
remained its main, and most effective, means of action, as seen in the anti-
corruption movements that have been developing since 2014, they encouraged 
a change in the previously apathetic political culture. 
  
The EU: not yet vulnerable, but at risk  
 
When looking at the role of the CVM in Romania, one aspect of EU legislation 
that stands out is the decline in effectiveness post-accession compared to the 
pre-accession period. One explanation is the assumption that the new member 
states would continue to play by the rules, as their early behavior of successful 
compliance seemed to suggest (Sedelmeier, 2008). Infringement, the most 
widely-used mechanism for ensuring that member states implement and follow 
community legislation correctly, does not show any positive correlations 
between the number of years since accession and the number of infringement 
cases in the new member states. Furthermore, as late as 2014, there was no 
evidence that these countries were performing worse than older member states, 
either in terms of new infringement cases open against them, or the rate of their 
closing. Germany, Spain, France and Italy are present alongside Bulgaria, 
Romania and Hungary among the countries with the most infringement cases 
open at the end of the year (The European Commission, 2015). Another issue 
with using infringement as a potential control mechanism is that it does not 
pertain to areas relevant to deconsolidation. The majority of infringement cases 
are concerned with internal market, environment, mobility and taxation issues, 
rather than justice, human rights or social welfare. For example, in 2014 
infringement in the EU on issues pertaining to justice made up only 6% of cases, 
and those on employment just 5% (The European Commission, 2015, p. 15).  
However, aside from infringement, the EU did not have any other formal 
instruments to check for member states’ compliance during the reference period 
- much less any which were dedicated to safeguarding democracy. The CVM is 
an important exception, especially considering its effectiveness, but it has only 
been used to monitor Romania and Bulgaria, and not extended to other CEE 
countries. Thus, there is more substantial evidence that a stronger EU had a 
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positive role in preventing backsliding in Romania by helping re-balance power 
checks and helping create a more efficient and transparent judiciary. The fight 
against corruption remained particularly strong, including after the 2011-2014 
reference period: in 2015, Romania’s Anti-Corruption Directorate indicted 
prime-minister Victor Ponta, five ministers and 21 MPs (Macdowall, 2016). The 
EU’s strong influence on promoting democratic norms in Romania managed to 
keep some aspects of the country’s chaotic politics in check, albeit not enough 
to prevent some measure of backsliding. 
Vulnerability turned out to be much more apparent in relationship to 
Hungary, but not yet within the 2008-2011 period. For instance, the first election 
of Fidesz was not seen as problematic enough to prevent Hungary from taking 
over the Council presidency as scheduled, and the initial outlook from EU leaders 
was positive, if somewhat cautious. However, the EU did not, at the time, resort 
to sanctions outside typical infringement procedures or issuing 
recommendations. After the new Constitution came into force and Fidesz further 
entrenched itself into power, it became apparent that the EU was legally and 
administratively unprepared to deal with a deconsolidation scenario in practice. 
All this points to an EU still strong in relation to its member states, but becoming 
gradually more vulnerable later. Combined, for instance, with Hungary’s growing 
bargaining power and Fidesz’s ability to emphasize nationalist politics over 
common European norms, this indicates an increasingly complicated problem for 
the future.  
This section began by looking at evidence of the combined positive 
impact of civil action and the EU’s domestic impact on democratic backsliding. 
To re-examine this evidence through the lens of the original embeddedness 
model requires turning the question around: without these positive effects, 
would democratic backsliding have occurred to an even greater extent? The 
answer is more clear-cut in Romania’s case. Both the CVM and anti-
governmental protests had a direct impact on legislation being passed, amended 
or scrapped by the legislative. It also encouraged the anti-corruption fight, 
leading to the prosecution of high-ranking politicians in the Parliament and 
several cabinets so far. The fact that civil society actions were frequently 
organized in response to controversial political developments and, in some 
cases, were successful in stalling or preventing them altogether, suggests that 
indeed, without the input of civil society actors, democracy may have 
deteriorated further. Similarly, the CVM is a monitoring mechanism that 
examines developments in Romania’s checks and balances retrospectively and 
issues legal recommendations. Some, as the CVM reports note, have been 
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successfully implemented, leading to institutional and legislative changes in line 
with EU norms, while others were either partially applied or left out. Once again, 
the fact that individual changes, such as the positive track record of the National 
Anti-Corruption Directorate, can be traced back to EU interventions, serve as 
evidence that, in its absence, QOD may have declined more. 
The explanatory power of ~CV in Hungary is less clear because there is 
not enough evidence to easily turn the question around. For one thing, no legal 
instruments are available to link EU actions, preventive or retroactive, to positive 
changes in Hungarian politics. For another, the relatively weak position of the 
civil society and the lack of clear institutional or legislative changes following civil 
actions point to a lack of evidence for the C~V -> D explanatory path, but this 
does not automatically mean that ~CV -> ~D has occurred. A reasonable 
interpretation here is that weak civil actions and a more vulnerable EU could 
have worsened Hungary’s situation, but there is no conclusive evidence to 
support this claim. The result of this analysis, then, is that ~CV can be observed 
in Romania but not in Hungary. 
 
 
5.5. Summary of findings  
 
The goal of this chapter was to use process tracing to answer three questions: 
(1) How did ~E~S contribute to deconsolidation in Hungary and Romania? (2) 
How did the rise of right-wing populism impact QOD in Hungary, as well as the 
country’s relationship with the EU? (3) Has ~CV contributed to deconsolidation 
in either, or both countries, and if so, in which conditions? A summary of the 
evidence and conclusions for each of these follows. 
 
5.5.1. The impact of socio-economic decline 
 
As a causal explanation, ~E~S is in an interesting position when viewed through 
the lens of prediction tests used in process tracing. It is both certain and unique 
in the case of Romania, where no alternative explanation emerged, while in 
Hungary it is certain but not unique, due to the simultaneous presence of ~EPB. 
This means that ~E~S can be subjected to two types of tests - doubly-decisive in 
the former, and hoop in the latter (see Table 5.2). However, based on the 
evidence from the previous sections, ~E~S fails the doubly-decisive test: while 
socio-economic decline did indeed occur, it was not the main reason for 
deconsolidation. Political instability, a system of checks and balances suffering 
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from long-term dysfunctions and the government’s low capacity to implement 
reforms emerged as more relevant explanations for deconsolidation. The only 
substantial piece of evidence linking ~E~S to democracy were the 2011-2012 
anti-governmental protests demanding socio-economic reforms in the wake of 
the financial crisis. However, as evidence it is inconclusive because protesters did 
not succeed in securing their demands.  
Hungary’s case is interesting because here, the evidence for ~E~S 
partially overlaps with that for ~EPB. 2008-2011 corresponds to the period when 
Hungary was the most affected by the financial crisis. Its effects, along with those 
of the austerity measures the MSZP government was required to implement, 
worsened the country’s socio-economic conditions, leading to higher 
unemployment and social exclusion. These changes took place at the same time 
as a decline in QOD could be noted. However, rather than relying only on pattern 
(statistical) evidence, which puts this analysis in the way of the 
correlation/causation fallacy, I suggest that it is more worthwhile to focus on the 
sequence and account evidence that supports the ~EPB explanation. In theory, 
~E~S passes the prediction test, but its reliance on statistical data for evidence 
also means that it should be treated cautiously. Overall ~E~S finds itself in a 
rather complicated situation. On the one hand, failing the doubly-decisive test 
does not automatically invalidate it, but it is certainly weakened by the presence 
of evidence pointing to more valuable explanations. On the other hand, it passes 
the straw-in-the-wind test, which is too weak to either confirm or outright reject 
the explanation. Thus, the only viable conclusion is that ~E~S is a partial and weak 
explanation for deconsolidation in both Hungary and Romania. 
 
5.5.2. Economic decline and the rise of populism 
 
This alternative explanation is specific to Hungary and relies on sequence and 
account evidence. ~EPB is a certain, non-unique condition which, similarly to 
~E~S, requires a straw-in-the-wind test and therefore would appear just another 
type of weak explanation. This is not, however, the case. Instead, it shows that 
the use of non-uniqueness, which is an artefact of QCA, can produce artificial 
results if not considered carefully. In fact, I suggest that ~EPB is the strongest 
explanation for decline out of the three examined in this chapter. There is strong 
sequence evidence linking the two: the economic hardships that Hungary 
inherited from the mid-2000s were aggravated by the financial crisis that hit the 
country in 2008-2009.  This led to MSZP’s political collapse and power transfer 
to Fidesz. The constitutional reform that followed offers particularly strong 
174 
 
account evidence of how populist entrenchment erodes democracy. On the 
other hand, bargaining power requires a looser interpretation due to the time 
frame when the analysis is conducted. By 2011, concerns about Hungary’s 
democracy had started to emerge, but attitudes, particularly from the EU, were 
still rather hopeful.  In later years, as Fidesz further secured its hold on 
government, it became clear that this period had set the scene for a gradual 
increase in bargaining power. Thus, considering the partial overlap of ~E~S and 
~EPB, as well as the strong factual support for ~EPB, I suggest that the latter could 
instead be treated as unique, requiring (and passing) a doubly-decisive test that 
lends the economic crisis - populist entrenchment - bargaining power sequence 
strong explanatory power. 
 
5.5.3. Civil society action and EU vulnerability 
 
Since ~CV was only theorized in the beginning of this chapter, and had no 
previous empirical support from QCA, one of the goals of this chapter was to look 
for evidence of its occurrence. Sequence and account evidence was found in 
Romania, but no conclusive proof of either kind could be identified in Hungary. 
This reduces the explanatory power of ~CV somewhat, since it is only relevant to 
one case, and even then, it is not unique. According to the types of evidence 
discussed in Chapter 3, ~CV passes the high certainty - low uniqueness prediction 
test in the case of Romania, but not in that of Hungary. Both situations, however, 
correspond to weak certainty tests and have neither strong confirmatory nor dis-
confirmatory power. In general terms, the explanation is not rejected, but 
neither can it be considered a strong explanation without further evidence.  
Two additional methodological conclusions can be drawn from this 
chapter. Firstly, the initial QCA analysis showed that conditions ~S or B were 
necessary for deconsolidation but, while both are present here, individually they 
provide weak explanations. Secondly, the fact that QCA rarely produces unique 
causal relations potentially weakens the explanatory power of certain 
conditions. However, as seen in the case of Hungary, this phenomenon should 
be treated cautiously. QCA postulates that alternative explanations can co-exist 
but says nothing about whether some explanations are more valuable than 
others. Both factors - relevance and weak necessary conditions - illustrate the 
need to complement QCA with other methodological approaches in order to 









In this dissertation, I sought to answer three questions concerning democratic 
deconsolidation in Central and Eastern Europe: what were the conditions under 
which it occurred after EU accession, and how do these conditions interact with 
eachother? What were the intervening processes explaining the occurrence of 
deconsolidation? And what was the nature of the EU’s domestic impact in this 
context? By combining the democratic embeddedness model as a way of 
operationalizing deconsolidation with a set-theoretic multimethod approach, it 
was possible to examine these questions, first at a cross-country level, and then 
individually in Hungary and Romania.   
The findings corresponding to the first research question show that 
embeddedness is better at explaining deconsolidation, than it is at addressing 
democratic improvement. According to the embeddedness model, either a 
combination of favorable economic (E) and social (S) conditions, or a 
combination of low support for populism (P) and decline in bargaining power in 
relation to the EU (B) are sufficient to explain democratic improvement (D). The 
reverse, according to Wolfgang Merkel’s original assumptions about 
embeddedness, is also true. Based on this, the model was translated in Chapter 
4 into two theoretical formulas (TF) based on Boolean rules, as follows: 
 
TF1: ES + ~P~B -> D 
TF2: ~E~S + PB -> ~D 
 
The solution formulas (SF) that describe the sufficient conditions from the 
empirical analysis are: 
SF1: S~B -> D 
SF2: ~E~S + ~EB -> ~D 
 
There is a notable difference between TF1 and SF1, which describe the theorized 
and observed conditions for democratic improvement respectively. The 
hypothesis put forward by the translated embeddedness model states that 
either a favorable socio-economic context (ES), or a combination of weak 
populism and bargaining power in relation to the EU (~P~B) explain democratic 
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improvement. However, empirical results reveal that only a combination of 
favorable social conditions and declining bargaining power (S~B) were instead 
sufficient to produce such an outcome. On the other hand, where 
deconsolidation is concerned, TF2 and SF2 indicate that the theory and empirical 
evidence are much better aligned – more so, considering that in the majority of 
CEE countries that experienced deconsolidation, strong support for populism 
was also present. With the exception of three cases (Estonia, Slovakia and 
Slovenia), the formula is actually ~E~S + ~EPB, making the solution a super-set of 
the theoretical formula.  
 With regards to the cases themselves, a few consistencies emerged. 
Breaking down the 2005-2014 decade into shorter intervals shows that 
democratic deconsolidation is not as prevalent as expected. Out of the eighteen 
cases that were included in the final analysis, seven experienced some degree of 
improvement in QOD, mainly concentrated in the 2005-2008 time period (Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia), while Lithuania and Latvia also 
experienced a slight improvement in 2011-2014. The remaining cases showed 
evidence of deconsolidation, most typically in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and 
Slovakia, where democratic quality declined across the board between 2005 and 
2014. The majority of these cases are concentrated in 2008-2011, a period where 
the theory and solution formulas, as described above, are aligned.  
 The second and third research questions addressed in this dissertation 
are connected. The EU’s domestic impact was examined along with several 
country-specific factors, using process tracing in Hungary (2008-2011) and 
Romania (2011-2014). The first step was to expand the set-theoretic translation 
of the embeddedness model to include civil society (C) and EU vulnerability (V) - 
the two conditions that were left out of the initial stage of the analysis due to 
the difficulty of operationalizing them in a meaningful way. Thus, the complete 
theoretical formula for embeddedness in set-theoretic form is: 
 
ES + ~P~B + C~V -> D 
~E~S + PB + ~CV -> ~D 
 
Three particular questions were important for process tracing, based on the 
previous results from the quantitative comparative analysis: how did ~E~S 
contribute to deconsolidation in Hungary and Romania? How did the rise of 
populism affect QOD in Hungary, and the country’s relationship with the EU? And 
how have civil society and EU vulnerability contributed to deconsolidation?  
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 Findings show that ~E~S, which was originally observed in both Hungary 
and Romania, had a limited impact on deconsolidation, while evidence for other 
factors is more substantial. In Romania, political instability, a dysfunctional 
system of checks and balances, and low government capacity were the main 
contributors to deconsolidation. In Hungary, the consequences of the economic 
crisis helped consolidate Fidesz’s hold on power. In Chapter 5, I argued that ~EPB 
is the strongest explanation for deconsolidation examined in this dissertation, 
when taken sequentially: in Hungary’s case, the financial crisis occurred in the 
context of long-standing economic troubles dating back to the social-democratic 
MSZP rule of the mid-2000s. Popular dissatisfaction with the social-democratic 
government propelled Fidesz into power and enabled the 2011 constitutional 
reforms, which resulted in further entrenchment and provided a springboard for 
Euroscepticism, later increasing Hungary’s bargaining power in relation to the 
EU. 
 The EU’s capacity to apply formalized sanctions when a member state 
fails to comply with European legislation is the most important factor for 
successful domestic intervention. By continuing to monitor judiciary reforms in 
Romania through the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism, the EU, in 
combination with an active civil society involved in anti-government protests, 
managed to keep a check on corruption. The lack of formal sanctions placed the 
EU in a more vulnerable position in relation to Hungary, although this was not 
yet the case in 2008-2011, when concerns about Fidesz’s anti-democratic 
tendencies had not yet materialized. The two cases highlight the necessity of 
formalizing post-accession sanctions in ways that would bring them close to the 
efficiency of pre-accession conditionality, which is particularly difficult in the 
absence of an incentive as strong as the earlier perspective of membership. Since 
2014, the issue of deconsolidation has become more pressing in the region and 






The two main limitations of this study stem from the choice of 
methodology. The set-theoretic approach has several strengths, which I 
discussed in Chapter 3. Among these, the most important is that it enables cross-
case analysis, which is useful when looking at a whole geographic region. 
However, as Chapter 4 showed, some cases were excluded based on their 
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mismatch with the theoretical expectations of external embeddedness. In a 
single-method research design, this imposes a serious limitation on both 
empirical insights and theory testing. However, the analysis in this dissertation is 
conducted in two stages, where process tracing is applied within-case, to act as 
a more demanding form of theoretical testing. The results are mixed. The ~E~S 
explanatory path finds itself in an ambiguous situation where it cannot be either 
fully confirmed or fully rejected, but offers a weak alternative to the significantly 
stronger ~EPB.  
The second limitation deals with the mismatch between the verbal form 
of the embeddedness model, and its set-theoretic translation. As I explained in 
Chapter 4, the way Wolfgang Merkel formulates the concept of embeddedness 
implies a symmetrical relation between conditions and outcome. When 
conditions affecting embeddedness are present and strong, embeddedness is 
also strong; conversely, when they are weak or absent, embeddedness is also 
weak. In other words, TF1 and TF2, as described above, should both be true. 
However, the set-theoretic approach operates on an assumption of asymmetry. 
Thus, when translating embeddedness using the rules of Boolean algebra, the 
negation of TF1 would not be ~E~S + PB -> ~D but (~E+ ~S)(P + B) -> ~D. But since 
one of the goals of this study was meaningful theory testing, symmetry was also 
assumed in the formula’s translation. Typically, the set-theoretic approach 
suggests there should be no evidence for TF1 and TF2 simultaneously. But this is 
not a limitation in substantial analytical terms. Rather, it shows that, while 
symmetry is attractive in theory, empirically it is rather unlikely. The implication, 
as discussed in Chapter 4, is that the embeddedness model can be refined to 
account for this issue.  
 
 
6.3. Avenues for further research 
 
 I began working on this dissertation during a period when concerns 
about the stability of CEE democracies were beginning to emerge, and 
completed it at a time when they have, unfortunately, materialized. 
Nevertheless, among increasing authoritarian tendencies and rule of law 
violations in the region, I argue that there are a few reasons for optimism, which 
provide valuable topics for future research. Two of these - democratic credibility 





6.3.1. New stakes: democratic credibility 
 
 In the post-accession period, much of the integration literature focused 
on compliance as the main tool for ensuring legal alignment between the EU and 
its newest member states. But in the absence of both strong incentives and 
strong sanctions to comply, CEE countries did not behave much differently from 
older member states in the long run, such that the early post-accession rates of 
compliance fell. This approach also proved ineffective in keeping deconsolidation 
in check in the absence of dedicated instruments. Thus, examining the 
relationship between the EU and CEE countries through the lens of compliance 
does not reveal much about the inner workings of promoting democratic 
stability. It is worthwhile, instead, to focus on democratic credibility as a central 
concept, in a way that also brings in candidate countries. Under rational models 
of rule adoption, the link between these actors is largely unidirectional and top-
down: the EU produces legislation at the institutional level, which member states 
and candidates must implement or be subjected to sanctions, through 
infringement mechanisms and conditionality respectively. With the logic of 
credibility I propose a more complex relationship that does away with the top-
down direction of rule adoption, and accounts for the impact of member states 
and candidates on the EU.  
This approach is based on the mutual interactions between the three 
actors, and highlights three dimensions of both democratic credibility and its 
crises. Firstly, the EU is a weakening democracy hub. While it has made its 
mission to become a democracy promoter outside its borders explicit, the loss of 
democratic quality among its member states no longer consists of isolated cases, 
despite many of them having been consolidated democracies for decades. This 
not only strikes at one of the EU’s core values, but affects its credibility and 
weakens its position as a democracy promoter in a geopolitical context where 
economically successful non-democratic alternatives are becoming attractive to 
countries in transition. Additionally, deconsolidation among member states and 
the difficulties candidate countries face in developing consolidated democracies 
feed back into, and accentuate, the EU’s credibility problem. This could be 
attenuated assuming that the EU takes on an active role as a democracy 
promoter among its member states and in relation to candidate countries, by 
supplementing domestic efforts in this respect with dedicated mechanisms of 
democratic consolidation. In the case of member states, the rational, sanction-
based mechanism should take a step back, since the EU cannot intervene directly 
at the domestic level to shape democracy.  In this case, alternative domestic-
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driven models, such as lesson drawing and social learning, may prove more 
effective. 
With candidates, the system of sanctions and incentives persists in the 
form of conditionality. However, previous enlargements have already shown 
that conditionality does not necessarily translate into consolidated democracy. 
Mechanisms creating external pressure should thus be supplemented with 
models of rule adoption based on appropriateness rather than consequences. 
Overall the democratic credibility approach describes a much wider analysis 
framework than compliance. The logic of democratic credibility does not actually 
exclude compliance entirely but counts it as a component to be examined in 
combination with others, rather than a stand-alone analytical instrument.  
 
6.3.2. The EU’s future as democracy watchdog 
 
On the 2nd of May 2018, the European Commission announced a new 
proposal meant ‘to strengthen the protection of the EU budget from financial 
risks linked to generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the Member 
States’ (The European Commission, 2018, May 2). According to the new 
regulation, the Union may suspend or restrict access to EU funding in cases 
where rule of law violations are observed, ‘proportionate to the nature, gravity 
and scope of the generalized deficiencies’. Sanctions apply to funds under shared 
management, where the beneficiary is a governmental institution, and excludes 
individual recipients on the grounds that they cannot be held responsible for 
government actions. The new proposal focuses on ensuring the independence of 
the judiciary among its member states, and on limiting instances of corruption 
and fraud related to the EU budget.  
Although it does not mention democracy explicitly, this proposal is a 
significant step in the direction of creating an effective form of post-accession 
conditionality. As I have shown in Chapters 2 and 5, the EU’s ability to develop 
formal sanctions is the decisive factor in whether or not it will have a meaningful 
domestic impact. This new approach replicates the external incentives model in 
a different context. Under conditionality, candidates implemented reforms 
because the benefit of membership was significantly higher than the cost of 
compliance. The Commission’s recent budgetary proposal will increase the cost 
of non-compliance in a concrete way, by targeting the rule of law, with wider 
implications for democracy. Of course, the proposal is in its early stages and has 
not been voted into effect yet, so it is difficult to predict what these implications 
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will be, or even if they will be effective long-term. Nevertheless, both the process 
and its consequences open up new research opportunities into the EU’s role as 
a democratic actor, and the course of democratic deconsolidation in Central and 








































All data used in the measurement of economic and social contexts is based on 
Eurostat. Data for bargaining power comes from Eurostat, Eurobarometer and 
Antonakakis, Badinger and Reuter (2014). Data on populist parties is taken from 
the studies by van Kessel (2015) and Havlik and Pinkova (2012), and the Parties 
and Elections in Europe database (Nordsieck, 2017). See Chapter 2 and 
Bibliography for full details.  
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DEBT: General government gross debt as percentage of GDP  
GINI: Gini coefficient 
POV: Population at risk of poverty and social exclusion 
UNEMPL: Unemployment as percentage of adult population 
SGDP: Country’s share in total EU GDP 
VOTE: Voting power in the Council 
SKEPT: Public Euroscepticism as percentage of population expressing lack of trust 
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Data on populism 
 










Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria 
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Latvia For Fatherland and Freedom (1993-2011) 




17/100 (2014)  
Lithuania Order and Justice Party 
 
 












Romania People’s Party - Dan Diaconescu 
 
47/471 (2012) 

















Table A.5. Final data for dichotomization 
 
CASE E2005 E2008 E S2005 S2008 S B2005 B2008 B P D 
BG1 - 53.85 - - 28.77 - - 5.84 - - - 
CZ1 43.5 45.23 -1.73 17.83 14.8 3.03 11.48 9.92 -1.56 0 0.38 
EE1 37.93 40.32 -2.39 22.67 19.4 3.27 8.13 4.68 -3.45 0 0.84 
HU1 43.03 50.28 -7.25 22.3 20.4 1.9 9.42 10.68 1.26 1 -0.37 
LV1 45.5 46.43 -0.93 30.83 26.47 4.36 9.5 9.53 0.03 1 1.41 
LT1 55.83 63.91 -8.08 28.53 22.87 5.66 6.63 5.93 -0.7 1 1.04 
PL1 58.87 59.37 -0.5 32.93 23.2 9.73 11.37 9.49 -1.88 1 0.59 
RO1 - 47.51 - - 28.57 - - 6.93 - - - 
SI1 40.16 40.98 -0.82 16.27 15.43 0.84 8.12 6.75 -1.37 1 0.02 
SK1 51.94 49.24 2.7 24.87 17.97 6.9 8.44 6.37 -2.07 1 -3.24 
CASE E2008 E2011 E S2008 S2011 S B2008 B2011 B P D 
BG2 53.85 56.71 -2.86 28.77 31.8 -3.03 5.84 6.69 0.85 1 -5.24 
CZ2 45.23 50.47 -5.24 14.8 15.73 -0.93 9.92 15.08 5.16 0 2.77 
EE2 40.32 42.51 -2.19 19.4 22.43 -3.03 4.68 7.74 3.06 0 -0.33 
HU2 50.28 60.89 -10.61 20.4 23.13 -2.73 10.68 12.53 1.85 1 -3.86 
LV2 46.43 55.81 -9.38 26.47 30.47 -4 9.53 11.2 1.67 1 0.17 
LT2 63.91 69.23 -5.32 22.87 27.17 -4.3 5.93 7.59 1.66 1 -0.27 
PL2 59.37 61.8 -2.43 23.2 22.67 0.53 9.49 12.18 2.69 1 1.09 
RO2 47.51 58.35 -10.84 28.57 27.2 1.37 6.93 9.03 2.1 0 1.03 
SI2 40.98 53.14 -12.16 15.43 17.1 -1.67 6.75 12.46 5.71 1 -0.01 
SK2 49.24 54.71 -5.47 17.97 20 -2.03 6.37 10.93 4.56 1 -2.77 
CASE E2011 E2014 E S2011 S2014 S B2011 B2014 B P D 
BG3 56.71 60.69 -3.98 31.8 28.97 2.83 6.69 8.88 2.19 1 -1.29 
CZ3 50.47 52 -1.53 15.73 15.33 0.4 15.08 14.68 -0.4 1 -0.52 
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EE3 42.51 44.88 -2.37 22.43 23 -0.57 7.74 5.5 -2.24 0 1.94 
HU3 60.89 58.83 2.06 23.13 22.7 0.43 12.53 12.15 -0.38 1 -0.12 
LV3 55.81 55.39 0.42 30.47 26.33 4.14 11.2 8.98 -2.22 1 0.23 
LT3 69.23 69.21 0.02 27.17 24.33 2.84 7.59 5.94 -1.65 1 2.49 
PL3 61.8 60.97 0.83 22.67 21.5 1.17 12.18 10.96 -1.22 1 -1.59 
RO3 58.35 61.6 -3.25 27.2 27.37 -0.17 9.03 8.92 -0.11 1 -1.47 
SI3 53.14 66.22 -13.08 17.1 18.37 -1.27 12.46 12.4 -0.06 0 -0.78 
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